In a crisis of trust, a screen comes down between politicians and voters. The screen feels opaque to both sides. Politicians feel that when they do a good job, they can’t get their message across. Voters feel that politics is increasingly unintelligible, like a spectacle of several sports mixed into one. Rackets, bats, and balls are flying about, but the point of the activity and the roles of the actors involved, seem opaque. The sense of opacity compounds other kinds of distrust: feeling unsafe, powerless, and betrayed.

This context means we have to reframe an old political question for our age. Instead of asking “How should politicians speak to voters to keep trust?”, we need to ask, “How should politicians speak to voters whose trust they have already lost?” I propose to give some practical tips in answer to this question. I don’t intend them as solutions, but rather reminders of what politicians already know but are inclined to forget.

Change is Real

This is hard for everybody. It is important to admit, both for citizens and politicians, that difficult historical circumstances generate fear and, consequently, the desire to deny reality – as though our historical circumstances could be wished away. This is why much technocratic politics sounds as though we are in 1998, not 2026.

This takes us to the first tip for politicians in our age: admit the crisis of trust without condescending to citizens. There is an evasive tendency to think that the crisis of trust boils down to three sources: misinformation, moral failure, and malign interference by Russia or our other enemies. The message this sends to citizens is that they have lost trust because they are irrational. But this view is itself an irrational form of misinformation.

Just as we don’t blame a swimmer for losing confidence in rough waters, we shouldn’t blame citizens for losing trust when social conditions make trust hard to sustain. Our democracies are actually coming out of the bay and heading into open water. Citizens are not imagining this. Social conditions such as profound inequality, the disinhibiting state of the Internet, the untethering of social bonds, and hyper-identity politics create low trust societies. The underlying cause of distrust is social reality, not false views about social reality. We need to speak to citizens without inappropriately normalising the conditions they face.

Consent of the Governed

This takes us to the second tip for politicians in our age: prioritise democratic consent over technocratic decision-making. Technocracy asks citizens to endorse the decisions of experts rather than grant their consent to individual decisions. In high-trust, low-polarisation societies, this can work well. In low-trust, high-polarisation societies, it leads to further erosion of confidence in politics and public institutions.

In practice, this means reversing the order of priority between policymaking and civic consent. Let’s take immigration as an example. The tendency has been to take in lots of people into one’s country and then try to persuade voters that the policy is based on sound economic and political considerations. This needs to be reversed. We have to start with what citizens feel on the doorstep. This doesn’t mean pandering to them. It means engaging and persuading them first and passing policy second. If we keep accumulating policies that do not have civic consent, we will lose our democracy.

Tactful Representatives

This takes us to the third tip for politicians in our age: be sensitive about how you tell citizens that you have decided against them. Deciding against them doesn’t mean that they are wrong. It just means that they lost. This has two benefits. First, you respect the values on the basis of which they opposed your policy. You give them credit for their commitment being more than just a whim or a desire. Second, you give them faith that in a democratic society, the conflict may be re-legislated, and they could win next time round. This pluralistic attitude, which admits that sound policy decisions contain some wrong, is powerful in diffusing resentment.

Don’t Be Your Enemy’s Enemy

On the fourth tip for politicians in our age: treat those who treat you as enemies as opponents, not enemies. When a politician who wants to use democracy to subvert democracy calls you an enemy of Britain, you should not call them an enemy of Britain in response. This is one of the paradoxes of democratic politics today. The instinct is to reciprocate in kind. But this hands your irresponsible opponent a victory. Their goal is to subvert democracy, and you joining the politics of enemies, which is the enemy of democracy, helps them do so. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, for instance, when the opponent threatens violence.

For the fifth tip for politicians in our age: treat voters as though they contain multitudes within them. Politics today makes politicians feel assailed. A natural response is to take a defensive rather than a proactive stance. Technocratic politicians feel the paralysing fear of passing power to authoritarian populists. This defensive stance undermines their ability to see voters they don’t agree with three-dimensionally.

Fortune Favours the Bold

This is about confidence – the confidence to see that there may be eight dimensions to a voter’s political position, with only two or three of them expressed at a particular time. A politician has to be able to engage with the other five or six and bring them out.

All these tips reflect the conviction that participatory democracy is a remarkable human achievement. At a historical moment when this achievement feels fragile, and dark clouds are circling, it feels natural to avoid rocking the boat. But passivity reproduces the very conditions that led to our crisis of trust in the first place. Practising politics, as Aristotle understood it, is something best done boldly, with all of our character, judgement, and powers of persuasion on board.

If successful in the upcoming Makerfield by-election and any subsequent leadership challenge, the Liberal Democrats would push Andy Burnham to instigate talks on a far more ambitious, new EU partnership.

At the heart of this proposal is a call for closer economic and political ties with Europe, alongside deeper security cooperation and a long-term pathway to re-building Britain’s relationship with the EU.

Could Davey’s New EU Partnership Right the Economic Wrongs of Brexit?

The Liberal Democrats argue that Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson’s ‘Brexit experiment’ has failed, citing estimates that in the midst of a cost-of-living crisis, the decision to leave the EU is costing the UK economy £90 billion per year. 

Under the prospective Growth and Defence Partnership, the UK would re-join the single market as a member of the European free trade agreement. Davey claims this could remove all trade barriers to Europe, boosting Britain’s economy and reversing years of economic damage in turn. 

He also advocates for the negotiation of a Customs Union between the UK and EU, which would prevent reciprocal tariffs on goods traded with member countries and ultimately lead to more efficient exchange: ‘Labour has failed to act. They refuse to cut red tape, pull down trade barriers and generate the growth we desperately need. Instead of change, they buried their heads in the sand’. 

Despite promises that Brexit would allow Britain to “take back control” of its laws and regulations, British businesses must still comply with many EU standards in order to access European markets. The difference is that the UK no longer has any meaningful influence over how those rules are made. Davey argues that a closer partnership would give Britain greater influence over decisions that directly affect its economy, allowing it to shape regional standards rather than simply adapting to them.

Immigration and the New EU Partnership

Daisy Cooper, Deputy Lead of the Liberal Democrats and Treasury Spokesperson, told PoliticsUK “It was the conservatives and Nigel Farage who plunged our immigration system into chaos by ripping up our returns agreement with EU countries”. She argues that breaking ties with the European Union has counterintuitively made it more difficult to control Britain’s borders in practice. 

The Party claims that the UK government currently lacks the agreements required to return individuals who arrive in the country illegally by crossing the channel in small boats. Cooper believes that a “new partnership with Europe would bring more control to Britain’s borders by giving us a returns agreement with every EU country, stopping dangerous small boat crossings by ending the pull factor created by the Conservatives and Farage.”

Defence: Britain’s Trump Card In Europe

The Liberal Democrats argue that Britain should use its strengths to secure a better deal with Europe. At a time of growing instability across the continent, given Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine and Trump’s initiative to ‘abandon European security’, the EU is seeking greater cooperation with the United Kingdom over defence. Meanwhile, Britain remains one of Europe’s leading military powers, with world-class armed forces and defence industries. 

According to the Lib Dems, the government should therefore leverage this strength in negotiations; a new EU defence partnership would allow Britain to work alongside ‘dependable allies’ to keep the region safe, while also creating jobs across the UK. 

Davey’s proposal has come at a time of heightened global conflict and diplomatic disjuncture. The Growth and Defence Partnership would send a clear and positive message to current EU members that the UK is committed to a future of cooperation with the European Union and reversing the isolationist policies of Brexit. 

This certainly aligns with the Liberal Democrats’ wider ambition to rejoin the European Union, but whether Labour is prepared to embrace the deal, is another matter altogether.

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Featured Image: Stephen Bingham/Flickr

In-text photo: House of Commons

But after 16 years in office, Orbán’s rule has come to an end. In a result few would have thought possible, Péter Magyar, a rising star in Hungarian politics, and his Tisza party defeated Fidesz in Hungary’s general election, toppling the most deeply entrenched political machine in the European Union. Orbán conceded defeat on election night, while Tisza secured 138 of the 199 seats in parliament: enough for a two-thirds supermajority.

The scale of the result makes it more than a routine change of government. For years, Hungary had been a symbol of democratic backsliding in Europe: a country where elections still took place, but where the playing field had been so thoroughly tilted in favour of the ruling party that removing it through the ballot box seemed increasingly remote. That is why this election is being read not simply as a defeat for Fidesz, but as the collapse of a political order that had come to look immovable.

A Test for the Global Right

Viktor Orbán’s influence stretches far beyond the borders of a small central European state. Steve Bannon, Donald Trump’s former adviser, once described him as “Trump before Trump”. He has been embraced by figures across the nationalist and populist right, from Matteo Salvini and Marine Le Pen to Trump himself. Just last week, US Vice-President J.D. Vance travelled to Budapest on the eve of the election, praising Orbán as an extraordinary leader and expressing confidence in his victory.

Before becoming the European Union’s longest-serving head of government and a self-styled defender of Christian conservative values, Orbán was a young anti-communist liberal. He first rose to prominence in the late 1980s after the fall of communism, presenting himself as a champion of democracy, national sovereignty, and Hungary’s western future.

Image: Former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban – EU2017EE / Annika Haas

Since then, both Orbán and his party have moved steadily to the right, with the decisive turning point coming after Fidesz won a constitutional supermajority in 2010. Drawing on the politics of fear and using the refugee crisis to sharpen his message, Orbán built a powerful “us-versus-them” narrative in which he cast himself as the guarantor of order and security in an increasingly hostile world.

