All eyes have been on Sir Keir Starmer since he sacked Former Foreign Office Chief Sir Olly Robbins last Thursday 16th May. 

This came after a Guardian investigation revealed that despite concerns being raised about Mandelson during his security vetting, the Foreign Office went ahead with his appointment. 

Having been announced as the UK’s ambassador to the US in December 2024, Peter Mandelson was formally appointed as US ambassador on 10th February 2025. However, he was sacked in September last year over his links to the late convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein. 

Over the past week, the Prime Minister has been facing calls to resign over claims he misled MPs when he told them that “full due process” had been followed – a claim 10 Downing Street strongly denies. 

Monday: Starmer addresses MPs

In a statement to MPs on Monday afternoon, Starmer said he takes “responsibility” for appointing Peter Mandelson, and that he shouldn’t have taken that decision. 

Explaining the timeline of events, he said he became aware that the Foreign Office granted Mandelson Developed Vetting clearance against the recommendations of the UK’s Security Vetting (UKSV) agency “for the first time” on Tuesday 14th April. 

He said: “I should have had [this information] a long time ago.” 

Regarding why Mandelson was appointed before security vetting had been completed, he said: “For a direct ministerial appointment, it was usual for security vetting to happen after the appointment but before starting in post.” He has since changed this process. 

He also explained that while UKSV’s decision is binding for many government departments, for the foreign office, appointment decisions are ultimately at their own discretion. The Prime Minister has now suspended these powers. 

Continuing his statement, Starmer said it was “absolutely unforgivable” that Sir Olly had let the then-Foreign Secretary David Lammy sign a statement that developed vetting clearance had been granted. 

He said had he known about UKSV’s recommendations, he would not have appointed Peter Mandelson.

Sir Adrian Fulford has now been appointed to lead a review into security vetting. 

Closing his statement, the PM called these events “incredible” and “beggars belief” – statements greeted with laughter by the House. 

Leader of the opposition Kemi Badenoch claimed Sir Keir had breached the ministerial code in not revealing this information “at the earliest opportunity” – this would have been during last week’s Prime Minister’s Questions on Wednesday 15th April. 

Putting six questions to the PM, she asked whether he would stand by his previous assertion while in opposition that a prime minister should resign if they mislead the house. 

Meanwhile, leader of the opposition Sir Ed Davey accused the PM of blaming his officials, asking why he asked “so few questions personally about the vetting process himself”. 

Both he and Green Party Leader Zack Polanski called on Sir Keir to resign. 

Reform UK MP Lee Anderson alongside Your Party MP Zarah Sultana were both made to leave the House after accusing the PM of lying. 

Tuesday morning: Robbins’ response 

Speaking to Emily Thornberry’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Sir Olly said there was an “atmosphere of pressure” from No. 10 over Peter Mandelson’s vetting.

Thornberry opened the meeting by telling him to “feel freer to give fuller answers to us” than he had at his previous appearance before the Committee on 3rd November 2025. “You clearly told us the truth, but you only told us part of the truth,” she said. 

Robbins accused No.10 of taking “a generally dismissive attitude” to Mandelson’s vetting clearance in January last year, saying: “The focus was on getting Mandelson to Washington quickly.” 

He said that when he arrived in post on 20th January, “there was already a very, very strong expectation coming from number ten that he needed to be in post and in America as quickly as possible”. 

By this point, Peter Mandelson’s name had already been submitted to the King as a nomination and the PM had announced his appointment. He said that agrément (the formal process by which the host country accepts the appointment) had also been obtained.

“Throughout January honestly, my office, the foreign secretary’s office were under constant pressure. There was an atmosphere of constant chasing,” the former foreign office chief said, with very frequent phone calls asking, “has this been delivered yet?”. 

When questioned by Emily Thornberry over whether there was any evidence of this pressure, he said he was sure there were phone calls showing contact between his office and the No. 10’s private office, but that there were no emails. 

In response, Thornberry highlighted the need for records “to show the extent of pressure the foreign office was being put under by No.10.” 

When pressed on why he didn’t know more about the contents of the vetting decision, Sir Olly explained that while he was told it was a “borderline” case, he’s “never seen a UKSV document”. He also declined to confirm whether anything had been identified that wasn’t already in the public realm. 

He maintained that vetting was completed “to the normal high standard” and that “whilst there was an atmosphere of pressure, the department rigorously followed process […] despite some in government never believing it was a process we needed to follow”. 

In response to a question from Sir John Wittingdale MP, he also confirmed that “it would have damaged” relations with the US to pull Mandelson as ambassador at that stage. 

Alongside this, he revealed that in March 2025 he was asked to “potentially” find Lord Matthew Doyle, the PM’s director of communications, a position as an ambassador. 

Tuesday afternoon: MPs respond 

Downing Street denied Robbins’ claims of an “atmosphere of pressure” and “dismissive attitude” towards Mandelson’s vetting.

In an emergency debate called by the Conservatives on Tuesday afternoon, Kemi Badenoch said the Prime Minister “personally decided to appoint a serious, known national security risk” due to his known relationship with Epstein and links to Russia and China. 

Accusing the PM of using Sir Olly as a “human shield”, she said: “The idea that it is No. 10 who are the victims of others not following due process is quite frankly laughable.” 

She backed SNP MP Stephen Flynn’s call for a no confidence vote, adding: “This Prime Minister has put the country’s national security at risk. He must take responsibility, it is time for him to go.” 

The Lib Dems accused the PM of trying to “appease Trump” with Mandelson’s appointment, while Reform said he is trying to “dump the entire scandal on one official”. Meanwhile the Green Party said the PM showed “totally unacceptable” “wilful ignorance” over the appointment.  

In response, Darren Jones, Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister, said: “The government has been and remains committed to keeping the House informed.”

Acknowledging that appointing Mandelson was the “wrong” decision, he added: “I’m here however to account for the government’s accountability on the process that followed.” 

Mr Jones also said that the government is working “at pace” to publish the remaining documents related to Mandelson’s appointment, as required by February’s humble address. 

Wednesday: PMQs 

PMQs were, as expected, dominated by questions over Mandelson’s appointment. 

The PM confirmed that Matthew Doyle was considered for an ambassadorial appointment – as is a normal conversation when people leave a position, according to Starmer. But, he said, nothing came of this conversation – and Doyle himself had come out on Tuesday saying he hadn’t known of any such conversations before then. 

In her six questions to the PM, Kemi Badenoch pressed Sir Keir on whether he stands by his statement that “full due process” was followed in Mandelson’s appointment, referring to Robbins’ testimony of a dismissive approach from No.10. 

Reiterating her concerns about national security, she said there is “no way” she would have appointed someone with Mandelson’s reputation, asking the PM “what planet” he was on over claims that Mandelson was given access to classified briefings before being cleared.  

Badenoch also said Robbins’ dismissal was unfair – an opinion shared by the Green Party’s Ellie Chowns – and asked the PM to “take responsibility and go”. 

Starmer maintained that due process was followed, and that Sir Olly’s testimony that he hadn’t shared his decision with No. 10 “puts to bed all the allegations levelled at [him] by those opposite in relation to dishonesty”. 

He also reiterated that he was unaware of UKSV’s recommendations. Calling this a “very serious error in judgement,” he said: “Nothing is going to distract me from delivering for our country.” 

Thursday: Back to the select committee

Thursday morning saw Cat Little, Permanent Secretary of the Cabinet Office (the department’s most senior civil servant) giving evidence to Dame Emily Thornberry’s Select Committee. 

In her evidence, she echoed the PM in saying that “due process was followed.”

Referring to Sir Olly’s claims of pressure, she said that while putting together the documents to be published under the humble address: “I’ve not seen any documentation that would formally confirm that level of pressure”. 

In regards to the vetting summary, she told the committee she asked Sir Olly for a summary of UKSV’s recommendations, but “it was made clear to me that that information would not be forthcoming.” 

Requesting this information directly from security officials, she received it on 25th March but sought legal advice about handling sensitive documents before deciding to share them with the PM on 14th April. 

A lack of records has been a frequent issue throughout this saga, and it continued when Ms Little confirmed there was no formal record of the meeting in which Starmer decided to move forward with Mandelson’s appointment – even though “it is normal” to do so. 

Ms Little’s versions of events also seemed to suggest – in contrast to Sir Olly’s – that the Cabinet Office advised in favour of vetting Mandelson, not that this was unnecessary. 

Beyond the walls of the Select Committee, Thursday also saw an increase in murmurings about the Prime Minister’s future, with political reporters noting unrest among both Labour backbenchers and Cabinet ministers. 

What next?

Friday’s headlines were not dominated by the scandal – much to the PM’s relief. Rather, attention has turned to the failure of the Assisted Dying Bill in the House of Lords. 

However, the row is far from over. On Tuesday, we heard from Morgan McSweeney – the PM’s former Chief of Staff, who resigned over Mandelson’s appointment in February, taking “full responsibility”. 

He, alongside the Foreign Office’s Chief Property and Security Officer Ian Collard and former Foreign Office top civil servant Sir Philip Barton, have all been compelled to give evidence to the Select Committee. 

And of course the polls have opened this Thursday 7th May at 7am, which will likely put further pressure on the PM’s survival. 

Featured Image Credit: Prime Minister’s Office / Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office

The debacle of Mandelson’s appointment as foreign ambassador to the United States was birthed months ago when his explicit connections to infamous pedophile, Jeffrey Epstein, was unearthed, but has retained its eminence as a scandal that refuses to go away. Some of the comparatively minor scandals that have reared their ugly heads in recent decades were able to be patted away in timely Westminster fashion; when asked about why tax expenses have been used to purchase slotted spoons from Marks and Spencer, politicians are steadfast in reminding journalists that there are far greater matters of importance to attend to like the cost of living crisis or the war in Ukraine. This, however, simply refuses to do so.

