The Anatomy of a Collapse: The 2024 Revolution

The current political landscape is the direct result of the Gen Z Uprising in mid-2024. What began as a student-led protest against a discriminatory civil service quota system transformed into a massive, national movement against the 15-year rule of Sheikh Hasina. The state’s attempts to suppress the dissent led to a staggering loss of life; the United Nations has estimated that roughly 1,400 people were killed during the crackdown.

The subsequent public fury forced Hasina to flee by helicopter to India on August 5, 2024. In the aftermath, the country turned to Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus to lead an interim government. His mandate has been focused on “cleaning the house”, overhauling the police, the judiciary, and the election commission, before returning the country to civilian rule.

A Nation Judging Its Past

The transitional period has been defined by a series of legal reckonings aimed at the former ruling elite. Most notably, a Bangladeshi court has sentenced Sheikh Hasina to death in absentia for crimes against humanity committed during the 2024 crackdown. Additionally, she has been handed a combined 21-year prison sentence across separate corruption cases.

Image: Former Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon meets with Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina at the COP26 Women’s Climate Leadership Event – Scottish Government

The legal fallout has also reached the United Kingdom. Tulip Siddiq, a prominent British Labour MP and niece of the deposed leader, was recently sentenced to a two-year prison term by a Dhaka court. The charges involve allegations of corruption and influence-peddling related to government land allocations. This judgment, delivered in her absence, is not recognised by the UK government. Siddiq has dismissed the entire proceeding as a politically motivated and contrived attempt to target her family.

The Return of the BNP and the End of an Era

This election marks a major transition for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). On December 25, 2025, Tarique Rahman, the son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, returned to Dhaka after 17 years in exile in London. His return was a massive symbolic event for the party, occurring just days before his mother, Khaleda Zia, passed away at the age of 80 on December 30, 2025.

Image: Former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia meets Former Foreign Henry Bellingham – FCDO

Rahman is now the frontrunner to be the next Prime Minister. He has pledged a platform of “Democratic Renewal,” which includes:

• Restoring the independence of the judiciary.
• Revitalising the nation’s ailing economy.
• Modernising state infrastructure to prevent future authoritarianism.

Opposing him is a resurgent 11-party alliance led by Jamaat-e-Islami, the country’s largest Islamist party. Once banned under the Hasina regime, the group has regained significant political ground. While they appeal to a conservative base in a nation that is 90% Muslim, their rise has sparked deep-seated fears among women and religious minorities regarding the potential erosion of secular protections.

The July Charter: A Referendum for Reform

Beyond selecting local representatives, citizens are casting a second ballot in a national referendum. This vote centers on the “July Charter,” a blueprint for sweeping constitutional changes intended to serve as “guardrails” against future autocracy. The proposed reforms include:

1. Bicameralism: Moving from a single-chamber parliament to a two-house system by adding an Upper House of 100 seats to the Jatiya Sangsad.
2. Term Limits: Restricting any individual from serving as Prime Minister for more than 10 years (two five-year terms).
3. Caretaker System: Reinstating an independent interim body to manage all future elections, ensuring neutrality

Economic and Social Headwinds

The winner of this election will inherit a nation in economic distress. Bangladesh’s vital garment export industry, a cornerstone of the economy, saw exports drop by 2.6% in the latter half of 2025 due to persistent unrest. Furthermore, inflation remains a major burden for the working class, sitting at 8.58% as of January 2026.

Global eyes are fixed on Dhaka, with roughly 500 international observers from the European Union and the Commonwealth monitoring the process. As mounted police patrol the polling stations with banners proclaiming a safe voting environment, the atmosphere is a mix of festive hope and cautious anxiety. For millions of young voters who have never seen a truly transparent election, today is the ultimate test of whether the “Gen Z Uprising” can be successfully codified into a stable, lasting democracy.

Featured Image via The World Bank / Faruk Pinjo

The Rise of Anutin and the New Conservative Order

The most significant shift in Thai politics over the last year has been the emergence of caretaker Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul as the undisputed heavyweight of the conservative camp. Once a mid-sized kingmaker known for his medical marijuana platform, Anutin’s Bhumjaithai party has successfully absorbed the remnants of the old military-aligned factions to become a formidable royalist-conservative force.

Image: Former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting – World Economic Forum/ Greg Beadle

Anutin’s path to the premiership in September 2025 was a masterclass in political manoeuvring. He seized the opportunity when the Constitutional Court removed Paetongtarn Shinawatra, effectively collapsing the Pheu Thai-led government. By positioning himself as a stable hand during the border crisis with Cambodia, Anutin secured the backing of the palace and the conservative elites. His campaign has leaned heavily into nationalism, promising a border wall and a massive expansion of military-backed volunteer forces, rhetoric that has resonated with an electorate rattled by the prospect of war.