Repeated landslide victories gave him the power to rewrite the constitution, reshape state institutions, and pass laws that tightened his grip on power while squeezing independent media, civil society, and democratic checks. Ever since, Orbán has used his dominance of the political system to present himself as the nation’s protector against an ever-changing list of enemies: migrants, Brussels, LGBTQ+ groups, George Soros and, more recently, Ukraine.

Why the Change?

One might ask: with a system so deeply rooted and influential, how was change even possible? Previous challengers were either outmanoeuvred or swiftly crushed by the government’s propaganda machine, which proved highly effective at discrediting opponents before they could gain real momentum.

For years, despite a lack of transparency and widespread allegations of corruption, much of the Hungarian public was kept onside by a potent mix of fear-based messaging and targeted economic support. The government coupled campaigns against perceived enemies with tangible benefits for key groups, including tax breaks for families and the restoration of the 13th-month pension.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Fidesz also managed to present itself as the guarantor of peace, portraying the opposition as reckless figures who would drag Hungary into a war that was not its own. This year, Orbán returned to that familiar populist script. He framed the election as a choice between peace and war, telling voters they could keep Hungary as an “island of peace and security” by re-electing him, or risk chaos by backing Magyar, whom he depicts as a proxy for Brussels and Kyiv.

But fear of the war began to fade as a dominant political force after 2024, and the government’s message has become harder to sustain against the realities of daily life. A combination of poor economic management and a succession of damaging scandals left Fidesz looking less invincible. Voters appeared more focused on domestic concerns, particularly the economy and public services. Growth has stalled and healthcare remains under strain; food prices have climbed to near-EU average levels, even though Hungarian wages remain among the lowest in the bloc.

Image: Prime Minister Peter Magyar via Flickr – Norbert Banhalmi 

That shift created an opening for Péter Magyar, a 45-year-old former Fidesz insider, to emerge as the first genuinely credible challenger to Orbán’s rule. A lawyer and former diplomat, he spent years inside Orbán’s circle and (through his marriage to former Justice Minister Judit Varga) was close to the heart of the system itself.

He burst into national politics in early 2024 after Varga was forced out over a scandal surrounding a presidential pardon in a child sexual abuse case, a moment that badly shook the government’s moral authority. Magyar seized that opening, breaking publicly with Fidesz and presenting himself as a disillusioned insider willing to say aloud what many Hungarians already suspected: that Orbán’s system had become defined by cronyism and the concentration of power.

He moved quickly to turn that outrage into a political vehicle, building his party, Tisza, as a broad anti-establishment force. Tisza’s strong second-place finish in the 2024 European elections transformed Magyar from a media phenomenon into a serious political contender. He has since built his appeal around promises to restore ties with the EU, tackle high-level corruption, and revive public services.

When the Unstoppable Force Met the Immovable Object

Before Sunday’s election, more than 100,000 people gathered in Budapest for a massive anti-government concert described as a “system-breaking” event. The crowd was overwhelmingly young, and the atmosphere felt less like a campaign event than a final release of collective energy.

Even though most polls had shown Tisza with a clear advantage, 16 years of unshakable power left many feeling that victory was “too good to be true”. Reuters had reported that Tisza was ahead in independent polling (in some cases by as much as 13 points) but Hungary’s electoral system still favoured Fidesz, meaning a lead in vote share was never guaranteed to translate into power.

Image: Secretary Rubio Holds Joint Press Availability with Hungarian Prime Minister – State Department / Freddie Everett

Once the polls opened, participation reached unprecedented levels. By the afternoon, turnout had already surpassed the previous overall record, eventually peaking at a record 80%. As the country waited, Tisza’s gathering by the Danube drew a huge crowd. When the first results showed a clear lead for Magyar, the mood turned from nervous hope to celebration. By the end of the night, Budapest had become what Reuters described as a “party zone”.

The campaign also exposed a clear social and generational divide. Among older voters, particularly those over 65, Fidesz retained much of its strength. However, among younger and more educated Hungarians, the picture was sharply different. Reuters reported that Fidesz won only 8% support among voters aged 18 to 29, underlining how decisively youth turnout drove Tisza’s victory.

Orbán No Longer: What Is Next for Hungary?

Four consecutive parliamentary supermajorities gave Fidesz the freedom to entrench itself across almost every part of Hungarian public life: the media, the judiciary, state institutions, and universities. That is what made Viktor Orbán’s defeat so significant, but it is also why defeating him is not the same thing as dismantling the system he leaves behind.

For years, it was assumed that even if a challenger beat Orbán, they would struggle to govern without a two-thirds majority to undo the deeper legal architecture of the Orbán era. What even the boldest pollsters hesitated to predict was that this is exactly what Tisza secured: a parliamentary supermajority of its own.

With this mandate, the party now has the strength to restore democratic checks, strengthen judicial independence, and join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to unlock billions in frozen EU funds.

But with great power comes great responsibility. A supermajority removes excuses. Tisza can no longer argue that its ambitions are blocked by parliamentary arithmetic. If it fails to deliver visible democratic renewal, it will be much harder to blame the structure it inherited. The task will not be straightforward, as Orbán-era loyalists remain embedded throughout the state. Orbán may be gone, but the system he built is not.

Featured Image via European Union

The overarching convention which determines legality of armed attack between states is Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits states from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. The two widely accepted exceptions are:

• UN Security Council authorisation under Chapter VII
• Self-defence under Article 51 if an armed attack occurs

For self-defence to be lawful, most scholars say it must satisfy:

• Armed attack (or at least an imminent one)
• Necessity, meaning force is required to stop the threat
• Proportionality, meaning the response adequately reflects what is needed to repel the attack.

The Standard of Imminence

The Israeli president, Isaac Herzog, told BBC Radio 4’s Today programme the fact that Iran was “planning a bomb” was enough to justify the attacks. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter there is a right to self-defence in response to an armed attack. A broader interpretation of international law has been that a state has a right to use force in response to an “imminent threat.” Thus, “imminence” is the key here.

Traditionally, international law has drawn on the 19th century Caroline formulation, which requires a threat to be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.” Under this standard, the bar for anticipatory self-defence is extremely high.

Does Iran Pose a Threat?

Currently, Iran harbours zero nuclear weapons. This is not simply a baseless claim: Iran is bound by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Essentially, the treaty is a bilateral agreement whereby signatory states “agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”

Image: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at an officers’ graduation ceremony – Kobi Gideon / GPO

Israel, since its inception in 1948, has refused to sign. Further, Iran routinely submits to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a UN-related international organisation based in Vienna that monitors nuclear programmes to ensure nuclear materials are not diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons. Israel, on the other hand, refuses to submit.

While Iran has expanded uranium enrichment in recent years, enrichment alone does not constitute a nuclear weapon. The determinable, crucial step (weaponisation) remains difficult to verify. Thus, it can be argued that the existence of a potential future capability does not satisfy the Caroline standard of an imminent armed attack.

However, supporters of the strikes have argued that the speed with which highly enriched uranium can potentially be converted into a weapon compresses the traditional understanding of imminence. In this light, the test for imminence is most salient. Without proper evidence of a potential nuclear weapon to be sure-fire ready for deployment as opposed to mere preparation, the notion that the attacks can be justified on the grounds of imminence seems surely thin.

The Necessity Component

There exists a variety of avenues in which the two nations could have attempted before violent means. For example, diplomacy and nuclear agreements: for instance, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or sanctions and monitoring regimes (as mentioned, Iran already submits to this). This opens discussions regarding the “necessity” component of assessing whether attacks were truly legal. The requirements of necessity demand that force be used only when no reasonable peaceful alternatives remain or were already exhausted to no avail.

Proportionality: Were the Strikes Limited?

To assess the proportionality element, the targets and casualties of this operation are particularly salient. As mentioned, even if a threat were considered imminent, international law requires that the response be proportionate. Strikes must be limited to what is necessary to neutralise the threat rather than punish or deter a rival state more broadly.

Image: President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speak in the Diplomatic Reception Room before a dinner – The White House / Daniel Torok

Reports indicate the strikes have targeted a wide range of military, political and economic infrastructure, not just nuclear facilities. The operation launched by US-Israeli forces was far more extensive than the limited intervention last year. Early strikes reportedly targeted senior Iranian leadership and security infrastructure: senior Iranian officials were killed, including military leadership and the country’s Supreme Leader (Ayatollah) during the opening strikes. Iranian naval vessels and minelayers were destroyed near the Strait of Hormuz, as well as drone factories and missile-related infrastructure have also been targeted. These are all types of targets typically cited by the US and Israel as legitimate military objectives.

Reports also indicate substantial civilian harm: more than 1,200 people have been killed since the campaign began, while humanitarian organisations report damage to thousands of residential buildings and dozens of healthcare facilities. Particularly controversial was a strike on a girls’ school that reportedly killed over a hundred civilians. President Trump denies his involvement in the attack, instead claiming it was Iran’s own missile which hit the school.

International Humanitarian Law and the Geneva Conventions

Even if the strikes were considered lawful under the right of self-defence, they must still comply with the rules governing the conduct of hostilities under international humanitarian law. These rules are codified in the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols.

Two principles are particularly relevant:

1. Distinction: This requires parties to a conflict to differentiate between military objectives and civilian objects. Attacks may only be directed at legitimate military targets, such as military facilities, weapons depots, or command structures. Civilian infrastructure, including homes, schools and hospitals, cannot be intentionally targeted.
2. Proportionality: Closely related is the principle of proportionality. Even when a target is a legitimate military objective, an attack may be unlawful if the expected civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

If such sites were struck intentionally, they would almost certainly constitute violations of international humanitarian law. If they were damaged incidentally while attacking nearby military targets, the legality would depend on whether the expected civilian harm was considered excessive at the time of the attack.