This week, the country has learnt in a shocking revelation that his appointment was much less a blunder than a fundamental catastrophe – that he had failed his vetting process and yet catapulted into a seat at the table of British elitism regardless.

Sheepishly, the Prime Minister insists he had no knowledge that this had occurred; that this was a fact kept from him and accordingly sacked the senior Civil Servant, Sir Olly Robbins, who he holds most culpable as the progenitor of this grave scandal. Put simply, the British public have been handed excuse upon excuse ranging from: “we didn’t know” (but we did); “it was a mistake” (but an honest one); “the wrong conclusions were drawn” (in good faith). We are invited to believe, all at once, that nothing was known, that the wrong things were known, that the right things were misunderstood, and that—despite all this—the decision itself was entirely reasonable, however regrettable in hindsight.

However, do any of these excuses wash? Is there a single way in which the government can say, with a straight face, that allowing a close ally of a defamed international pedophile into classified British affairs is justified with procedural malfunction? The difficulty is not that excuses are made for Mandelson, but that they are so readily available – they belong to the political culture that produced him in the first place. 

The excuses, reasons and justifications – of which there are many – are all inherently plausible. Even despite just 16% of the UK population believing that Starmer was misled, it could very well be that he was. But it is not the same thing as an excuse. For what is striking is not the absence of explanation, but its abundance.

In this pantomime affair, the villain of an insidious and cynical Whitehall seems to be an ever present stage-set, doing both no harm at all but simultaneously the evil puppeteer of Starmer’s demise whilst he begs the public to witness it and believe him. Starmer casts himself the lead in a Shakespearean morality play, fuelled by righteous anger, touched by tragedy, let down by treachery and perennially surrounded by forces just coherent enough to be blamed, but never quite tangible enough to be seen.

What emerges, then, is an unsettling ritual that has long stood in the way of the public and elected office. It is the driver of poor electoral turnout, it’s the reason party membership is at an all time low. The perceived notion among many is that the public are mere mortals underneath a perceived distinctly unsympathetic, unrepresentative hierarchy who seem to be inexorably above the law whenever these scandals re-emerge in a cyclical fashion. The public are alienated not because they don’t understand politics, but rather that they understand it all too well. 

Thus Harold Wilson’s famous quote that “The Labour Party is a moral crusade or it is nothing” feels utterly at odds with this shambolic affair that Starmer seems to be desperately trying to row back to shore. Evidently the Labour Party has long prided itself on seeking to marry moral purpose with political exercise. Mandelson belongs to the tradition that resolves this tension in a way that allows the latter to eclipse the former rather than reconciling the two. What is presented as pragmatism is, in reality, a set of assumptions about power so deeply embedded they no longer appear as choices at all. 

If we are to, with empathy, follow the government into the notion that the full facts of the matter were not readily apparent at the time, then the charge is one of startling incompetence. If, on the other hand, the facts were indeed available but disregarded, then the pressing issue of sheer misjudgement is ever more visceral. And if responsibility is to be displaced onto process, then we are left with the curious doctrine that leadership consists precisely in not leading. 

The words resolutely inscribed in many of Labour’s merchandise and campaign literature is: “country first, party second”. It is the lingo of pragmatism that the party has so fluently spoken and pushed the envelope of since July 2024; that the best decisions are those that deliver, however unappealing and controversial. If the public grit their teeth, surrender and brace for a small but consequently relieving period of strife, that eventually there will be a rainbow at the end of the storm.

Pragmatism, so to speak, is the politics that will eventually come good. The issue, however, is that what is often called pragmatism is simply ideology that has forgotten it is ideology. It’s no use my insistence that the problem was the “wet paint” sign not being more thoroughly brought to my attention as I get up from the bench with a paint-sodden back. True pragmatism, in the end, is only what survives explanation.

All of this matters. If a political culture that cannot distinguish between explanation and justification, it eventually ceases to treat responsibility as meaningful at all. If every failure can be reclassified as a procedural defect, then nothing is ever finally owned by anyone in particular. And if nothing is owned, then nothing is truly answerable. The result, then, is not a more sophisticated politics, but a hollowed-out one whereby power is easily exercised without remainder and then retrospectively dissolved into an array of conveniently placed excuses to be wheeled out and reached for when necessary.

For this reason solely, the routine manufacture of excuses ought not to be treated as harmless spin or even familiar political theatre. Instead, it is an endemic blemish within the British high office which corrodes the most basic linchpin principles that we herald as what makes this country so unique – the unspoken bond that binds us all and prevents us from being subjugated by tyranny, a robust and proud history of checks and balances on power from Magna Carta to the Miners Strike – the idea that decisions can be held to account in any meaningful sense at all.

A democracy in which every mistake is immediately absorbed into a narrative of bureaucratic mishap and misunderstanding is one in which responsibility is permanently deferred. And what is deferred indefinitely, in the end, is the very essence of political judgment entirely.

Each account seems to point elsewhere: to a failure of communication, to a gap in procedure, to a misunderstanding at the relevant stage. Yet the effect is always the same. Responsibility is continually pushed one step back, until it becomes difficult to say where, if anywhere, it properly resides. What begins as explanation ends as evasion simply by accumulation. Quite simply, excuses are thin – especially that of the self-pitying, manufactured kind. It cannot continue. 

Mandelson is not the difficulty. Rather, he is merely the occasion for it. What matters is a twofold matter of both disgraced leaders of international pedophile cabals having close access to British national security affairs but also the ease with which politics learns to talk its way out of these humiliating debacles alls whilst the British public’s intelligence is insulted for the world to see. There is evidently no shortage of reasons being offered. There is, however, no excuse. 

Featured Image credits:  “Prime Minister Keir Starmer hosts a business roundtable” by Number 10, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

For a sitting Health Secretary to use the word “gaslighting” about his own department’s flagship public institution is, by any measure, a significant moment. But does the strategy that’s been laid out actually deliver?

The Problem It’s Trying to Fix

The backdrop to this strategy is bleak. The Women and Equalities Committee, chaired by Labour MP Sarah Owen, delivered a damning parliamentary report in December 2024 that used the phrase “medical misogyny” without apology. It found that women experiencing painful reproductive conditions: endometriosis, adenomyosis, heavy menstrual bleeding, PMDD –  routinely have their symptoms dismissed, normalised, and minimised. Women, for years, were told to “suck it up.” Their pain, the committee concluded, was treated as a personality failing rather than a medical complaint. 

The statistics sit behind that language like a wall. As of December 2024, there were over 586,000 women on incomplete gynaecology pathways in the NHS, with nearly 45% of those patients waiting more than 18 weeks, far beyond the NHS standard. Almost 19,000 had been waiting longer than a year. Endometriosis, affecting roughly one in ten women, currently takes close to a decade to diagnose on average. The gynaecology waiting list has more than doubled in eight years. Female life expectancy has declined. Only the wealthiest third of women, the strategy’s own authors note, can expect to remain in good health until retirement.

This is not a niche policy issue. It is a crisis affecting millions of people’s daily lives: their careers, relationships, fertility, and mental health.

What the Strategy Actually Does

The renewed strategy is built around four pillars: centring women’s voices and choices; transforming NHS performance in the services that matter most to women; supporting all women to live healthy, prosperous lives; and creating a structural approach to reform under the wider 10-Year Health Plan.

Several concrete commitments stand out.

1. For the first time, the strategy introduces a guaranteed standard requiring that women are offered appropriate and effective pain relief for invasive gynaecological procedures, including contraceptive coil fittings and hysteroscopies. This is long overdue. Campaigners and clinicians have been pushing for this for years following high-profile accounts, including from BBC presenter Naga Munchetty, of traumatic coil fittings conducted without anaesthesia. A Mail on Sunday investigation found that up to a third of women received no pain relief at all during coil insertion, even after guidance recommending it was issued in 2021. The strategy now moves that guidance to a mandatory standard of care; a meaningful shift, if enforced.
2. Women will be directed to the right specialist at the first attempt through a new single referral system, rather than being “passed from one appointment to another,” in Streeting’s words. Action will be taken to cut the near-decade-long diagnostic wait for conditions like endometriosis.
3. Perhaps the most structurally significant element is the proposal to link women’s feedback directly to provider funding through a new trial. Streeting was explicit about the logic: “We need to hit medical misogyny where it hurts –  the wallet.” Services that fail to listen to women would, in theory, face financial consequences.
4. The strategy reaffirms the government’s earlier commitment to set an explicit target to close the Black and South Asian maternal mortality gap, an issue of profound inequality. Black women are currently approximately 2.3 times more likely to die during or shortly after pregnancy than white women; South Asian women are around 1.4 times more likely. The government says it will invest £50 million through the National Institute for Health and Care Research to tackle maternity disparities.
5. A £1 million investment in a menstrual education programme aims to help girls distinguish between normal and abnormal periods earlier. This matters: the parliamentary report found that sex education has consistently failed to teach girls what constitutes “normal” menstruation, which contributes to diagnostic delays that stretch into adulthood.

The strategy is embedded in the government’s wider 10-Year Health Plan and its ambition to shift care from hospitals into communities. New Neighbourhood Health Centres are envisaged as single, accessible points for women’s health — if they can replicate the success already shown by the existing Women’s Health Hubs model, where GP practices pool specialist services in areas like menopause care and coil fitting, this could be transformative.