The Shinawatra Dynasty in Crisis

For twenty years, the name Shinawatra was synonymous with electoral dominance. Today, that legacy is facing an existential threat. The Pheu Thai party, the vehicle of billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra, is polling in a distant third place, a reality that would have been unthinkable five years ago.

Image: Former Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha meets with Former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen – Prachatai

The family’s downfall has been spectacular. After years in exile, Thaksin returned to Thailand in late 2023 only to find himself jailed. His daughter, Paetongtarn, took the mantle of Prime Minister in 2024 but lasted only a year before being judicially ousted. The smoking gun was a leaked phone call with Cambodia’s former leader Hun Sen, in which she was heard referring to the foreign strongman as uncle while disparaging the Thai military. In the eyes of many voters, especially in the nationalist heartlands, this was seen as a betrayal of national honour.

Now, with Thaksin behind bars and the family brand tarnished, Pheu Thai is campaigning on a platform of Shinawatra nostalgia, led by Thaksin’s nephew Yodchanan Wongsawat, in a desperate attempt to hold onto their dwindling base in the North and Northeast.

The King and the Veto of the Establishment

In Thailand, the ballot box is rarely the final word. King Maha Vajiralongkorn remains the country’s ultimate moral and political authority, and the conservative establishment, a mix of the palace, the military, and the judiciary, retains the power to veto results it finds unpalatable. The monarchy is a highly revered institution protected by some of the world’s strictest lese-majeste laws, and the King’s approval remains the ultimate prize for any aspiring government.

Image: King Maha Vajiralongkorn marrying his bodyguard Queen Suthiya – Mark Joseph Jochim

The People’s Party is already facing a new wave of legal investigations regarding their past stance on the monarchy, which could see its leaders banned before they even take office. This veto architecture ensures that even if the progressives win the popular vote, they must still navigate a system where the palace-military nexus holds the keys to the kingdom.

The People’s Party: Winning the Vote, Losing the Power

If the polls are to be believed, the progressive People’s Party is set to win the most seats for the second consecutive time. As the successor to the dissolved Move Forward and Future Forward parties, the People’s Party represents a generation of Thais who are fed up with the status quo. They are running on a transformative agenda: dismantling monopolies, ending military conscription, and overhauling a bureaucracy they say has kept Thailand in the shadow of its regional peers.

However, their leader, Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut, is already under the shadow of the same judicial architecture that destroyed his predecessors. The National Anti-Corruption Commission is currently investigating 44 former lawmakers, including Natthaphong himself, over past attempts to reform the royal insult laws. Even if they win a plurality on Sunday, the People’s Party faces the threat of party dissolution or disqualification before a cabinet is even formed.

The Border War and the Constitutional Question

The ghost at the banquet of this election is the 2025 border crisis with Cambodia. The conflict, which centred on contested strategic hills and ancient temples, has fundamentally altered the political map. It provided the conservative establishment with the perfect pretext to reassert the importance of the military and the monarchy as the ultimate defenders of the state. For the first time in years, the reform message of the progressives is being countered by a potent security message from the right.

Image: Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and Thailand’s Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul after signing the Kuala Lumpur Accord alongside President Trump – The White House / Daniel Torok

Simultaneously, voters will face a historic choice on a separate ballot: a referendum on the 2017 Constitution. This document, drafted by the military junta that seized power in 2014, was designed to ensure that the wrong parties could never truly govern. While a yes vote for a new constitution is almost certain to pass, the process is a legal labyrinth. Even with a public mandate, the Constitutional Court has ruled that two more referendums and several rounds of parliamentary approval are required before a single word of the charter can be changed.

The Likely Outcome: A Fragile Truce

The most probable result on Sunday night is a fractured parliament where no party holds a majority. While the People’s Party will likely claim the largest share of the 500 seats, they are unlikely to find a coalition partner willing to risk the wrath of the establishment. This leaves the door open for Anutin to once again play the role of the great stabiliser.

A coalition between Bhumjaithai and a weakened Pheu Thai, perhaps backed by smaller conservative blocks, would be the establishment’s preferred outcome. Such a government would focus on economic stimulus and border security while keeping the reformists at arm’s length. Yet, as the history of the last two decades has shown, any government that ignores the clear mandate for change from Thailand’s youth is building its house on sand.