Conclusion

Ultimately, assessing proportionality is notoriously difficult in real time and often depends on information available only to military planners. Nevertheless, the scale of civilian harm reported in the strikes is likely to intensify scrutiny from international lawyers and human rights organisations.

The legality of the US and Israeli strikes on Iran remains deeply contested under international law. While both states have framed their actions as necessary in the unwavering pursuit of self-protection and long-term peace, the legal threshold for anticipatory self-defence is exceptionally high. The traditional standard of imminence requires a threat that is immediate and unavoidable, and the available public evidence that Iran was on the verge of deploying a nuclear weapon appears limited.

Image: President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speak privately in the Vermeil Room before a dinner – The White House / Daniel Torok

Evidently, questions regarding necessity appear paramount. Diplomatic mechanisms, inspection regimes and international agreements designed to constrain Iran’s nuclear programme have existed for years, raising doubts over whether the use of force was truly the only viable option available.

Even if the strikes were considered legally justified under the right of self-defence, their conduct must still comply with international humanitarian law. Reports of extensive civilian casualties and damage to residential areas, hospitals and schools place the proportionality of the operation under serious scrutiny. In practice, the legality of such actions is rarely determined in the immediate aftermath of conflict; rather, it is formulated through long-term efforts and debates through international institutions and historical judgement.

For now, the strikes occupy a legally ambiguous space: both in the realm of being highly contested by legal scholars and world leaders alike, but also torn between the tension which exists within international law over how states respond to emerging security threats in an increasingly unstable terrain.

Featured Image via The White House / Daniel Torok

That came as a surprise to anyone who had been following the recent AI news emerging from China. Just weeks earlier, a Stanford University report had found that Chinese AI models had “caught up or even pulled ahead” of their American competition. In his New Year’s Address, Xi Jinping boasted about what he called a “transformative 2025 for China’s AI,” describing “breakthrough developments” on the subject. So, who is ahead of who here?

“I know it doesn’t fit into headlines, but this is so much more nuanced than just a simple ‘who’s ahead’,” says Thomas Derksen, a Shanghai-based entrepreneur, influencer and consultant who has covered the Chinese tech world for years. “It really depends on what your metrics are whether you’re looking at open or closed source, for instance.”

Open vs Closed AI Models: Where the US and China Lead

Closed-source AI models are engineered to perform a wide variety of tasks for their users, but their algorithms remain closed off and cannot be altered. “With these models, the Americans are for sure still leading the way with OpenAI, Anthropic and Google,” says Grace Shao, founder and analyst of industry newsletter AI Proem on Substack.

Image: Open AI Logo – Flickr via Trong Khiem Nguyen

“There are specific use cases where the Chinese AIs make some waves, such as in having very advanced video generation abilities,” Shao says, “but the pioneering of these general-purpose models is still being done by the American labs.”

Open-source AI models, however, are a much different story. With their code usually available publicly, developers can alter the workings of the models for their own use cases, particularly relevant when companies want to use the models. “In the end, nobody cares if you or I use the American closed source models to write a poem or get a cooking recipe,” Thomas Derksen says. “What matters is what open-source businesses are making money with- and this is where the Chinese are dominating.”

Why Businesses Are Choosing Chinese AI Models

Chinese AI models have indeed increasingly been favoured in the business world, for instance by global players like Pinterest and Airbnb, who are now using Deepseek open-source models and Alibaba’s Qwen AI respectively. Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky told the BBC the Chinese-made models were simply “good, fast, and cheap.” 

“Are these Chinese models the absolute frontier technology? Probably not yet,” Grace Shao says. “But if a company from a pure business perspective wants a top-notch model in terms of performance but is also cost-conscious, they may well choose a Chinese model.” 

Image: Chinese AI Deepseek – Flickr via Trong Khiem Nguyen

“A lot of companies do just favour Chinese models because they’re so cheap,” Derksen agrees. “Deepseek’s models are roughly on the level of Chat-GPT 5 now,” he says, “but at a fraction of the cost. Especially in markets like Africa or Southeast Asia, many firms just can’t afford the pricey American models, and opt for the Chinese ones.” 

For Derksen, this is a classic Chinese strategy. “Often when Chinese companies see that they might not quite be able to keep up in terms of quality, they bring the cost down,” he says. “And with the conditions on the ground in China, this is easy.”

Powering cheap AI, one windmill at a time

On a cold February morning in the dimly lit train station of Ulanqab, an industrial city in Inner Mongolia province in China’s far north, migrant worker Li vents his frustrations. “They have us building windmills all day out on that bloody steppe,” he grunts. “Sometimes the wind blows so cold I could freeze into an ice block.” Smirking, he points to the AI translation app flickering across his phonescreen. “The big bosses there need our windmills, though.” 

To build their cheap AI models, companies like Deepseek rely on a crucial factor- China’s affordable, seemingly infinite electricity production. “Over the last decade, we have seen a huge rise in Chinese renewable energy solutions,” says Grace Shao. Once largely dependent on coal, the value of China’s green energy sector has doubled between 2022 and 2025, with massive investment into wind and solar power, often in the country’s north. China now has some of the cheapest electricity on the planet.

Image: Power lines in rural Inner Mongolia, China – Julius Buhl

And this cheap, scalable electricity allows Chinese AI-makers to run massive, energy-intensive AI training centers at a lower cost than many Western competitors. Inner Mongolia has become one of the main hubs for this, as the cold steppes are now crowded with windmills that power several state-of-the-art data centers. “The Chinese now have the capacity here, and can thus push the price down,” Shao says.

Meanwhile, the competition in America is struggling in this area. “The US grid is old, and the electricity demand has not changed in decades,” Shao says. “Expanding it now to power the AI datacenters is expensive, and there is only slow progress on unlocking new renewable power sources. This is a kind of bottleneck for the US.” And electricity is not the only area in which China seems to have a leg up these days.

China’s AI Talent Boom and the “Reverse Brain Drain”

For long, observers argued that China was struggling to pioneer new technologies because much of its prime talent headed for Silicon Valley when given the chance. “But that’s the past,” Grace Shao says.

AI-trailblazer Tencent recently hired Vinces Yao, a top researcher who worked on OpenAI’s first AI agents. Several other high-profile engineers who had previously worked in the development of key AI models in the US have recently moved across the Pacific, a trend some have dubbed a “reverse brain drain.”

“Talent is no longer a bottleneck for Chinese AI,” Grace Shao says. “Some people are homegrown, some are engineers returning from the Bay Area- either way, the calibre is very high.”

According to Derksen, this is very much part of Beijing’s plan. “If Xi Jinping declares something a priority as he has done with attracting AI talent, that impacts everyone in China; every university, every province, every city will do their best to fulfil the order,” he says. “The scientists are feeling this, they get resources and support everywhere they go in China, so it’s no surprise that a lot are heading there.”

And then, the cost factor strikes again. “I can essentially get two engineers for the price of one in China,” Thomas Derksen says. “Living costs and salaries are just much lower than in the US. There is an abundance of talent, and the Chinese working culture is still ruthless. They can just get more done in a shorter time.”

As businesses seem to favour Chinese AI powered by cheap electricity and abundant talent, it may seem like Beijing is winning this race easily. But there is one constraint China just can’t seem to shake off.

AI Chips: China’s Biggest Weakness

AI developers rely on specially designed computer microchips to train their AI models. They are incredibly hard to manufacture, and having an outdated chip can cost developers significantly more and delay model development for years. “American NVIDIA and Taiwanese TSMC are still the undisputed number one when it comes to making these chips,” Thomas Derksen says, “and they’re not letting the Chinese access them freely. And that is their biggest problem.” 

Over the past few years, Washington has tightened export restrictions on advanced chips and chipmaking equipment, limiting China’s access to the crucial hardware. In December, Deepseek was accused of illegally training its models on NVIDIA’s Blackwell Chips despite the import ban, an accusation the company denies. “The lack of access to state-of-the-art chips remains the biggest AI bottleneck for China,” Grace Shao says. “It’s the only area where they can’t bring the cost down, at least for now.”

Image: The crucially important AI Chips – Flickr via Tim Reckman

To combat this, China has in return long been pouring billions into manufacturing chips domestically, with the government tapping tech giants Huawei and Alibaba to create alternatives. 

And there have been some successes. In September, Chinese State Media reported that a new chip manufactured domestically by Alibaba can match the performance of Nvidia’s semiconductors while using less energy. 

But aside from these success announcements, the key player remain vague as to how much they have actually progressed.  “It’s a black box, they really don’t want people to know what the status is,” Thomas Derksen says. “But it’s clear Alibaba and Huawei are working like crazy to catch up.” But until they can, Lin Junyuan’s 20% chance statement seems to still have some backing.

Anyone in third place?

While China and the US are racing each other for AI dominance, the rest of the world has been busy too. India, for instance, has been pioneering its own sovereign models, most notably BharatGPT, heavily supported by the government. With a massive domestic market and an abundance of tech talent, Prime Minister Modi has repeatedly stressed his ambition for his country to become the world’s number three when it comes to AI.

Image: Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the AI Impact Summit he hosted in February (Narendra Modi Picture Gallery)

In Europe, Mistral AI has made headlines, with the French startup winning sizeable defense contracts in both Germany and France, as the EU pushes for greater AI independence. 