What the Strategy Doesn’t Do — Yet

Progress has been “too slow” before. 

The 2022 Women’s Health Strategy, published under the Conservatives, contained similar commitments and similar rhetoric. The parliamentary inquiry found its progress had been insufficient. The risk with this iteration is the same: a well-intentioned document that struggles to translate into consistent practice across a fragmented NHS. Structural reforms, like shifting commissioning to bring gynaecology and contraception under single funding streams, remain complicated and have historically been resistant to top-down policy fixes.

The waiting list problem is immense. 

While the strategy pledges to cut the gynaecology waiting list, the scale of the backlog is daunting. Even the commitment to move patients from the independent sector — where spare private capacity exists — into state-funded treatment represents a significant logistical undertaking. The elective reform plan announced earlier this year aims to reduce the longest waits from 18 months to 18 weeks, but the timeline remains unclear.

“Medical misogyny” requires cultural change, not just clinical protocols. 

The Women and Equalities Committee was unambiguous: the problem is not simply a lack of resources. It is a culture of bias, normalisation, and dismissal, embedded across primary and secondary care. Sarah Owen, chair of the committee, described it as “not a criticism of male doctors” specifically, but a “systemic misogyny” that runs through the whole structure. A new standard of care mandating pain relief is a policy. Changing the underlying attitudes of clinicians requires sustained training, accountability, and cultural leadership over years.

Intersectional inequalities need more than targets. 

The commitment to close the black and Asian maternal mortality gap is welcome and long overdue, but setting a target is not the same as achieving it. Significant variation in access to perinatal mental health services by ethnicity persists. ICB budget cuts risk undermining the specialist programmes that disproportionately serve the women who need them most.

Does It Tackle Misogyny? 

That depends on what you think tackling misogyny in healthcare looks like.

If it means naming the problem honestly and committing the government’s authority to confronting it: yes, this strategy does that more forthrightly than anything that has come before it. The language is not a bureaucratic euphemism. Calling out a “system that gaslights women” from the despatch box, and then legislating pain standards and accountability mechanisms to match, represents a qualitative shift.

Weighing in here myself (as a woman), I am split into two minds: we are finally moving in a positive direction for women’s rights in healthcare, but the fact that it has taken this long for us to acknowledge the sexism occurring frustrates me.

The menopause, for example, has only been given recognition in recent years, and that was mostly through relentless campaigning from the Menopause Mandate, an incredibly powerful movement from dedicated women for the menopause to be recognised properly in healthcare. It was through an aunt of mine that I discovered the sheer amount of symptoms that occur during the menopause, and upon further research I realised just how little women are taught about their health in schools.

Testosterone is not included in NHS prescriptions, costing from £60 monthly, something that most women need to feel like “themselves” again. Out of curiosity, I recently read a book on how to deal with the perimenopause (called the Feel Good Fix), and despite it not being in my imminent future, it made me truly admire all the women who have fought so hard to raise awareness of menopausal symptoms, and that women should not “disappear” once they reach a certain point in their lives.

Women’s contraception currently has one of the longest lists of side effects possible from a medication, and Plan B was only recently made free in pharmacies. After watching a Loose Women debate about medieval contraceptive methods, the pain described from inserting an IUD without anaesthetic to me feels, quite frankly, torturous. The lack of education surrounding the pill and its effectiveness is also alarming – it is not common knowledge that antibiotics stop it from working, or that Plan B is less effective if you are over 155-165 pounds.

So while this new Women’s Health Strategy is a step in the right direction, it is important to note that it is just that – a step. There is much more awareness and education needed surrounding women’s health, but for now, a government that names the problem honestly has at least cleared the first hurdle. The women who’ve been waiting a decade for a diagnosis will be watching closely to see if it clears the rest.

Featured Image Credit: House of Commons on Flickr

But after 16 years in office, Orbán’s rule has come to an end. In a result few would have thought possible, Péter Magyar, a rising star in Hungarian politics, and his Tisza party defeated Fidesz in Hungary’s general election, toppling the most deeply entrenched political machine in the European Union. Orbán conceded defeat on election night, while Tisza secured 138 of the 199 seats in parliament: enough for a two-thirds supermajority.

The scale of the result makes it more than a routine change of government. For years, Hungary had been a symbol of democratic backsliding in Europe: a country where elections still took place, but where the playing field had been so thoroughly tilted in favour of the ruling party that removing it through the ballot box seemed increasingly remote. That is why this election is being read not simply as a defeat for Fidesz, but as the collapse of a political order that had come to look immovable.

A Test for the Global Right

Viktor Orbán’s influence stretches far beyond the borders of a small central European state. Steve Bannon, Donald Trump’s former adviser, once described him as “Trump before Trump”. He has been embraced by figures across the nationalist and populist right, from Matteo Salvini and Marine Le Pen to Trump himself. Just last week, US Vice-President J.D. Vance travelled to Budapest on the eve of the election, praising Orbán as an extraordinary leader and expressing confidence in his victory.

Before becoming the European Union’s longest-serving head of government and a self-styled defender of Christian conservative values, Orbán was a young anti-communist liberal. He first rose to prominence in the late 1980s after the fall of communism, presenting himself as a champion of democracy, national sovereignty, and Hungary’s western future.

Image: Former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban – EU2017EE / Annika Haas

Since then, both Orbán and his party have moved steadily to the right, with the decisive turning point coming after Fidesz won a constitutional supermajority in 2010. Drawing on the politics of fear and using the refugee crisis to sharpen his message, Orbán built a powerful “us-versus-them” narrative in which he cast himself as the guarantor of order and security in an increasingly hostile world.

Repeated landslide victories gave him the power to rewrite the constitution, reshape state institutions, and pass laws that tightened his grip on power while squeezing independent media, civil society, and democratic checks. Ever since, Orbán has used his dominance of the political system to present himself as the nation’s protector against an ever-changing list of enemies: migrants, Brussels, LGBTQ+ groups, George Soros and, more recently, Ukraine.

Why the Change?

One might ask: with a system so deeply rooted and influential, how was change even possible? Previous challengers were either outmanoeuvred or swiftly crushed by the government’s propaganda machine, which proved highly effective at discrediting opponents before they could gain real momentum.

For years, despite a lack of transparency and widespread allegations of corruption, much of the Hungarian public was kept onside by a potent mix of fear-based messaging and targeted economic support. The government coupled campaigns against perceived enemies with tangible benefits for key groups, including tax breaks for families and the restoration of the 13th-month pension.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Fidesz also managed to present itself as the guarantor of peace, portraying the opposition as reckless figures who would drag Hungary into a war that was not its own. This year, Orbán returned to that familiar populist script. He framed the election as a choice between peace and war, telling voters they could keep Hungary as an “island of peace and security” by re-electing him, or risk chaos by backing Magyar, whom he depicts as a proxy for Brussels and Kyiv.

But fear of the war began to fade as a dominant political force after 2024, and the government’s message has become harder to sustain against the realities of daily life. A combination of poor economic management and a succession of damaging scandals left Fidesz looking less invincible. Voters appeared more focused on domestic concerns, particularly the economy and public services. Growth has stalled and healthcare remains under strain; food prices have climbed to near-EU average levels, even though Hungarian wages remain among the lowest in the bloc.

Image: Prime Minister Peter Magyar via Flickr – Norbert Banhalmi 

That shift created an opening for Péter Magyar, a 45-year-old former Fidesz insider, to emerge as the first genuinely credible challenger to Orbán’s rule. A lawyer and former diplomat, he spent years inside Orbán’s circle and (through his marriage to former Justice Minister Judit Varga) was close to the heart of the system itself.

He burst into national politics in early 2024 after Varga was forced out over a scandal surrounding a presidential pardon in a child sexual abuse case, a moment that badly shook the government’s moral authority. Magyar seized that opening, breaking publicly with Fidesz and presenting himself as a disillusioned insider willing to say aloud what many Hungarians already suspected: that Orbán’s system had become defined by cronyism and the concentration of power.

He moved quickly to turn that outrage into a political vehicle, building his party, Tisza, as a broad anti-establishment force. Tisza’s strong second-place finish in the 2024 European elections transformed Magyar from a media phenomenon into a serious political contender. He has since built his appeal around promises to restore ties with the EU, tackle high-level corruption, and revive public services.

When the Unstoppable Force Met the Immovable Object

Before Sunday’s election, more than 100,000 people gathered in Budapest for a massive anti-government concert described as a “system-breaking” event. The crowd was overwhelmingly young, and the atmosphere felt less like a campaign event than a final release of collective energy.

Even though most polls had shown Tisza with a clear advantage, 16 years of unshakable power left many feeling that victory was “too good to be true”. Reuters had reported that Tisza was ahead in independent polling (in some cases by as much as 13 points) but Hungary’s electoral system still favoured Fidesz, meaning a lead in vote share was never guaranteed to translate into power.

Image: Secretary Rubio Holds Joint Press Availability with Hungarian Prime Minister – State Department / Freddie Everett

Once the polls opened, participation reached unprecedented levels. By the afternoon, turnout had already surpassed the previous overall record, eventually peaking at a record 80%. As the country waited, Tisza’s gathering by the Danube drew a huge crowd. When the first results showed a clear lead for Magyar, the mood turned from nervous hope to celebration. By the end of the night, Budapest had become what Reuters described as a “party zone”.