In China’s backyard, the South Korean government has invested heavily in making its own “fully native” model, aiming to create an AI entirely independent from foreign models.

“The more important AI becomes and the more America and China advance, the more a lot of leaders are realising that they can’t be too dependent on either country,” Shao says. “The fear of AI-exploitation, of being a market while the money is made elsewhere is a real concern.”

But compared to China and the US, the industry seems in its infancy across the board. Bloomberg recently labelled India the “AI world’s most valuable unpaid intern” as the country is stellar at using AI models but still very much struggles at making them. In South Korea, three of the five companies shortlisted to make its “fully native” AI were found to still be using some code from foreign models, with executives saying that a fully decoupled model was “unrealistic.” 

Europe seems even worse off: throughout the AI race, the United States have produced 40 foundation models, while China has developed 15. All of Europe combined has created just three. “And even European prestige projects like Mistral are far away from their American or Chinese counterparts,” Grace Shao says. 

Do Countries Really Need Sovereign AI Models?

But does everyone really need to be building their own AI? “So many resources need to be in place locally to build an AI ecosystem from the bottom up,” Grace Shao says. “Trying to catch up to China or the US will take a long, long time for many countries, and it doesn’t make sense for most.” Instead, she says the conversation should not be framed as a race, but as an opportunity where countries can leverage their own strengths to build parts of their own tech stack, while still leaning on infrastructure led by the two superpowers.

Singapore has for example been courting both American and Chinese labs and attracting talent from both countries, who have then been building data centers in the small city state. Malaysia and Thailand are following a similar strategy. In South Korea, the government has invested $1.2 billion to enhance AI literacy in education after the “native model” disaster, aiming to become a talent hub for the technology. 

In the end, Grace Shao says, many countries can find niches in this. “Outside of Asia, industry-heavy countries like Germany can for instance focus on AI-powered robotics or something like that, while countries in the gulf with an abundance of energy can focus more on utilizing that for AI” she says. “Each economy has its own advantages here.” 

Thomas Derksen believes there also needs to be a change of mentality as well, particularly in Europe. “We need to acknowledge the fact that this technology has come to stay,” he says. “It’s a revolution and we’re in the middle of it. So we might as well get on with it and try to adapt.”

In the end, who’s winning this revolution right now depends on what winning means. The US still leads at the mere performance level. China is racing ahead on cost and scale, while the Americans maintain their biggest advantage, the chips. Meanwhile, for much of the world, the real question may not be who comes first- but where they can get a foot in the door.

Featured Image via The White House / Daniel Torok

Supported by allies China, Iran, North Korea, and Belarus, Russia has maintained their army primarily through foreign funding: producing arms, armoured vehicles, and other supplies through these means. The result of this has been a major strain placed upon both the Ukrainian army and the nation’s civilian population: with Ukraine only managing to meet 60 percent of its national electricity demand by January 2026, resulting in nationwide blackouts (particularly in Kyiv).

While this has certainly served to lower national morale within the former Soviet republic, Russia’s façade of strength and military domination appears to be crumbling.

Key Moments

The most divisive conflict throughout the entire campaign remains the war’s opening clash at Antonov Airport: lasting from the first day of the operation to 25 February 2022. As Russian forces aimed to utilise Blitzkrieg tactics to capture the airport (a major strategic landmark), the army faced major complications in landing their own heavy transport aircraft, as a result of Ukraine’s 4th National Guard Regiment’s efforts to surround the Russian forces and damage the runways. While Russia eventually succeeded, holding the base until April the same year, the damage sustained by the runways prevented a major aerial advantage for the Russian forces, destroying chances of successful routes into the capital.

28 February 2022, four days after President Putin’s announcement of a Russian invasion, the first rocket attacks were launched in Ukraine’s second largest city, Kharkiv (located in the northeastern part of the country), killing at least nine civilians and wounding over forty. This first spark of the conflict marked a distinct precedent for the “operation”, and was shortly followed by an intensified military effort by Russian forces on the capital, Kyiv.

Image: President Zelenskyy delivering an Easter address amid the conflict with Russia – President of Ukraine

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant Crisis has also remained a significant strategic threat since early on in the conflict, with a fire breaking out on 3 March as a result of a persistent shelling campaign by Russian forces. While all six of the plant’s reactors remain in a state of “cold shutdown” for the safety of both the staff and the local civilian population, the site remains a stronghold for occupying Russian units, and has overseen constant bombardment (primarily in the form of drone attacks and shelling) from both parties.

Not only has the Zaporizhzhia occupation caused both logistical and strategic issues for the Ukrainian army, but also legal concerns, with the proximity of the fighting to the plant raising questions of whether the operation classifies as nuclear terrorism.

A combination of both smaller skirmishes and major operations have been the make-up of the war from this point onwards- with significant sieges (such as Mariupol) granting the Russian army grand advantages in terms of access to Crimea and the Donbas in the form of land bridges. On the contrary, counter-offensives remained the focal point of Ukrainian combat until 2023, with the Kharkiv Lightning Strike in September liberating over 6,000 kilometers of occupied territory in a matter of days (including major cities Izium and Kupiansk).

In the later months of 2022, Russia declared the annexation of four Ukrainian regions (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia), however this was widely internationally rejected.

2023 saw an overarching stalemate, a significant contrast to the ever-changing nature of the conflict in 2022. While more major campaigns (such as the Battle of Bakhmut, lasting from August 2022 to May 2023) resulted in severe human losses for the Russian army, events like the Nova Kakhovka Dam Collapse in the summer of 2023 caused almost equally severe destruction in Ukraine.

Following their successful campaigns to drive Ukrainian forces out of Kursk in 2024, the Russian army appears to have significantly slowed down in their advancement into Ukrainian territory: advancing only 15-70 meters a day in their most successful offences. Making progress at a slower rate than the allies in the Battle of the Somme, it is clear to see that the insurgent force is struggling in achieving their strategic goals. Managing to seize just shy of 12 per cent of the nation, and remaining in control of 20% of it, it is easy to understand why after four years of total war Moscow is beginning to lose its morale.

War Crimes

With the International Criminal Court opening emergency investigations into the legality of the invasion as early 2 March 2022, and the International Court of Justice following exactly two weeks later by questioning the lack of evidence of the Kremlin’s justification for the war, there has been a severe concern regarding the criminal nature of the conflict from the very beginning.

Image: President Zelenskyy addresses the Israeli Knesset amid the conflict with Russia – President of Ukraine

A major turning point in this regard was the tragic discovery of mass graves in several Ukrainian towns (most notably Bucha, Irpin, Izyum, Lyman, Kherson, and Mariupol) as early as April 2022. Not only are these graves suggestive of massacres having taken place nationwide, but also a violation of both international humanitarian law and the Geneva conventions’ Additional Protocol I.

Evidence of “filtration camps” has also been presented, where Ukrainian civilians and soldiers are interrogated illegal methods (such as sexual violence, abduction, forced relocation, starvation, and torture). Over 91 per cent of civilian detainees held by the Russian Federation have described themselves as being treated in this way. The desired outcome of these method appears to be in order to remove those believed to pose a threat to Russian control. 

Similar experiences are also reported by both Russian and Ukrainian prisoners of war, with the most significant controversy regarding prisoner of war camp housing remaining the death of an estimated figure of 50 Ukrainian prisoners taken during their defence of Mariupol. While Russian forces have claimed that this tragedy was the result of a Ukrainian missile strike, many observers have suggested that the disaster was most likely caused by Russian authorities.

As of 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Putin.

NATO reaction

Since 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, NATO has remained in full support of both Ukraine’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty, “condemn(ing) Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms.”

Image: President Zelenskyy and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte meet at the NATO Washington Summit – The President of Ukraine

In response to this policy, allies of the Organisation have consistently provided the nation with military assistance, delivering on billions of Euros worth of supplies, training, and weapons.

Not only has NATO assisted in funding Ukrainian efforts, but the European Union has remained the country’s largest provider of financial and humanitarian support. Offering over €100 billion of aid, as well as €70 billion of military support, and €17 billion in support for refugees.

Global Impact

Soaring food prices across Europe, triggering energy shocks and power outages, accelerating inflation, and forcing major shifts in European energy dependency, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has placed the continent and its alliances under significant economic strain. As well as this, allies of Ukraine have enacted widespread sanctions upon Russian companies, particularly energy providers, which in turn has placed major strain on the continent (as well as straining Russia’s own war economy).

Aside from the financial impact of the conflict, over 3.7 million people continue to be displaced across Ukraine. While 4.4 million people have returned from their displacement since 2022, the intensifying nature of campaigns in winter months (particularly those closer to the Eastern border) have disrupted efforts.

Recent Developments

On 19 November 2025, a 28-point peace plan was revealed, drafted in peace talks between the United States and Russia. January 2026 saw the three nations (Ukraine, Russia, and the United States) hold trilateral peace talks for the first time since 2022, further signifying a diplomatic effort between all three nations to end the war.

Image: Prime Minister Keir Starmer meets Ukraine President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Alexander Stubb, President of Finland, Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission ahead of a meeting with US President Donald Trump – No 10 Downing Street / Simon Dawson

However, while these peace talks have occurred between the nations’ respective correspondents in both Geneva and Abu Dhabi, ‘total war’ remains ongoing in Ukraine, raising concerns regarding the progress made in these meetings.

Where we stand now

As of February 2026, data is beginning to suggest that Russia is hardly maintaining an upper hand, with a struggling army and a war economy that is grinding to a halt. The early failings of Blitzkrieg tactics have left Russia fighting a war of attrition which it is unable to maintain, and this can be seen in the slowing of Russian advancement alone. Gaining less than 1.5 per cent of further Ukrainian territory since the start of 2024, the lack of an adequate war economy is clearly the factor which is slowing progress.

Not only has Russia failed to generate any breakthroughs in the Ukrainian front line within any of its last two years of offensives, but a major decline in popular support within Russia itself can be blamed at least in part for the fatigue the country appears to be facing (with a majority of 55 per cent of Russians believing that at least one person in their social circle opposes the war).

While terms of national security for Ukraine are beginning to be finalised, territorial distribution remains the heart of debate between the two parties, remaining unsolved despite the numerous meetings held to date. Despite two rounds of trilateral talks between American, Ukrainian, and Russian representatives, there still is yet to appear a resolution to this ongoing debate.

Until territorial gains are agreed, it is likely that a peace deal will remain unsigned, leaving the Russian invasion of Ukraine a distinct lack of a timeline for its resolution, and keeping both nations under a state of duress for the foreseeable future.

Featured Image via President of Ukraine

The Anatomy of a Collapse: The 2024 Revolution

The current political landscape is the direct result of the Gen Z Uprising in mid-2024. What began as a student-led protest against a discriminatory civil service quota system transformed into a massive, national movement against the 15-year rule of Sheikh Hasina. The state’s attempts to suppress the dissent led to a staggering loss of life; the United Nations has estimated that roughly 1,400 people were killed during the crackdown.

The subsequent public fury forced Hasina to flee by helicopter to India on August 5, 2024. In the aftermath, the country turned to Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus to lead an interim government. His mandate has been focused on “cleaning the house”, overhauling the police, the judiciary, and the election commission, before returning the country to civilian rule.

A Nation Judging Its Past

The transitional period has been defined by a series of legal reckonings aimed at the former ruling elite. Most notably, a Bangladeshi court has sentenced Sheikh Hasina to death in absentia for crimes against humanity committed during the 2024 crackdown. Additionally, she has been handed a combined 21-year prison sentence across separate corruption cases.

Image: Former Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon meets with Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina at the COP26 Women’s Climate Leadership Event – Scottish Government

The legal fallout has also reached the United Kingdom. Tulip Siddiq, a prominent British Labour MP and niece of the deposed leader, was recently sentenced to a two-year prison term by a Dhaka court. The charges involve allegations of corruption and influence-peddling related to government land allocations. This judgment, delivered in her absence, is not recognised by the UK government. Siddiq has dismissed the entire proceeding as a politically motivated and contrived attempt to target her family.

The Return of the BNP and the End of an Era

This election marks a major transition for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). On December 25, 2025, Tarique Rahman, the son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, returned to Dhaka after 17 years in exile in London. His return was a massive symbolic event for the party, occurring just days before his mother, Khaleda Zia, passed away at the age of 80 on December 30, 2025.

Image: Former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia meets Former Foreign Henry Bellingham – FCDO

Rahman is now the frontrunner to be the next Prime Minister. He has pledged a platform of “Democratic Renewal,” which includes:

• Restoring the independence of the judiciary.
• Revitalising the nation’s ailing economy.
• Modernising state infrastructure to prevent future authoritarianism.

Opposing him is a resurgent 11-party alliance led by Jamaat-e-Islami, the country’s largest Islamist party. Once banned under the Hasina regime, the group has regained significant political ground. While they appeal to a conservative base in a nation that is 90% Muslim, their rise has sparked deep-seated fears among women and religious minorities regarding the potential erosion of secular protections.

The July Charter: A Referendum for Reform

Beyond selecting local representatives, citizens are casting a second ballot in a national referendum. This vote centers on the “July Charter,” a blueprint for sweeping constitutional changes intended to serve as “guardrails” against future autocracy. The proposed reforms include:

1. Bicameralism: Moving from a single-chamber parliament to a two-house system by adding an Upper House of 100 seats to the Jatiya Sangsad.
2. Term Limits: Restricting any individual from serving as Prime Minister for more than 10 years (two five-year terms).
3. Caretaker System: Reinstating an independent interim body to manage all future elections, ensuring neutrality

Economic and Social Headwinds

The winner of this election will inherit a nation in economic distress. Bangladesh’s vital garment export industry, a cornerstone of the economy, saw exports drop by 2.6% in the latter half of 2025 due to persistent unrest. Furthermore, inflation remains a major burden for the working class, sitting at 8.58% as of January 2026.

Global eyes are fixed on Dhaka, with roughly 500 international observers from the European Union and the Commonwealth monitoring the process. As mounted police patrol the polling stations with banners proclaiming a safe voting environment, the atmosphere is a mix of festive hope and cautious anxiety. For millions of young voters who have never seen a truly transparent election, today is the ultimate test of whether the “Gen Z Uprising” can be successfully codified into a stable, lasting democracy.

Featured Image via The World Bank / Faruk Pinjo

“Salute!” Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi smiles across the table to her Italian counterpart, Giorgia Meloni. A few minutes later, she leads her aides, who appear much more hesitant than their boss, in singing “Happy Birthday” for the Italian PM (in Italian, of course). Three days earlier, Takaichi surprised South Korean leader Lee Jae-myung by handing him drumsticks after a summit; the two then jammed to viral K-pop hits. When Donald Trump visited in October, she joined him on stage while he addressed US troops, smiling and waving to the soldiers.

Japan’s first female prime minister has charmed her way onto the world stage, and at home, things are going similarly well. The 64-year-old enjoys a 70% approval rating, as “Sana-mania” grips the country. Takaichi has conquered social media with her sense for viral moments and unique fashion choices, which particularly excite younger voters. According to current polls, she is set to win a two-thirds majority in the lower house on Sunday, giving her LDP party full control of Japan’s legislature. But beneath the excitement, Takaichi faces the job of governing a Japan in turmoil, with crises that charisma alone won’t solve.

A Breath of Fresh Air in a Country in Decline

“Takaichi is atypical of a Japanese politician, not just because she’s a woman but also because of her background,” says Hitoshi Suzuki, Senior Research Fellow at the Tokyo-based Institute of Geoeconomics. Japan’s politics remain largely male-dominated and upper-class, with most Prime Ministers stemming from the same few influential families. Takaichi, meanwhile, grew up middle-class, something she often emphasises when talking about affordability issues, a topic she has had to discuss a lot.

Japan is in the middle of an affordability crisis. Real wages have fallen constantly since 2022 amidst high inflation, and a price spike in 2025 made matters even worse. Japan also has the highest debt burden of any developed economy, and the Yen is losing value as well. “We haven’t had any sufficient growth in Japan since the boom in the 1990s,” Hitoshi Suzuki says. “In the 2000s, people were talking about the ‘lost decade’. Now, we have to face the fact that we’ve lost three decades.”

Image: Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi gives a speech – Trong Khiem Nguyen / Flickr

And that is where Takaichi comes in. “She’s offering a vision of hope for a demoralised nation,” says Jeff Kingston, Professor of Asian Studies at Temple University in Tokyo. “Japan is eager to overcome this era of stagnation and decline, and her upbeat, positive, yet down-to-earth messaging appeals to voters.” Takaichi has indeed tried kickstarting the economy in her relatively short tenure, putting in place a budget in December that included slashing petrol prices and issuing stimulus cheques.

“But except for the messaging, realistically, everyone knows that Takaichi can’t just magically bring about an economic boom,” Hitoshi Suzuki says. “All developed economies are struggling to get any economic growth right now, and despite some prestige projects in the semiconductor industry, we in Japan won’t be an exception.”

The Rise of the Far-Right

Along with the economic downturn, a new force has emerged in Japanese politics. Propagating a “Japan-first” ideology that takes inspiration from Donald Trump, the Sanseito party has been gaining traction in recent years. The party has two core messages: they demand a tougher stance on immigration and a tougher stance on China.

Image: Prime Minister Keir Starmer meets Japanese PM Sanae Takaichi – No 10 Downing Street / Simon Dawson

After having held only one seat in the powerful lower house of parliament for years, Sanseito won a record 26 seats at the last election in July. The success commanded global media attention, in part because Japan had never had a notable far-right force in parliament since the Second World War. “We always thought a resurgence of the far right wouldn’t be possible in Japan,” Hitoshi Suzuki remembers. “It was alarming to a lot of regular Japanese people.”

Most of Sanseito’s support had come from core LDP voters who thought the party had become too liberal under Sanae Takaichi’s predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba. After Ishiba resigned following a string of electoral setbacks, the LDP nominated the more conservative Takaichi in October. Within four months of her government, Sanseito has moved from running an anti-government campaign to actively campaigning for Takaichi to remain Prime Minister. The new PM has largely hijacked their agenda.

Anti-China Rhetoric: Popular but Risky

Nowhere is that clearer than in foreign policy. Takaichi has adopted a hawkish approach to China, angering Beijing by saying that Japan could support Taiwan militarily if China were to invade it. The Chinese responded angrily, cancelling flights, issuing travel warnings, and imposing export restrictions.

Image: President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi watch the World Series before a bilateral meeting – The White House / Daniel Torok

The move sent Takaichi’s approval ratings in Japan skyrocketing. “People like her standing up to Beijing’s browbeating,” Jeff Kingston says. “She was trying to position herself as a kind of Margaret Thatcher of Asia, and it has worked.” Disliking the Chinese government is deeply rooted in Japanese society, where 86% of respondents said they had “unfriendly feelings” towards Beijing in a 2024 poll. “People are tired of decades of our government being too soft on China under Takaichi’s predecessors; this was integral to the rise of Sanseito,” Hitoshi Suzuki says. “Takaichi put an end to this.”