The campaign also exposed a clear social and generational divide. Among older voters, particularly those over 65, Fidesz retained much of its strength. However, among younger and more educated Hungarians, the picture was sharply different. Reuters reported that Fidesz won only 8% support among voters aged 18 to 29, underlining how decisively youth turnout drove Tisza’s victory.

Orbán No Longer: What Is Next for Hungary?

Four consecutive parliamentary supermajorities gave Fidesz the freedom to entrench itself across almost every part of Hungarian public life: the media, the judiciary, state institutions, and universities. That is what made Viktor Orbán’s defeat so significant, but it is also why defeating him is not the same thing as dismantling the system he leaves behind.

For years, it was assumed that even if a challenger beat Orbán, they would struggle to govern without a two-thirds majority to undo the deeper legal architecture of the Orbán era. What even the boldest pollsters hesitated to predict was that this is exactly what Tisza secured: a parliamentary supermajority of its own.

With this mandate, the party now has the strength to restore democratic checks, strengthen judicial independence, and join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to unlock billions in frozen EU funds.

But with great power comes great responsibility. A supermajority removes excuses. Tisza can no longer argue that its ambitions are blocked by parliamentary arithmetic. If it fails to deliver visible democratic renewal, it will be much harder to blame the structure it inherited. The task will not be straightforward, as Orbán-era loyalists remain embedded throughout the state. Orbán may be gone, but the system he built is not.

Featured Image via European Union

As to why students are increasingly turning to Reform, the answer is clear: degrees no longer ensure employment after graduation, and young people, noting that Reform are one of the few parties speaking up about it, are realising that Nigel Farage may just have the solution. Speaking to young supporters of Reform, there seems to be a consensus among them that universities have become breeding grounds for left-wing ideologies, rather than educational institutions, thus meaning that the majority of degrees, including what Farage has termed “-ology” subjects, are useless in regards to obtaining well-paid jobs.

One Politics student at Birmingham University told us that they believe “there are many pointless degrees out there that ultimately lead to nothing more than debt”, questioning “whether some courses are setting students up for the real world”.

Similarly, Jayden Palmer, a Reform UK candidate and influencer, also revealed to us that he believes universities have “tilted so heavily toward ideological courses while ignoring whether they actually prepare students for the real economy”. It is clear that these students feel they have been left behind by the educational system, their futures left unsupported by universities. But, is this really why students have flocked to Farage’s party?

Perhaps the real reason lies within the demographics of Students for Reform. The national leadership is overtly male, run by Jack Eccles, supported by Honorary President Matt Goodwin, who has expressed some questionable rhetoric on women over the course of his career. Most Reform society leaders are also male, although few do have female members as executives, although sparse amounts attend events. There is clear reasoning behind this – young, white, male students feel as though they’ve been forgotten, left disadvantaged by diversity and inclusivity schemes, and thus have turned to Reform for support.

Samuel Hussey, a prospective Reform UK candidate and social media influencer, stated that “young men have nothing to believe in”, arguing that “if you’re a white working-middle class man this country, almost every aspect of society is against you” as a result of “years of radical woke madness,” adding that young men are rejecting the “new social expectations that place us under everybody else”. He then digressed that “young men need a future they can believe in” and that they “want and deserve to feel proud again”. Clearly, students believe that Reform will enable them to escape from the “New Woke Order”, if that exists, and access greater support.

Whilst there is evidence to suggest that working class, white boys have been left behind by state education, how Reform would challenge that is questionable. Universities increasingly offer greater access schemes for minority groups, such as BAME students and transgender students, yet do not offer support which academically performs the worst – working-class men. Considering that Reform have committed to lower funding to universities, it is unlikely that any new support schemes for male students would emerge.

Referring to Farage’s rhetoric around students issues, Brandon Morley, Co-President of Birmingham University Reform Society, said that there are wider grievances among young people and he would take “a more hardline stance” on immigration, believing that Reform hasn’t gone far enough. So whilst Reform may be attracting youth members based on their commitment to reversing inclusivity schemes, some right-wing students do not feel as though Reform is focusing fully on them.

As a result of this, many students, who previously supported Reform, have defected to Restore Britain, with a number of related societies popping up across the country, often replacing Reform societies. A spokesperson for the Restore Britain Society at York St John said that many in their generation feel misled by institutions and are seeking alternatives, thus have left Reform in the hope that Rupert Lowe will be willing to go further. The question is now, can Reform maintain their student base, or will they lose it to Restore, or even the Conservatives, as they begin to advance in the polls.

However, it would be fallacious to pretend Reform is welcome on campuses. Speaking exclusively to Politics UK, a member of the York Reform Executive Committee described incidents where individuals shout “fascist” or cough/spit/throw drinks at them, implying that “unsympathetic staff often leak our locations to left-wing groups”.

A spokesperson for St. Andrews Reform Society said that they receive “the most mockery and bitterness online”, as compared to other political societies. Earlier this year, Reform students at St. Andrews were confronted by left-wing protestors, which led to Suella Braverman releasing a statement condemning both the university and the students for “political violence”.

In another incident, whilst speaking at a PPE society event at Warwick, George Finch, the 19-year-old Reform Leader of Warwickshire Council, faced an attempted assault by a left-wing protestor, who, after shouting and running at Finch, attempted to throw his shoe. After the event, Finch stated that “you have to be brave nowadays to go to our educational establishments, adding that universities are “poisonous” environments that treat those with his views as “the enemy” and arguing that events are disrupted through “violence and intimidation” which “shut down legitimate avenues of debate”.

Although Jack Eccles, the President of Students for Reform, and the National Leadership responded to the incident at St. Andrews, a Reform member at the University of Birmingham stated that Eccles provided no support after they informed him they had received violent threats and felt unsafe on campus for being openly Reform.

Several Reform societies are tipped to defect to Restore Britain, as a Young Restorers organisation is in the early stags of development, stating that the Party and student national leadership alike have done far too much to little to support students.

Students for Reform, although currently unstable, has the potential to be transformed into a movement that could tip support to Farage in the next general election. It is clear that young voters are turning to the right, feeling left behind by state education, however, which party they will commit to is not yet certain. After all, Restore is on the rise, with dozens of young Restore Britain influencers appearing across Instagram and Tiktok, and the Conservative Party is once again polling highly among men aged 18-25. If Reform can provide stability to their student wing, perhaps the Teal Revolution will continue to spread across universities. Time will tell whether it is really “Time for Reform”.

Featured Image Credit: Gage Skidmore

Greg Stafford MP

Member for Farnham and Bordon

This article argues that SLAPP lawsuits are being used to intimidate critics and that Greg Stafford MP’s Private Members’ Bill would widen protections, allow early dismissal of abusive cases and protect defendants from excessive costs to safeguard free speech.

The chilling effect of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or SLAPPs, is growing in the United Kingdom. For some, as an obscure legal concept, SLAPPs has quickly become a threat to basic democratic norms: the ability of journalists, campaigners, whistleblowers, researchers, and ordinary people to speak out on matters of public interest without fear of financial ruin and intimidation. Yet the current legal protections against SLAPPs remain too narrow and ineffective, leaving vulnerable voices exposed.

That is why I introduced my Private Members’ Bill, titled Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation Bill, which I believe represents a step toward broadening protections and restoring confidence in free speech and public participation.

What is a SLAPP?

SLAPPs are legal claims that have little to do with legitimate grievances and much to do with silencing critics. They are used by powerful individuals, corporations, and other well-resourced actors to burden a target with exorbitant legal costs and psychological strain until they back down or entirely self-censor. SLAPPs can be dangerous before a case reaches a courtroom: endless legal letters, threats of litigation, and the looming threat of unlimited costs are often enough to stifle reporting, deter advocacy and chill discussion on matters of public interest.

From allegations of corruption to environmental concerns and public health debates, SLAPPs undermine the public’s right to know and the press’ ability to hold power to account. The consequences demonstrate that SLAPPs are not just a theoretical problem, but a tangible threat to democracy.

The Conservatives were the first government to introduce statutory measures to counter SLAPPs through the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, countering SLAPP cases at an early stage. Despite over 70 per cent of cases being closely related to economic crime, current legislation surrounding SLAPPs fails to account for the other 30 per cent, leaving a broader range of strategic litigation aimed at silencing public interest speech untouched. Journalists, campaigners, and ordinary people remain vulnerable to intimidation that the law was meant to prevent.

Outlier

Globally, the UK is still widely viewed as a leader in its legal courts and legislative standards; however, when anti-SLAPP legislation operates to a higher standard in other countries than our own, we must question the current Bill’s scope and effectiveness.

In the United States, several states have enacted their own anti-SLAPP legislation, while those that have not remain largely protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech. Similarly, in Canada, protections exist at the provincial level, notably in Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia. In Europe, the European Union adopted an Anti-SLAPP Directive in 2024, requiring all Member States to implement minimum protective safeguards.

Elsewhere, more limited or targeted protections exist in jurisdictions such as Australia and other parts of South East Asia, including the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. 

Closing the Gap

I introduced my Private Members’ Bill to address the gap. Its aim is simple: to prevent the misuse of litigation as a tool to suppress freedom of speech and public participation. While a Private Members’ Bill does not guarantee passage into law, it is essential to keep pushing this onto the Government’s agenda and to reinvigorate debate about how the UK protects free expression to push the Government toward meaningful reform.

My Bill builds on the 2023 Act by expanding the scope of SLAPP protections to all litigation brought with the aim of suppressing public participation, not just those tied to economic crime. It provides courts with a clearer statutory framework to identify and swiftly dismiss SLAPP claims before they drain defendants’ time, money, and mental wellbeing. It is designed to prevent powerful interests from using the legal system as a cudgel to intimidate those who speak out in the public interest.