But angering China is also risky. Beijing is Tokyo’s largest trading partner and holds massive leverage over Japanese companies when it comes to rare earths. “Japanese business leaders do not want to see too much anti-China policy, even though they’re not saying so publicly,” Suzuki says. “If Takaichi goes too hardcore anti-China, the business elite will at some point turn against her. But Sanseito will too if she is too soft.”

The Immigration Dilemma

On immigration, another key Sanseito topic, Takaichi is caught between two stools in a similar way.

Only about 3% of Japan’s population is foreign, yet anxiety about uncontrolled migration is widespread. Takaichi has repeatedly tapped into those fears and promised to review the immigration system, something 70% of Japanese support, according to a poll in January. “By acknowledging the issues and appearing like she is on top of it, Takaichi has effectively sidelined this topic, which is remarkable as Sanseito gained so much ground with it just half a year ago,” Jeff Kingston says. “But on the other hand, there is consensus that Japan needs immigration.”

Having seen declining birth rates for decades, Japan’s population is projected to fall by about 30% to 87 million by 2070, when four out of every 10 people will be 65 or older. “If Takaichi fails to start tough immigration policies, she will lose the right wing. But at the same time, Japanese businesses want and need foreign workers,” Hitoshi Suzuki says. “It’s a balancing act again.”

Japan’s Only Partner

Another major uncertainty for Takaichi is Donald Trump, with whom she shares a complicated relationship. Trump was Takaichi’s first guest as Prime Minister, with the President saying afterwards that the meeting had left him “deeply impressed”. But the following weeks were marred by tension as Trump announced, and then repealed, his infamous tariffs against Japan. After Takaichi’s comments on Taiwan angered Beijing, Trump also refused to come to her aid. But on Saturday, he officially endorsed her bid for Prime Minister.

Image: President Trump addresses American soldiers stationed in Japan – The Trump White House Archive / Flickr

“We are really reliant on the United States: Japan has no regional support system like NATO; they are kind of our only ally,” Hitoshi Suzuki says. The two countries closely collaborate when it comes to security, with the US having stationed around 55,000 soldiers in Japan, the country’s only foreign military presence.

But economically, the tariffs have left scars. “Most Japanese businesses see Trump as a geostrategic risk now,” Suzuki says, “but they are very reliant on the US. The strategy is teaming up with the US as long as we can, but also minimising the risk, which is very difficult.”

According to Jeff Kingston, however, Takaichi has her way of pleasing Trump and will put this on display at their next meeting in March. “She will tell him that Japan is ramping up defence spending, which will be music to his ears,” Kingston believes. “He’ll welcome her win in the election, he likes winners anyway, and she will be one.”

If Takaichi does secure the landslide victory expected on Sunday, she will be able to look back at a remarkable first few months in office. She has galvanised voters, turned the far-right from foes into allies, and charmed her way onto the world stage. But what lies ahead will be the real challenge for “Asia’s Margaret Thatcher”. For now, she symbolises hope, but disillusionment is never far away.

Featured Image via The White House / Daniel Torok

The Rise of Anutin and the New Conservative Order

The most significant shift in Thai politics over the last year has been the emergence of caretaker Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul as the undisputed heavyweight of the conservative camp. Once a mid-sized kingmaker known for his medical marijuana platform, Anutin’s Bhumjaithai party has successfully absorbed the remnants of the old military-aligned factions to become a formidable royalist-conservative force.

Image: Former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting – World Economic Forum/ Greg Beadle

Anutin’s path to the premiership in September 2025 was a masterclass in political manoeuvring. He seized the opportunity when the Constitutional Court removed Paetongtarn Shinawatra, effectively collapsing the Pheu Thai-led government. By positioning himself as a stable hand during the border crisis with Cambodia, Anutin secured the backing of the palace and the conservative elites. His campaign has leaned heavily into nationalism, promising a border wall and a massive expansion of military-backed volunteer forces, rhetoric that has resonated with an electorate rattled by the prospect of war.

The Shinawatra Dynasty in Crisis

For twenty years, the name Shinawatra was synonymous with electoral dominance. Today, that legacy is facing an existential threat. The Pheu Thai party, the vehicle of billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra, is polling in a distant third place, a reality that would have been unthinkable five years ago.

Image: Former Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha meets with Former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen – Prachatai

The family’s downfall has been spectacular. After years in exile, Thaksin returned to Thailand in late 2023 only to find himself jailed. His daughter, Paetongtarn, took the mantle of Prime Minister in 2024 but lasted only a year before being judicially ousted. The smoking gun was a leaked phone call with Cambodia’s former leader Hun Sen, in which she was heard referring to the foreign strongman as uncle while disparaging the Thai military. In the eyes of many voters, especially in the nationalist heartlands, this was seen as a betrayal of national honour.

Now, with Thaksin behind bars and the family brand tarnished, Pheu Thai is campaigning on a platform of Shinawatra nostalgia, led by Thaksin’s nephew Yodchanan Wongsawat, in a desperate attempt to hold onto their dwindling base in the North and Northeast.

The King and the Veto of the Establishment

In Thailand, the ballot box is rarely the final word. King Maha Vajiralongkorn remains the country’s ultimate moral and political authority, and the conservative establishment, a mix of the palace, the military, and the judiciary, retains the power to veto results it finds unpalatable. The monarchy is a highly revered institution protected by some of the world’s strictest lese-majeste laws, and the King’s approval remains the ultimate prize for any aspiring government.

Image: King Maha Vajiralongkorn marrying his bodyguard Queen Suthiya – Mark Joseph Jochim

The People’s Party is already facing a new wave of legal investigations regarding their past stance on the monarchy, which could see its leaders banned before they even take office. This veto architecture ensures that even if the progressives win the popular vote, they must still navigate a system where the palace-military nexus holds the keys to the kingdom.

The People’s Party: Winning the Vote, Losing the Power

If the polls are to be believed, the progressive People’s Party is set to win the most seats for the second consecutive time. As the successor to the dissolved Move Forward and Future Forward parties, the People’s Party represents a generation of Thais who are fed up with the status quo. They are running on a transformative agenda: dismantling monopolies, ending military conscription, and overhauling a bureaucracy they say has kept Thailand in the shadow of its regional peers.

However, their leader, Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut, is already under the shadow of the same judicial architecture that destroyed his predecessors. The National Anti-Corruption Commission is currently investigating 44 former lawmakers, including Natthaphong himself, over past attempts to reform the royal insult laws. Even if they win a plurality on Sunday, the People’s Party faces the threat of party dissolution or disqualification before a cabinet is even formed.

The Border War and the Constitutional Question

The ghost at the banquet of this election is the 2025 border crisis with Cambodia. The conflict, which centred on contested strategic hills and ancient temples, has fundamentally altered the political map. It provided the conservative establishment with the perfect pretext to reassert the importance of the military and the monarchy as the ultimate defenders of the state. For the first time in years, the reform message of the progressives is being countered by a potent security message from the right.

Image: Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and Thailand’s Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul after signing the Kuala Lumpur Accord alongside President Trump – The White House / Daniel Torok

Simultaneously, voters will face a historic choice on a separate ballot: a referendum on the 2017 Constitution. This document, drafted by the military junta that seized power in 2014, was designed to ensure that the wrong parties could never truly govern. While a yes vote for a new constitution is almost certain to pass, the process is a legal labyrinth. Even with a public mandate, the Constitutional Court has ruled that two more referendums and several rounds of parliamentary approval are required before a single word of the charter can be changed.

The Likely Outcome: A Fragile Truce

The most probable result on Sunday night is a fractured parliament where no party holds a majority. While the People’s Party will likely claim the largest share of the 500 seats, they are unlikely to find a coalition partner willing to risk the wrath of the establishment. This leaves the door open for Anutin to once again play the role of the great stabiliser.

A coalition between Bhumjaithai and a weakened Pheu Thai, perhaps backed by smaller conservative blocks, would be the establishment’s preferred outcome. Such a government would focus on economic stimulus and border security while keeping the reformists at arm’s length. Yet, as the history of the last two decades has shown, any government that ignores the clear mandate for change from Thailand’s youth is building its house on sand.

Featured Image via United Nations (AP/Anton L. Delgado)

In the first round of voting on January 18, Seguro secured 31.1% of the vote, positioning himself as the frontrunner. Ventura followed with 23.5%, a result that confirmed the continued growth of his party, which was established only seven years ago. The election follows a period of heightened political activity in Portugal, including three legislative elections since 2021, and serves as a significant indicator of the current ideological divisions within the electorate.

The Role and Powers of the President

While the Portuguese President does not hold executive authority, a responsibility that lies with the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, the office is far from purely ceremonial. Under the country’s semi-presidential system, the President acts as a “guarantor of the institutions” and possesses several significant “reserve powers.”

Image: Prime Minister Luis Montenegro at the Web Summit 2024 – David Fitzgerald/Web Summit via Sportsfile

The most substantial of these is the authority to dissolve the Assembly of the Republic and call for early legislative elections. This power is particularly relevant in the current context, as Portugal is governed by a center-right minority administration led by Prime Minister Luís Montenegro. Additionally, the President has the power to veto legislation. While a parliamentary majority can eventually override a presidential veto on standard laws, the President can also refer legislation to the Constitutional Court for review, providing a significant check on the legislative branch.

Profiles of the Candidates

António José Seguro returned to the political forefront for this campaign after more than a decade away from active leadership. His platform emphasises institutional stability, the protection of social welfare systems, specifically the National Health Service, and a commitment to the democratic values established after the 1974 revolution. He has characterised his candidacy as a moderate alternative intended to unite voters across the democratic spectrum, from the center-left to the center-right, who are concerned by the rise of anti-establishment movements.

André Ventura has built his campaign on a platform of significant institutional change. As the leader of Chega, which became the main opposition party in parliament following the May 2025 legislative elections, his message centres on a critique of the traditional political class. His campaign has focused on issues such as stricter immigration controls, judicial reform, and a hardline stance on corruption. Ventura’s presence in the runoff represents a milestone for the Portuguese right, signalling that the “cordon sanitaire” that historically marginalised far-right movements in Portugal has become less effective.

Key Issues and Electoral Dynamics

The election is taking place against a backdrop of persistent social and economic challenges. Voters have consistently cited the housing crisis, characterised by high rents and property prices in urban centres, as a primary concern. Other dominant issues include low average wages and the rising cost of living, which have contributed to a sense of disenchantment with the traditional parties that have alternated in power for fifty years.

Image: Liberal initiative candidate João Cotrim de Figueiredo at the ALDE Party Congress in Dublin – ALDE Party

The runoff will largely be decided by the voters whose candidates were eliminated in the first round. This includes supporters of João Cotrim de Figueiredo of the Liberal Initiative (16%), independent candidate Admiral Henrique Gouveia e Melo (12.3%), and Luís Marques Mendes of the Social Democratic Party (11.4%). The decision by the ruling Social Democrats (PSD) not to formally endorse either candidate has added a layer of complexity to the race, as center-right voters must now decide whether to back a traditional rival from the Socialist Party or a populist challenger.

Domestic and European Implications

Domestically, the outcome will determine the nature of the relationship between Belém Palace (the presidential residence) and São Bento (the Prime Minister’s residence). A victory for Seguro would likely result in a more traditional, mediating presidency that seeks to maintain the current balance of power. A victory for Ventura could lead to a more interventionist approach, potentially challenging the stability of the Montenegro government and pushing for a realignment of the right-wing political bloc.

Image: Prime Minister Luis Montenegro speaks to the media as he arrives at the Washington NATO Summit – Joshua Roberts / US Department of State 

On a broader scale, the election is being monitored as a significant test of European political trends. Portugal was long viewed as an exception to the populist wave seen in other EU member states. After the Netherlands weathered a similar challenge from Geert Wilders, international attention now turns to Portugal to see if it will follow a similar path. The 2026 runoff serves as a case study in how established democracies respond to the mainstreaming of populist movements. Regardless of the final result, the fragmentation seen in the first round suggests that the era of two-party dominance is transitioning toward a more complex, multi-polar political environment.

Featured Image via Parti Socialisti / Philippe Grangeaud

When the Titanic sank on a bitter April night in 1912, her captain, Edward J. Smith’s reported last words were: “Be British.” We can infer with confidence that the late captain was referring to the bravery and dogged, reckless pneuma which defines our national spirit rather than some gesticulated nod to crass stereotypes. The British are unique in this impetuous hauteur. The Germans have efficiency and roboticism and the French have style, but the British are more dogged, brave, resolute and tenacious than either of them. They are steadfast in the face of utter disaster, as exemplified by our mighty symbols of national folklore – the Charge of the Light Brigade, the Titanic and Dunkirk. No nation fails more magnificently and shamelessly, yet with such hubris. While fighting in the Falklands War, Prince Andrew described being shot at as “very character building”. Perhaps in the light of subsequent events he ought to have been shot at a little more.

A week prior, the most popular politician in the country made a fleeting bid to stand as an MP in the Gorton and Denton by-election, in the nick of time before the 5pm deadline only to be blocked by the National Executive Committee (NEC) a day later. Perhaps Starmer and his allies were taking a leaf out of the late captain’s book, taking on the form of passengers on the Titanic, steadfastly refusing to man the lifeboats out of loyalty to a failing strategy; simultaneously doing so in utterly shameless fashion in full view of a public furiously shaking their heads.

The Cynical Game of Westminster

The response to this could have almost been guessed verbatim. This is a uniform trait amongst the Westminster contingent, for MPs are an almost lab-designed, meticulously crafted class of people (often literally choreographed in the same elite educational institutions and Old Boys’ Clubs). Should they be asked to comment on the scandal regarding the use of their tax-funded expenses to pay for lampshades or slotted cutlery from Marks & Spencer, they’ll be quick to remind the public that there are far greater matters to attend to such as the cost of living crisis or the war in Ukraine. Like clockwork, Starmer offered much of the same response when asked to justify this, stating: “Having an election for the Mayor of Manchester when it’s not necessary would divert our resources away from the elections that we must have.” If there was ever an instance which lends truth to the quote by Slavoj Žižek that “in contemporary societies… cynical distance, laughter, irony, are, so to speak, part of the game. The ruling ideology is not meant to be taken seriously or literally” then it is here where the NEC’s decision is hegemonic as this is not a charade lost on the people of Manchester. In a recent poll by the New Statesman, just 7% of people agree with the NEC’s stated reason that a mayoral by-election would be an expensive inconvenience for locals and 33% even say the party blocking Burnham would make them “less likely” to vote Labour.

Touching Down in the “Echo Chamber”

And so Starmer’s gleeful announcement on X that he had “touched down” in China was met with the expected hostility by the suspiciously uniform horde of Union Jack-draped bulldog profile pictures on X iterating word salad lambasts reminiscent of a McCarthyist Red Scare era. In the eyes of the cesspit of Musk’s echo chamber, Starmer is somehow in the cross section of Thatcher’s imago Dei and also Lenin’s love child, ready to open the door to the looming spectre of socialism whilst simultaneously somehow enacting soft austerity with all the coiffured virility of Mrs T herself.

Image: Prime Minister Keir Starmer visits Yuyuan Garden in China – No 10 Downing Street / Simon Dawson

In a video which beamed into the timelines of Britons nationwide of the Prime Minister being led through a bellicose convoy of discernibly tall armed guards – whom we can assuredly assume were purposefully selected – you can almost, for a second, see the enormity of the situation dawning upon this former human rights lawyer, son of humble parents; the real-time realisation that he’s a long way from home, a long way away from swanky London middle-class dinner parties. Facing the grandeur of an authoritarian hegemon in a bid to secure trade, Starmer, in the eyes of many, is out of his depth. Yet there is a newfound glimmer of reappraisal for our head of government in this controversial spectacle; just weeks after having to fend off the underhand threat of a de-facto leadership challenge in the face of plummeting approval ratings, our party leader faces down the autocratic custodian in a bid to revitalise a frayed labour market and reassert our nation’s status on the global podium. He may not have the nation on his side, yet still, he’s there. What is a debacle to many could just as easily be interpreted to be a leader still swinging in the eleventh round to remind the world that Britain is not a joke.

Souvenirs from a Transnational Holiday

The aim – he stated – was to “deliver for the British people”, and more specifically, “securing trade” was the designated motive for this obscure visit – the first British Prime Minister to meet the controversial figure since 2018. When David Cameron welcomed him in 2015, he did so with the warm quintessential embrace of British culture – drinking pints in a pub named ‘The Plough’ whilst donning a red Poppy on the lapel and taking him to watch a Manchester City match, yet still utterly unable to shake the Etonian-Oxford graduate pneuma upon which he was immaculately clad in. Starmer is set to bring home some souvenirs from his trans-national holiday (no, not a t-shirt that says “I heart China”) – free visa travel for Brits wanting to stay in China below 30 days as well as announcing a border security agreement with China to crack down on the flow of Chinese-made small boat parts after 60% of small boat engines used by migrants were found to be Chinese-manufactured. Billions sealed in export deals and expanded market access for UK firms, job creation in Port Talbot and inward investment with Chinese firms creating hubs in London and Liverpool. Yet, this shouldn’t be the only thing he brings home from his visit.

The Industrial Blueprint

Over the past four decades, the Chinese state has systematically built an integrated manufacturing ecosystem, combining large-scale infrastructure investment, state-backed finance, regional industrial clusters and an abundant, increasingly skilled labour force. The result is sustained productivity growth, high investment coupled with technological upgrading. Britain, however, has done the opposite: it has relied on fragmented private investment, dismantled domestic supply chains, allowed manufacturing to collapse and attempted to replace industry with services and finance in a new age of managerial corporatism, endless e-mail jobs and ushering in the age of the “knowledge economy” after a four decade long sustained bludgeoning of its industrial hubs and deregulated labour market. The result has been catastrophic, for a community to not only suffer the material damage of deindustrialisation but experience the deracination of the bonds and dignity of labour which once rested upon the hands that wove it.

Image: Prime Minister Keir Starmer walks on the Bund in Shanghai – No 10 Downing Street / Simon Dawson

This is, of course, not a treatise on how Britain should adopt an authoritarian regime with Chinese characteristics and for Brits to refer to the Prime Minister as ‘Chairman Keir’, but that the lesson learnt from our visit ought to be that it needs ambition backed by institutional power. Without a state capable of building industries, the heralded ‘green transition’ will remain a conveniently easy-to-reach-for titbit of rhetoric rather than an economic reality. Labour’s tragedy is that it recognises the necessity of transformation yet lacks the courage to pursue it.