Proposals in my PMB include a statutory definition of what constitutes a SLAPP, clarifying when a claim is intended to intimidate or silence public participation. Previously, judgments have relied entirely on interpretation without clear legal standards; therefore, they have been applied inconsistently. This Bill would additionally establish an early dismissal mechanism, allowing courts to strike out claims at an early stage if the claimant cannot show they have a realistic prospect of success. This prevents defendants from being dragged through long and costly legal battles.

Another important provision is protection from legal costs for defendants. Individuals such as journalists or small-scale campaigners would not be forced to pay the claimant’s legal costs unless a judge decides otherwise. I know firsthand that the threat of costs can deter people from defending themselves, even when they know they are in the right. Reducing this financial pressure empowers people to speak out without fear of being bankrupted by litigation.

A central part of the draft provision has been to balance how to prevent strategic abuse of the legal system, without restricting legitimate claims. SLAPPs are not always easy to identify. Malicious intent can be subtle, and courts are rightly cautious about intervening in disputes that involve genuine grievances. If thresholds for intervention are too high or too subjective, SLAPPs will continue to chill speech long before a judge makes a formal ruling.

Despite these challenges, I am encouraged by the renewed focus on anti-SLAPP reform. The UK Government has recognised that SLAPPs are evolving and can involve not just economic crime but environmental activism, academic research, and other forms of public interest speech. The Government’s wider anti-corruption strategy has acknowledged the problem and committed to action, though comprehensive reforms may not be in place for years. Every month that powerful interests can use litigation as a cudgel rather than a tool for justice is another month that journalists, campaigners, and ordinary citizens suffer in silence.

Without Fear or Favour

In a democracy, the law should protect the weak against intimidation by the powerful, not provide loopholes for the wealthy to misuse the courts. I believe my Bill is a step toward ensuring that public interest speech is shielded from legal harassment rather than cowed by it. To make it truly effective, however, lawmakers must listen to those who have faced SLAPPs firsthand and ensure protections are broad, clear, and practical. Our legal framework must match our democratic ideals, or we risk leaving the very voices that hold power to account without any protection at all.

Photo Credit: Matt Brown

This article features in the new edition of ChamberUK. Our parliamentary journal.

You can buy your copy here.

The overarching convention which determines legality of armed attack between states is Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits states from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. The two widely accepted exceptions are:

• UN Security Council authorisation under Chapter VII
• Self-defence under Article 51 if an armed attack occurs

For self-defence to be lawful, most scholars say it must satisfy:

• Armed attack (or at least an imminent one)
• Necessity, meaning force is required to stop the threat
• Proportionality, meaning the response adequately reflects what is needed to repel the attack.

The Standard of Imminence

The Israeli president, Isaac Herzog, told BBC Radio 4’s Today programme the fact that Iran was “planning a bomb” was enough to justify the attacks. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter there is a right to self-defence in response to an armed attack. A broader interpretation of international law has been that a state has a right to use force in response to an “imminent threat.” Thus, “imminence” is the key here.

Traditionally, international law has drawn on the 19th century Caroline formulation, which requires a threat to be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.” Under this standard, the bar for anticipatory self-defence is extremely high.

Does Iran Pose a Threat?

Currently, Iran harbours zero nuclear weapons. This is not simply a baseless claim: Iran is bound by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Essentially, the treaty is a bilateral agreement whereby signatory states “agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”

Image: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at an officers’ graduation ceremony – Kobi Gideon / GPO

Israel, since its inception in 1948, has refused to sign. Further, Iran routinely submits to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a UN-related international organisation based in Vienna that monitors nuclear programmes to ensure nuclear materials are not diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons. Israel, on the other hand, refuses to submit.

While Iran has expanded uranium enrichment in recent years, enrichment alone does not constitute a nuclear weapon. The determinable, crucial step (weaponisation) remains difficult to verify. Thus, it can be argued that the existence of a potential future capability does not satisfy the Caroline standard of an imminent armed attack.

However, supporters of the strikes have argued that the speed with which highly enriched uranium can potentially be converted into a weapon compresses the traditional understanding of imminence. In this light, the test for imminence is most salient. Without proper evidence of a potential nuclear weapon to be sure-fire ready for deployment as opposed to mere preparation, the notion that the attacks can be justified on the grounds of imminence seems surely thin.

The Necessity Component

There exists a variety of avenues in which the two nations could have attempted before violent means. For example, diplomacy and nuclear agreements: for instance, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or sanctions and monitoring regimes (as mentioned, Iran already submits to this). This opens discussions regarding the “necessity” component of assessing whether attacks were truly legal. The requirements of necessity demand that force be used only when no reasonable peaceful alternatives remain or were already exhausted to no avail.

Proportionality: Were the Strikes Limited?

To assess the proportionality element, the targets and casualties of this operation are particularly salient. As mentioned, even if a threat were considered imminent, international law requires that the response be proportionate. Strikes must be limited to what is necessary to neutralise the threat rather than punish or deter a rival state more broadly.

Image: President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speak in the Diplomatic Reception Room before a dinner – The White House / Daniel Torok

Reports indicate the strikes have targeted a wide range of military, political and economic infrastructure, not just nuclear facilities. The operation launched by US-Israeli forces was far more extensive than the limited intervention last year. Early strikes reportedly targeted senior Iranian leadership and security infrastructure: senior Iranian officials were killed, including military leadership and the country’s Supreme Leader (Ayatollah) during the opening strikes. Iranian naval vessels and minelayers were destroyed near the Strait of Hormuz, as well as drone factories and missile-related infrastructure have also been targeted. These are all types of targets typically cited by the US and Israel as legitimate military objectives.

Reports also indicate substantial civilian harm: more than 1,200 people have been killed since the campaign began, while humanitarian organisations report damage to thousands of residential buildings and dozens of healthcare facilities. Particularly controversial was a strike on a girls’ school that reportedly killed over a hundred civilians. President Trump denies his involvement in the attack, instead claiming it was Iran’s own missile which hit the school.

International Humanitarian Law and the Geneva Conventions

Even if the strikes were considered lawful under the right of self-defence, they must still comply with the rules governing the conduct of hostilities under international humanitarian law. These rules are codified in the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols.

Two principles are particularly relevant:

1. Distinction: This requires parties to a conflict to differentiate between military objectives and civilian objects. Attacks may only be directed at legitimate military targets, such as military facilities, weapons depots, or command structures. Civilian infrastructure, including homes, schools and hospitals, cannot be intentionally targeted.
2. Proportionality: Closely related is the principle of proportionality. Even when a target is a legitimate military objective, an attack may be unlawful if the expected civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

If such sites were struck intentionally, they would almost certainly constitute violations of international humanitarian law. If they were damaged incidentally while attacking nearby military targets, the legality would depend on whether the expected civilian harm was considered excessive at the time of the attack.

Conclusion

Ultimately, assessing proportionality is notoriously difficult in real time and often depends on information available only to military planners. Nevertheless, the scale of civilian harm reported in the strikes is likely to intensify scrutiny from international lawyers and human rights organisations.

The legality of the US and Israeli strikes on Iran remains deeply contested under international law. While both states have framed their actions as necessary in the unwavering pursuit of self-protection and long-term peace, the legal threshold for anticipatory self-defence is exceptionally high. The traditional standard of imminence requires a threat that is immediate and unavoidable, and the available public evidence that Iran was on the verge of deploying a nuclear weapon appears limited.

Image: President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speak privately in the Vermeil Room before a dinner – The White House / Daniel Torok

Evidently, questions regarding necessity appear paramount. Diplomatic mechanisms, inspection regimes and international agreements designed to constrain Iran’s nuclear programme have existed for years, raising doubts over whether the use of force was truly the only viable option available.

Even if the strikes were considered legally justified under the right of self-defence, their conduct must still comply with international humanitarian law. Reports of extensive civilian casualties and damage to residential areas, hospitals and schools place the proportionality of the operation under serious scrutiny. In practice, the legality of such actions is rarely determined in the immediate aftermath of conflict; rather, it is formulated through long-term efforts and debates through international institutions and historical judgement.

For now, the strikes occupy a legally ambiguous space: both in the realm of being highly contested by legal scholars and world leaders alike, but also torn between the tension which exists within international law over how states respond to emerging security threats in an increasingly unstable terrain.

Featured Image via The White House / Daniel Torok

That came as a surprise to anyone who had been following the recent AI news emerging from China. Just weeks earlier, a Stanford University report had found that Chinese AI models had “caught up or even pulled ahead” of their American competition. In his New Year’s Address, Xi Jinping boasted about what he called a “transformative 2025 for China’s AI,” describing “breakthrough developments” on the subject. So, who is ahead of who here?

“I know it doesn’t fit into headlines, but this is so much more nuanced than just a simple ‘who’s ahead’,” says Thomas Derksen, a Shanghai-based entrepreneur, influencer and consultant who has covered the Chinese tech world for years. “It really depends on what your metrics are whether you’re looking at open or closed source, for instance.”

Open vs Closed AI Models: Where the US and China Lead

Closed-source AI models are engineered to perform a wide variety of tasks for their users, but their algorithms remain closed off and cannot be altered. “With these models, the Americans are for sure still leading the way with OpenAI, Anthropic and Google,” says Grace Shao, founder and analyst of industry newsletter AI Proem on Substack.

Image: Open AI Logo – Flickr via Trong Khiem Nguyen

“There are specific use cases where the Chinese AIs make some waves, such as in having very advanced video generation abilities,” Shao says, “but the pioneering of these general-purpose models is still being done by the American labs.”