Blueprints vs Livelihoods

The machinery of decarbonisation exists in blueprints and acronyms – GB Energy, the National Wealth Fund, the Industrial Strategy Council, but not yet in the livelihoods of workers across the North and Midlands where Labour’s green transition has so far struggled to match its own rhetoric. The manifesto’s promise of 650,000 new green jobs has yet to materialise over a year into government, even as traditional industrial decline deepens. When the Titanic sank in 1912, Belfast ship builders defended their industrial pride with all of the admirable parochial hubris in: “She was fine when she left here!”. Samson and Goliath still stand tall over Belfast’s skyline as a potent symbol of industrial virility in a sector which has been beset with decline since WW2. Yet Harland & Wolff, forever burdened as the architects of the tragic vessel and, for many, a symbol of sectarian discrimination, now limps along under a rescue deal with a Spanish state company. Port Talbot and Scunthorpe steelworks face layoffs as they move to greener electric furnaces; Grangemouth refinery has been shuttered and repurposed as an import terminal by its Chinese owner. Britain’s industrial affairs, so to speak, are a sorry sight. But what is Labour doing about it?

The Problem with Skills-Based Policy

Beyond the job growth stimulus in the green sector, Labour have invested in a plethora of skills programmes in a welfare-to-work bid; Skills England is a national body to coordinate apprenticeships and further education as well as adult retraining. The caveat, however, is this is a corrective measure in a crumbling labour market which has evidenced its inability to align the demand-side crisis in a deregulated economy. Labour has also pledged to reform the Apprenticeship Levy to make it easier for SMEs to use funds and expand technical apprenticeships specifically in green energy. This, of course, relies on employers; if firms refuse to expand with no industrial incentive to do so, these apprenticeships do not scale. Perhaps most saliently, the party’s “just transition” coupled with its lamenting promise that “no community is left behind” with its redeployment of carbon-intensive workers… Yet as it remains, there exists virtually zero large-scale redeployment mechanism – and the Unions haven’t missed this. Sharon Graham, leader of Unite the Union, said: “We know what’s said about the jobs… But where are they?… We’ve been promised 650,000 in these new, green industries… But show me them. I can’t see them. Is someone driving an electric delivery bike working in a green industry of the future?”.

Image: Prime Minister Keir Starmer is given a guard of honour as he leaves Beijing – No 10 Downing Street / Simon Dawson

If Starmer wants to give Sharon Graham a witty answer to this, perhaps he should look towards the man he has spent the last few days with. Where a skills-based policy approach in Britain is treated as a substitute for industrial policy rather than its complement, China does the opposite. It builds industries first through state-backed investment, infrastructure and regional industrial planning, and only then scales vocational training to meet the labour demand those industries generate. The result is that China produces engineers for factories that exist, while Britain trains workers for jobs that often do not. It’s no use me trying to eat soup with a knife and fork or play the tuba with no fingers, in a similar fashion that it’s no use trying to run a developmental industrial strategy with neoliberal tools. This is partially why Labour candidates who once slept soundly on election night in the former-industrial red wall may worry about getting their deposit back in 2029.

The Legacy of Deng Xiaoping

None of this developmental strategy in China was an accident. In the decades following Mao’s death, and particularly after the ascension of Deng Xiaoping in the 1960s and 70s, the Chinese state turned their attention towards an export-oriented growth strategy that was neither socialist orthodoxy nor unfettered capitalism. If Deng was not a Marxist in theory, he was certainly one in outlook in the way he argued for the forces of production to be unleashed to ascend to a higher level of output for the benefit of the state’s labour force. If Marx requested a carrier of the flame in his insistence that redistribution could not exist in a period of stagnation, then it’s arguable that Deng was the one who stepped up. Foreign capital was welcomed however with the salient caveat that Chinese labour was injected into global supply chains with ruthless efficiency. Britain now struggles, even four decades on, to cling onto the wreckage of Thatcher’s grand experiment when it surrendered state control of the economy and sold off the cash cow of sovereign wealth funds. Where Britain was sowing the seeds of privatisation, China was reaping the rewards of its meticulous state planning and the ship of deindustrialisation was docking in the harbour.

Selling into China, Not Rebuilding Britain

Ultimately, our prime minister brings home £2.2bn in export deals and around £2.3bn in market access over 5 years; for a country utterly bereft of a beneficial growth model, this is paramount. Cultech will export up to £90 million over five years through a partnership with China Resources, creating 55 jobs in Port Talbot where it previously saw layoffs; Silverstream Technologies projects over £50 million in exports to 13 Chinese shipyards in 2025; Anemoi Marine Technologies will generate £28 million from Flettner Rotor Sail installations; and Brompton Bikes anticipates £111.5 million in Chinese sales over three years. A cynic, however, might raise the point that these deals are firm-level, revenue-driven and exist solely to generate revenue. Thus, Starmer’s exotic visit has been far from a failure, but similarly not a ‘win for the parish’. Cracks in Britain’s economic strategy are still there for all to see – job creation in niche sectors which will exist without regional clusters or skills pipelines necessary for large-scale industrial renewal. In effect, Britain is selling into China without rebuilding anything resembling a domestic industrial base.

Featured Image via No 10 Downing Street / Lauren Hurley

Yet Trump is just the latest in a long line of American presidents who, since the nation’s founding, have employed the tactics of gunboat diplomacy and economic intimidation to further US interests while bulldozing over anyone who stood in their way. Although Trump’s style of imperialism may not be new, what we are experiencing now is the fracturing of an international order that has shaped global relations since WWII, and with it, the sense of security that has been taken for granted by too many of us for too long.

Following WWII, principles of self-determination, human rights, and collective accountability were enshrined in global politics through international structures including the United Nations (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and NATO (1949). Yet Trump’s declaration that “I don’t need international law,” only “my own morality, my own mind,” indicates that these institutions are no longer enough to constrain the ambitions of world leaders.

Image: President Donald Trump delivers remarks at the Donald J. Trump – The White House / Daniel Torok

It is no secret that the US empire never disappeared, surviving the era of anti-colonialism in the form of global military bases and five permanently inhabited territories: Puerto Rico, Guam, the US Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Yet we are now seeing the most explicit re-embracing of the US’s role as an imperial power since the drive for decolonization and anti-imperialism following WWII.

On January 5, 2026, US Homeland Security Advisor and deputy chief of staff for policy Stephen Miller posted: “Not long after World War II the West dissolved its empires and colonies, sending colossal sums of taxpayer-funded aid to those former territories (despite having already made them far wealthier and more successful).” He described this as “a kind of reverse colonization,” declaring that “the neoliberal experiment, at its core, has been a long self-punishment of the places and peoples that built the modern world.”

It seems that empire is no longer a dirty word in international politics, a fact made stark by the return of rhetoric lifted from the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. In the November National Security Strategy, the administration promised to “reassert and enforce” the doctrine “to restore American pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere.”

The Monroe Doctrine was a staple of nineteenth-century US imperialism, warning European powers to refrain from intervening in the Western Hemisphere. It delineated the region as the exclusive sphere of US influence and was strengthened by the 1904 “Roosevelt Corollary,” which explicitly justified interventions across Latin America. The new “Trump Corollary” announced in the National Security Strategy signaled Trump’s return to an aggressive style of foreign policy and his intention to ramp up regional intervention.

Image: President Donald Trump addresses members of the media in the James S. Brady Press Briefing Room – The White House / Daniel Torok

Trump stayed true to his word when, on January 3, 2026, he launched a military strike in Venezuela and captured its leader, Nicolás Maduro. It seemed as if his New Year’s resolution of three days prior was all but forgotten. Trump blamed Maduro for the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan migrants in the US and, without evidence, accused the Venezuelan leader of “emptying his prisons and insane asylums.” Trump labelled two Venezuelan criminal groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and accused Maduro of leading one himself. The Venezuelan leader was then indicted in the US on charges relating to “narco-terrorism” and conspiracy to import cocaine, which he denies.

In a press conference on the day of the attack, Trump announced that President Monroe’s 1823 principles were now being referred to as the “Donroe Doctrine.” A post on X by the Department of State on January 5 declared: “This is OUR Hemisphere, and President Trump will not allow our security to be threatened.”

Yet Trump’s imperial ambitions did not end with Latin America. He has repeatedly insisted that the US will annex Greenland, an autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, to protect it from perceived threats from Russia and China. Although backing down from threats to acquire the territory by force and impose 10% import taxes on eight countries that had opposed his plans, he insisted that a “framework of a future deal with respect to Greenland and, in fact, the entire Arctic Region” is in place.

Image: President Trump participates in the Board of Peace Charter Announcement and Signing ceremony during the World Economic Forum – The White House / Daniel Torok

Turning to the Middle East, Trump is also growing his “Board of Peace” that was established to oversee the ceasefire in Gaza but has transitioned into something far more concerning. There is not a single mention of Gaza in the board’s charter, a text that seems to be an attempt to replace the UN Charter of 1945. Rather than promote self-determination and human rights, Trump’s charter bolsters him as an omnipotent chairman with complete control over meetings and discussions.

A life membership on the board stands at $1 billion in “cash funds,” effectively making it a private members’ club with no representation for the people it will govern. It is an alarming exercise of Trump’s megalomania and a palpable threat to the existing structures that govern international politics.

Of course, Trump is not entirely beyond restraint. His ambitions are subject to market pressures and political relationships, but we must not underestimate the threat he represents to the established world order. There is no doubt that we are entering a new era of global politics, and it is one in which international law is becoming increasingly discardable.

Featured Image via The White House / Daniel Torok