Open-source AI models, however, are a much different story. With their code usually available publicly, developers can alter the workings of the models for their own use cases, particularly relevant when companies want to use the models. “In the end, nobody cares if you or I use the American closed source models to write a poem or get a cooking recipe,” Thomas Derksen says. “What matters is what open-source businesses are making money with- and this is where the Chinese are dominating.”

Why Businesses Are Choosing Chinese AI Models

Chinese AI models have indeed increasingly been favoured in the business world, for instance by global players like Pinterest and Airbnb, who are now using Deepseek open-source models and Alibaba’s Qwen AI respectively. Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky told the BBC the Chinese-made models were simply “good, fast, and cheap.” 

“Are these Chinese models the absolute frontier technology? Probably not yet,” Grace Shao says. “But if a company from a pure business perspective wants a top-notch model in terms of performance but is also cost-conscious, they may well choose a Chinese model.” 

Image: Chinese AI Deepseek – Flickr via Trong Khiem Nguyen

“A lot of companies do just favour Chinese models because they’re so cheap,” Derksen agrees. “Deepseek’s models are roughly on the level of Chat-GPT 5 now,” he says, “but at a fraction of the cost. Especially in markets like Africa or Southeast Asia, many firms just can’t afford the pricey American models, and opt for the Chinese ones.” 

For Derksen, this is a classic Chinese strategy. “Often when Chinese companies see that they might not quite be able to keep up in terms of quality, they bring the cost down,” he says. “And with the conditions on the ground in China, this is easy.”

Powering cheap AI, one windmill at a time

On a cold February morning in the dimly lit train station of Ulanqab, an industrial city in Inner Mongolia province in China’s far north, migrant worker Li vents his frustrations. “They have us building windmills all day out on that bloody steppe,” he grunts. “Sometimes the wind blows so cold I could freeze into an ice block.” Smirking, he points to the AI translation app flickering across his phonescreen. “The big bosses there need our windmills, though.” 

To build their cheap AI models, companies like Deepseek rely on a crucial factor- China’s affordable, seemingly infinite electricity production. “Over the last decade, we have seen a huge rise in Chinese renewable energy solutions,” says Grace Shao. Once largely dependent on coal, the value of China’s green energy sector has doubled between 2022 and 2025, with massive investment into wind and solar power, often in the country’s north. China now has some of the cheapest electricity on the planet.

Image: Power lines in rural Inner Mongolia, China – Julius Buhl

And this cheap, scalable electricity allows Chinese AI-makers to run massive, energy-intensive AI training centers at a lower cost than many Western competitors. Inner Mongolia has become one of the main hubs for this, as the cold steppes are now crowded with windmills that power several state-of-the-art data centers. “The Chinese now have the capacity here, and can thus push the price down,” Shao says.

Meanwhile, the competition in America is struggling in this area. “The US grid is old, and the electricity demand has not changed in decades,” Shao says. “Expanding it now to power the AI datacenters is expensive, and there is only slow progress on unlocking new renewable power sources. This is a kind of bottleneck for the US.” And electricity is not the only area in which China seems to have a leg up these days.

China’s AI Talent Boom and the “Reverse Brain Drain”

For long, observers argued that China was struggling to pioneer new technologies because much of its prime talent headed for Silicon Valley when given the chance. “But that’s the past,” Grace Shao says.

AI-trailblazer Tencent recently hired Vinces Yao, a top researcher who worked on OpenAI’s first AI agents. Several other high-profile engineers who had previously worked in the development of key AI models in the US have recently moved across the Pacific, a trend some have dubbed a “reverse brain drain.”

“Talent is no longer a bottleneck for Chinese AI,” Grace Shao says. “Some people are homegrown, some are engineers returning from the Bay Area- either way, the calibre is very high.”

According to Derksen, this is very much part of Beijing’s plan. “If Xi Jinping declares something a priority as he has done with attracting AI talent, that impacts everyone in China; every university, every province, every city will do their best to fulfil the order,” he says. “The scientists are feeling this, they get resources and support everywhere they go in China, so it’s no surprise that a lot are heading there.”

And then, the cost factor strikes again. “I can essentially get two engineers for the price of one in China,” Thomas Derksen says. “Living costs and salaries are just much lower than in the US. There is an abundance of talent, and the Chinese working culture is still ruthless. They can just get more done in a shorter time.”

As businesses seem to favour Chinese AI powered by cheap electricity and abundant talent, it may seem like Beijing is winning this race easily. But there is one constraint China just can’t seem to shake off.

AI Chips: China’s Biggest Weakness

AI developers rely on specially designed computer microchips to train their AI models. They are incredibly hard to manufacture, and having an outdated chip can cost developers significantly more and delay model development for years. “American NVIDIA and Taiwanese TSMC are still the undisputed number one when it comes to making these chips,” Thomas Derksen says, “and they’re not letting the Chinese access them freely. And that is their biggest problem.” 

Over the past few years, Washington has tightened export restrictions on advanced chips and chipmaking equipment, limiting China’s access to the crucial hardware. In December, Deepseek was accused of illegally training its models on NVIDIA’s Blackwell Chips despite the import ban, an accusation the company denies. “The lack of access to state-of-the-art chips remains the biggest AI bottleneck for China,” Grace Shao says. “It’s the only area where they can’t bring the cost down, at least for now.”

Image: The crucially important AI Chips – Flickr via Tim Reckman

To combat this, China has in return long been pouring billions into manufacturing chips domestically, with the government tapping tech giants Huawei and Alibaba to create alternatives. 

And there have been some successes. In September, Chinese State Media reported that a new chip manufactured domestically by Alibaba can match the performance of Nvidia’s semiconductors while using less energy. 

But aside from these success announcements, the key player remain vague as to how much they have actually progressed.  “It’s a black box, they really don’t want people to know what the status is,” Thomas Derksen says. “But it’s clear Alibaba and Huawei are working like crazy to catch up.” But until they can, Lin Junyuan’s 20% chance statement seems to still have some backing.

Anyone in third place?

While China and the US are racing each other for AI dominance, the rest of the world has been busy too. India, for instance, has been pioneering its own sovereign models, most notably BharatGPT, heavily supported by the government. With a massive domestic market and an abundance of tech talent, Prime Minister Modi has repeatedly stressed his ambition for his country to become the world’s number three when it comes to AI.

Image: Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the AI Impact Summit he hosted in February (Narendra Modi Picture Gallery)

In Europe, Mistral AI has made headlines, with the French startup winning sizeable defense contracts in both Germany and France, as the EU pushes for greater AI independence. 

In China’s backyard, the South Korean government has invested heavily in making its own “fully native” model, aiming to create an AI entirely independent from foreign models.

“The more important AI becomes and the more America and China advance, the more a lot of leaders are realising that they can’t be too dependent on either country,” Shao says. “The fear of AI-exploitation, of being a market while the money is made elsewhere is a real concern.”

But compared to China and the US, the industry seems in its infancy across the board. Bloomberg recently labelled India the “AI world’s most valuable unpaid intern” as the country is stellar at using AI models but still very much struggles at making them. In South Korea, three of the five companies shortlisted to make its “fully native” AI were found to still be using some code from foreign models, with executives saying that a fully decoupled model was “unrealistic.” 

Europe seems even worse off: throughout the AI race, the United States have produced 40 foundation models, while China has developed 15. All of Europe combined has created just three. “And even European prestige projects like Mistral are far away from their American or Chinese counterparts,” Grace Shao says. 

Do Countries Really Need Sovereign AI Models?

But does everyone really need to be building their own AI? “So many resources need to be in place locally to build an AI ecosystem from the bottom up,” Grace Shao says. “Trying to catch up to China or the US will take a long, long time for many countries, and it doesn’t make sense for most.” Instead, she says the conversation should not be framed as a race, but as an opportunity where countries can leverage their own strengths to build parts of their own tech stack, while still leaning on infrastructure led by the two superpowers.

Singapore has for example been courting both American and Chinese labs and attracting talent from both countries, who have then been building data centers in the small city state. Malaysia and Thailand are following a similar strategy. In South Korea, the government has invested $1.2 billion to enhance AI literacy in education after the “native model” disaster, aiming to become a talent hub for the technology. 

In the end, Grace Shao says, many countries can find niches in this. “Outside of Asia, industry-heavy countries like Germany can for instance focus on AI-powered robotics or something like that, while countries in the gulf with an abundance of energy can focus more on utilizing that for AI” she says. “Each economy has its own advantages here.” 

Thomas Derksen believes there also needs to be a change of mentality as well, particularly in Europe. “We need to acknowledge the fact that this technology has come to stay,” he says. “It’s a revolution and we’re in the middle of it. So we might as well get on with it and try to adapt.”

In the end, who’s winning this revolution right now depends on what winning means. The US still leads at the mere performance level. China is racing ahead on cost and scale, while the Americans maintain their biggest advantage, the chips. Meanwhile, for much of the world, the real question may not be who comes first- but where they can get a foot in the door.

Featured Image via The White House / Daniel Torok

Local authorities facing severe financial pressure will be granted additional flexibility to balance their budgets, as the Government confirmed a fresh round of Exceptional Financial Support (EFS) alongside a £78 billion multi-year funding settlement for councils.

Announced by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government on 23 February, the package is intended both to prevent immediate service failure and to begin longer-term reform of how local government is funded.

What Exceptional Financial Support Allows

Exceptional Financial Support permits councils in acute financial difficulty to use capital resources – including receipts from asset sales and borrowing – to cover day-to-day revenue costs. While not designed as a permanent solution, it enables authorities to set legally balanced budgets and avoid effective bankruptcy.

The process has existed since 2020, largely as an emergency safeguard. However, ministers say this latest round sits within a broader commitment to stabilise council finances and reduce repeat reliance on exceptional measures.

Support is subject to strict conditions, including comprehensive financial assessments and further engagement where required to ensure credible recovery plans are in place.

The Councils Receiving Support

Alongside the national announcement, the Government has issued formal response letters to several authorities granted support or related flexibilities for 2026–27.

These include:

• London Borough of Croydon – granted support covering 2025–26 and 2026–27
• Slough Borough Council – granted support for 2026–27
• Thurrock Council – granted support across 2024–25, 2025–26 and 2026–27
• Woking Borough Council – granted support for 2026–27
• Warrington Borough Council – granted support covering 2025–26 and 2026–27
• Birmingham City Council – approved to reprofile previously agreed capitalisation support spanning 2020–21 to 2025–26

The inclusion of Birmingham – the largest local authority in Europe – underlines the scale and systemic nature of the pressures facing the sector.

Several of these councils have previously issued Section 114 notices or experienced sustained financial instability. In some cases, the new arrangements extend support across multiple years, reinforcing concerns about structural weaknesses in the current funding model.

A £78 Billion Multi-Year Settlement

Alongside EFS, ministers confirmed £78 billion for councils through what they describe as the first multi-year funding settlement in more than a decade.

The settlement introduces an updated evidence-based approach, incorporating the latest Indices of Multiple Deprivation to better reflect local need and the genuine costs of service delivery in deprived areas.

The Government argues this marks a shift away from an outdated funding framework that left some councils disproportionately exposed to financial shocks.

Minister: “People in deprived areas have been let down for too long”

Minister for Local Government and Homelessness, Alison McGovern, set out the case for intervention:

“People in deprived areas have been let down for too long, with councils in the poorest areas left on their knees and services cut back as a result.

The support we’re announcing is critical for the councils, and we are doing everything we can to ensure councils can balance the books, including by making £78 billion available through the first multi-year settlement in a decade.”

Her remarks frame the issue as one of fairness as much as financial management, particularly for communities experiencing higher levels of deprivation.

Breaking the Cycle

The Government has made clear that while Exceptional Financial Support remains necessary, it does not want to see rising numbers of councils entering the scheme. Ministers say funding reform and multi-year certainty should reduce repeat applications and enable authorities to move towards sustainable recovery.

For councils, the central question will be whether the combination of conditional support and revised allocations is sufficient to restore long-term financial stability.

If successful, the reforms could allow local authorities to shift their focus from crisis management to service improvement – protecting adult social care, children’s services, housing support and other essential local provision.

The breadth of councils now reliant on Exceptional Financial Support demonstrates the seriousness of the challenge. Whether this settlement represents a turning point will depend not only on the scale of funding, but on whether structural reform delivers the stability ministers promise.

(Photo: Stephen Richards)

Supported by allies China, Iran, North Korea, and Belarus, Russia has maintained their army primarily through foreign funding: producing arms, armoured vehicles, and other supplies through these means. The result of this has been a major strain placed upon both the Ukrainian army and the nation’s civilian population: with Ukraine only managing to meet 60 percent of its national electricity demand by January 2026, resulting in nationwide blackouts (particularly in Kyiv).

While this has certainly served to lower national morale within the former Soviet republic, Russia’s façade of strength and military domination appears to be crumbling.

Key Moments

The most divisive conflict throughout the entire campaign remains the war’s opening clash at Antonov Airport: lasting from the first day of the operation to 25 February 2022. As Russian forces aimed to utilise Blitzkrieg tactics to capture the airport (a major strategic landmark), the army faced major complications in landing their own heavy transport aircraft, as a result of Ukraine’s 4th National Guard Regiment’s efforts to surround the Russian forces and damage the runways. While Russia eventually succeeded, holding the base until April the same year, the damage sustained by the runways prevented a major aerial advantage for the Russian forces, destroying chances of successful routes into the capital.

28 February 2022, four days after President Putin’s announcement of a Russian invasion, the first rocket attacks were launched in Ukraine’s second largest city, Kharkiv (located in the northeastern part of the country), killing at least nine civilians and wounding over forty. This first spark of the conflict marked a distinct precedent for the “operation”, and was shortly followed by an intensified military effort by Russian forces on the capital, Kyiv.

Image: President Zelenskyy delivering an Easter address amid the conflict with Russia – President of Ukraine

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant Crisis has also remained a significant strategic threat since early on in the conflict, with a fire breaking out on 3 March as a result of a persistent shelling campaign by Russian forces. While all six of the plant’s reactors remain in a state of “cold shutdown” for the safety of both the staff and the local civilian population, the site remains a stronghold for occupying Russian units, and has overseen constant bombardment (primarily in the form of drone attacks and shelling) from both parties.

Not only has the Zaporizhzhia occupation caused both logistical and strategic issues for the Ukrainian army, but also legal concerns, with the proximity of the fighting to the plant raising questions of whether the operation classifies as nuclear terrorism.

A combination of both smaller skirmishes and major operations have been the make-up of the war from this point onwards- with significant sieges (such as Mariupol) granting the Russian army grand advantages in terms of access to Crimea and the Donbas in the form of land bridges. On the contrary, counter-offensives remained the focal point of Ukrainian combat until 2023, with the Kharkiv Lightning Strike in September liberating over 6,000 kilometers of occupied territory in a matter of days (including major cities Izium and Kupiansk).

In the later months of 2022, Russia declared the annexation of four Ukrainian regions (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia), however this was widely internationally rejected.

2023 saw an overarching stalemate, a significant contrast to the ever-changing nature of the conflict in 2022. While more major campaigns (such as the Battle of Bakhmut, lasting from August 2022 to May 2023) resulted in severe human losses for the Russian army, events like the Nova Kakhovka Dam Collapse in the summer of 2023 caused almost equally severe destruction in Ukraine.

Following their successful campaigns to drive Ukrainian forces out of Kursk in 2024, the Russian army appears to have significantly slowed down in their advancement into Ukrainian territory: advancing only 15-70 meters a day in their most successful offences. Making progress at a slower rate than the allies in the Battle of the Somme, it is clear to see that the insurgent force is struggling in achieving their strategic goals. Managing to seize just shy of 12 per cent of the nation, and remaining in control of 20% of it, it is easy to understand why after four years of total war Moscow is beginning to lose its morale.

War Crimes

With the International Criminal Court opening emergency investigations into the legality of the invasion as early 2 March 2022, and the International Court of Justice following exactly two weeks later by questioning the lack of evidence of the Kremlin’s justification for the war, there has been a severe concern regarding the criminal nature of the conflict from the very beginning.

Image: President Zelenskyy addresses the Israeli Knesset amid the conflict with Russia – President of Ukraine

A major turning point in this regard was the tragic discovery of mass graves in several Ukrainian towns (most notably Bucha, Irpin, Izyum, Lyman, Kherson, and Mariupol) as early as April 2022. Not only are these graves suggestive of massacres having taken place nationwide, but also a violation of both international humanitarian law and the Geneva conventions’ Additional Protocol I.

Evidence of “filtration camps” has also been presented, where Ukrainian civilians and soldiers are interrogated illegal methods (such as sexual violence, abduction, forced relocation, starvation, and torture). Over 91 per cent of civilian detainees held by the Russian Federation have described themselves as being treated in this way. The desired outcome of these method appears to be in order to remove those believed to pose a threat to Russian control. 

Similar experiences are also reported by both Russian and Ukrainian prisoners of war, with the most significant controversy regarding prisoner of war camp housing remaining the death of an estimated figure of 50 Ukrainian prisoners taken during their defence of Mariupol. While Russian forces have claimed that this tragedy was the result of a Ukrainian missile strike, many observers have suggested that the disaster was most likely caused by Russian authorities.

As of 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Putin.

NATO reaction

Since 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, NATO has remained in full support of both Ukraine’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty, “condemn(ing) Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms.”

Image: President Zelenskyy and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte meet at the NATO Washington Summit – The President of Ukraine

In response to this policy, allies of the Organisation have consistently provided the nation with military assistance, delivering on billions of Euros worth of supplies, training, and weapons.

Not only has NATO assisted in funding Ukrainian efforts, but the European Union has remained the country’s largest provider of financial and humanitarian support. Offering over €100 billion of aid, as well as €70 billion of military support, and €17 billion in support for refugees.

Global Impact

Soaring food prices across Europe, triggering energy shocks and power outages, accelerating inflation, and forcing major shifts in European energy dependency, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has placed the continent and its alliances under significant economic strain. As well as this, allies of Ukraine have enacted widespread sanctions upon Russian companies, particularly energy providers, which in turn has placed major strain on the continent (as well as straining Russia’s own war economy).

Aside from the financial impact of the conflict, over 3.7 million people continue to be displaced across Ukraine. While 4.4 million people have returned from their displacement since 2022, the intensifying nature of campaigns in winter months (particularly those closer to the Eastern border) have disrupted efforts.

Recent Developments

On 19 November 2025, a 28-point peace plan was revealed, drafted in peace talks between the United States and Russia. January 2026 saw the three nations (Ukraine, Russia, and the United States) hold trilateral peace talks for the first time since 2022, further signifying a diplomatic effort between all three nations to end the war.

Image: Prime Minister Keir Starmer meets Ukraine President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Alexander Stubb, President of Finland, Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission ahead of a meeting with US President Donald Trump – No 10 Downing Street / Simon Dawson

However, while these peace talks have occurred between the nations’ respective correspondents in both Geneva and Abu Dhabi, ‘total war’ remains ongoing in Ukraine, raising concerns regarding the progress made in these meetings.

Where we stand now

As of February 2026, data is beginning to suggest that Russia is hardly maintaining an upper hand, with a struggling army and a war economy that is grinding to a halt. The early failings of Blitzkrieg tactics have left Russia fighting a war of attrition which it is unable to maintain, and this can be seen in the slowing of Russian advancement alone. Gaining less than 1.5 per cent of further Ukrainian territory since the start of 2024, the lack of an adequate war economy is clearly the factor which is slowing progress.

Not only has Russia failed to generate any breakthroughs in the Ukrainian front line within any of its last two years of offensives, but a major decline in popular support within Russia itself can be blamed at least in part for the fatigue the country appears to be facing (with a majority of 55 per cent of Russians believing that at least one person in their social circle opposes the war).

While terms of national security for Ukraine are beginning to be finalised, territorial distribution remains the heart of debate between the two parties, remaining unsolved despite the numerous meetings held to date. Despite two rounds of trilateral talks between American, Ukrainian, and Russian representatives, there still is yet to appear a resolution to this ongoing debate.

Until territorial gains are agreed, it is likely that a peace deal will remain unsigned, leaving the Russian invasion of Ukraine a distinct lack of a timeline for its resolution, and keeping both nations under a state of duress for the foreseeable future.

Featured Image via President of Ukraine

In a more extreme instance, they attacked an officer with a sledgehammer, fracturing her back, during an organised break-in at a UK subsidiary of an Israeli defence firm. In her statement announcing the ban, Yvette Cooper claimed that the graffiti at the Brize Norton air base was part of “a long history of unacceptable criminal damage” carried out by members of Palestine Action.

As it stands, there are two primary pieces of statue that deal with, not just how those found to belong to proscribed terrorist organisations, but those who expressly show support for them: the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Terrorism Act 2006.

Under the Terrorism Act 2000, once an organisation is proscribed (officially banned by the Home Secretary): it is a criminal offence to belong to it (as per Section 11 of the statue), but it also an offence to invite support for it (Section 12). Section 12 was modified by amendments in 2019 led to the development that it remains an offence to express an opinion or belief that is supportive of a proscribed organisation and where the person is reckless as to whether the expression will encourage support for that organisation.

The caveat of “recklessness” has long been problematic for criminal prosecutions, and this case is no different. The amendment sets a high bar, that they were reckless as to whether it would encourage support and the expression was capable of encouraging support should invite a subjective test which should visit problems to every prosecution barrister involved. However, when the youth and elderly alike took to Westminster to protest against this proscription with cardboard box panels and placards inscribed with “I support Palestine Action”, that test is easily met. Put simply, there would exist very little reasonable excuse to avoid prosecution when a contextually-ready instance such as this one is present.

However, last week, the proscription was deemed unlawful and disproportionate by the UK Supreme Court, with judges citing that most of their activities had not reached the level, scale and persistence to be defined as terrorism. Yet that is not to say that the 2,500 people arrested for the crime relating to the protests have been resolutely vindicated – the Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood said she would appeal against the ban.

Furthermore, this ruling only vindicates those who stood in solidarity with Palestine Action and will not have an effect on those directly engaged with the group – those who have broken into factories or disrupted supply chains on behalf of the group on account of the charges being criminal damage, and thus outside the ruling specific to terrorist support. Thus, the issue of raising placards – upon which a bulk of the arrests stemmed from – will no longer be unlawful as a result of Friday’s ruling.

This ruling, however, suggests a variety of constitutional implications which are directly in the scope of public interest. At first glance, it evidences the constitutional limits on executive power – proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000 is an executive Act by the Home Secretary, where courts traditionally show deference in national security matters. Thus, if the Supreme Court held the proscription unlawful and disproportionate, there is evident signalling of judicial willingness to scrutinise national security classifications; a limit on executive discretion under s.3 Terrorism Act 2000 (the power for the Home Secretary to proscribe an organisation if believed to be concerned with terrorism); a reinforcement of proportionality under Article 10 of the ECHR.

Furthermore, a redefined look on the actual definition of the act and courts’ view in future. In legal disputes, courts will often look previously to landmark cases that clarified any in distinction regarding the application of statue or its doctrine. Here, the Court implicitly clarified the statutory definition of s.1 TA 2000 and the serious threshold for proscription.

Thus, in an age where arable ground for protest is amplified by the forces of social media in the wake of perceived grievances (the riots of 2024, the rise of Reform) this may act as a significant landmark for what may be a coming period marked by unrest and protest, be it civil or peaceful. This ruling, so to speak, extends far beyond a moralistic campaign of vindicating those who were arrested in the interests of the “pro-Israel lobby and weapons manufacturers… nothing to do with terrorism”, in the words of the infamous group’s co-founder Hume Ammori, but rather a question of how future judges and courts tend to interpret terroris legislation on a case-by-case basis as a whole.

The ruling ultimately exposes how protest movements may oscillate between lawful dissent angle and terrorism classification depending on executive judgement, and so there are salient concerns about legal certainty regarding the future of protest movements entirely. Should Mahmood’s appeal fail, it may very well consequently be followed by pressures to repeal the proscription entirely. In turn, all pending s12 prosecutions may very well collapse, convictions in a state of precarious and detentions raising false imprisonment claims. If this is a lesson to any future Home Office in succession, it may very well be one of meticulously tightening evidential thresholds before proscriptions actually take place and the police becoming more readily adaptable to protest-ready strategies.

Featured Picture by: Indigo Nolan – Flickr (Creative Commons Licence CC BY 4.0

The Anatomy of a Collapse: The 2024 Revolution

The current political landscape is the direct result of the Gen Z Uprising in mid-2024. What began as a student-led protest against a discriminatory civil service quota system transformed into a massive, national movement against the 15-year rule of Sheikh Hasina. The state’s attempts to suppress the dissent led to a staggering loss of life; the United Nations has estimated that roughly 1,400 people were killed during the crackdown.

The subsequent public fury forced Hasina to flee by helicopter to India on August 5, 2024. In the aftermath, the country turned to Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus to lead an interim government. His mandate has been focused on “cleaning the house”, overhauling the police, the judiciary, and the election commission, before returning the country to civilian rule.

A Nation Judging Its Past

The transitional period has been defined by a series of legal reckonings aimed at the former ruling elite. Most notably, a Bangladeshi court has sentenced Sheikh Hasina to death in absentia for crimes against humanity committed during the 2024 crackdown. Additionally, she has been handed a combined 21-year prison sentence across separate corruption cases.

Image: Former Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon meets with Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina at the COP26 Women’s Climate Leadership Event – Scottish Government

The legal fallout has also reached the United Kingdom. Tulip Siddiq, a prominent British Labour MP and niece of the deposed leader, was recently sentenced to a two-year prison term by a Dhaka court. The charges involve allegations of corruption and influence-peddling related to government land allocations. This judgment, delivered in her absence, is not recognised by the UK government. Siddiq has dismissed the entire proceeding as a politically motivated and contrived attempt to target her family.

The Return of the BNP and the End of an Era

This election marks a major transition for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). On December 25, 2025, Tarique Rahman, the son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, returned to Dhaka after 17 years in exile in London. His return was a massive symbolic event for the party, occurring just days before his mother, Khaleda Zia, passed away at the age of 80 on December 30, 2025.

Image: Former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia meets Former Foreign Henry Bellingham – FCDO

Rahman is now the frontrunner to be the next Prime Minister. He has pledged a platform of “Democratic Renewal,” which includes:

• Restoring the independence of the judiciary.
• Revitalising the nation’s ailing economy.
• Modernising state infrastructure to prevent future authoritarianism.

Opposing him is a resurgent 11-party alliance led by Jamaat-e-Islami, the country’s largest Islamist party. Once banned under the Hasina regime, the group has regained significant political ground. While they appeal to a conservative base in a nation that is 90% Muslim, their rise has sparked deep-seated fears among women and religious minorities regarding the potential erosion of secular protections.

The July Charter: A Referendum for Reform

Beyond selecting local representatives, citizens are casting a second ballot in a national referendum. This vote centers on the “July Charter,” a blueprint for sweeping constitutional changes intended to serve as “guardrails” against future autocracy. The proposed reforms include:

1. Bicameralism: Moving from a single-chamber parliament to a two-house system by adding an Upper House of 100 seats to the Jatiya Sangsad.
2. Term Limits: Restricting any individual from serving as Prime Minister for more than 10 years (two five-year terms).
3. Caretaker System: Reinstating an independent interim body to manage all future elections, ensuring neutrality

Economic and Social Headwinds

The winner of this election will inherit a nation in economic distress. Bangladesh’s vital garment export industry, a cornerstone of the economy, saw exports drop by 2.6% in the latter half of 2025 due to persistent unrest. Furthermore, inflation remains a major burden for the working class, sitting at 8.58% as of January 2026.

Global eyes are fixed on Dhaka, with roughly 500 international observers from the European Union and the Commonwealth monitoring the process. As mounted police patrol the polling stations with banners proclaiming a safe voting environment, the atmosphere is a mix of festive hope and cautious anxiety. For millions of young voters who have never seen a truly transparent election, today is the ultimate test of whether the “Gen Z Uprising” can be successfully codified into a stable, lasting democracy.

Featured Image via The World Bank / Faruk Pinjo