Featured Image via United Nations (AP/Anton L. Delgado)

In the first round of voting on January 18, Seguro secured 31.1% of the vote, positioning himself as the frontrunner. Ventura followed with 23.5%, a result that confirmed the continued growth of his party, which was established only seven years ago. The election follows a period of heightened political activity in Portugal, including three legislative elections since 2021, and serves as a significant indicator of the current ideological divisions within the electorate.

The Role and Powers of the President

While the Portuguese President does not hold executive authority, a responsibility that lies with the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, the office is far from purely ceremonial. Under the country’s semi-presidential system, the President acts as a “guarantor of the institutions” and possesses several significant “reserve powers.”

Image: Prime Minister Luis Montenegro at the Web Summit 2024 – David Fitzgerald/Web Summit via Sportsfile

The most substantial of these is the authority to dissolve the Assembly of the Republic and call for early legislative elections. This power is particularly relevant in the current context, as Portugal is governed by a center-right minority administration led by Prime Minister Luís Montenegro. Additionally, the President has the power to veto legislation. While a parliamentary majority can eventually override a presidential veto on standard laws, the President can also refer legislation to the Constitutional Court for review, providing a significant check on the legislative branch.

Profiles of the Candidates

António José Seguro returned to the political forefront for this campaign after more than a decade away from active leadership. His platform emphasises institutional stability, the protection of social welfare systems, specifically the National Health Service, and a commitment to the democratic values established after the 1974 revolution. He has characterised his candidacy as a moderate alternative intended to unite voters across the democratic spectrum, from the center-left to the center-right, who are concerned by the rise of anti-establishment movements.

André Ventura has built his campaign on a platform of significant institutional change. As the leader of Chega, which became the main opposition party in parliament following the May 2025 legislative elections, his message centres on a critique of the traditional political class. His campaign has focused on issues such as stricter immigration controls, judicial reform, and a hardline stance on corruption. Ventura’s presence in the runoff represents a milestone for the Portuguese right, signalling that the “cordon sanitaire” that historically marginalised far-right movements in Portugal has become less effective.

Key Issues and Electoral Dynamics

The election is taking place against a backdrop of persistent social and economic challenges. Voters have consistently cited the housing crisis, characterised by high rents and property prices in urban centres, as a primary concern. Other dominant issues include low average wages and the rising cost of living, which have contributed to a sense of disenchantment with the traditional parties that have alternated in power for fifty years.

Image: Liberal initiative candidate João Cotrim de Figueiredo at the ALDE Party Congress in Dublin – ALDE Party

The runoff will largely be decided by the voters whose candidates were eliminated in the first round. This includes supporters of João Cotrim de Figueiredo of the Liberal Initiative (16%), independent candidate Admiral Henrique Gouveia e Melo (12.3%), and Luís Marques Mendes of the Social Democratic Party (11.4%). The decision by the ruling Social Democrats (PSD) not to formally endorse either candidate has added a layer of complexity to the race, as center-right voters must now decide whether to back a traditional rival from the Socialist Party or a populist challenger.

Domestic and European Implications

Domestically, the outcome will determine the nature of the relationship between Belém Palace (the presidential residence) and São Bento (the Prime Minister’s residence). A victory for Seguro would likely result in a more traditional, mediating presidency that seeks to maintain the current balance of power. A victory for Ventura could lead to a more interventionist approach, potentially challenging the stability of the Montenegro government and pushing for a realignment of the right-wing political bloc.

Image: Prime Minister Luis Montenegro speaks to the media as he arrives at the Washington NATO Summit – Joshua Roberts / US Department of State 

On a broader scale, the election is being monitored as a significant test of European political trends. Portugal was long viewed as an exception to the populist wave seen in other EU member states. After the Netherlands weathered a similar challenge from Geert Wilders, international attention now turns to Portugal to see if it will follow a similar path. The 2026 runoff serves as a case study in how established democracies respond to the mainstreaming of populist movements. Regardless of the final result, the fragmentation seen in the first round suggests that the era of two-party dominance is transitioning toward a more complex, multi-polar political environment.

Featured Image via Parti Socialisti / Philippe Grangeaud

The Origin of the Deal: Tory Negotiations

The claim that this deal is an “immoral surrender” by the Starmer government ignores the fact that negotiations were formally launched in November 2022 by the then-Foreign Secretary, James Cleverly. Under the Conservative government, officials conducted eleven rounds of high-level negotiations between London and Port Louis. These talks were continued and refined under Lord Cameron’s tenure as Foreign Secretary. The final round of Tory-led negotiations took place just weeks before the 2024 general election. By the time the government changed hands, the framework for ceding sovereignty in exchange for a long-term lease of the military base was already the established “Plan A” for the British state.

The Legal Reality: Why the UK Had to Act

The UK did not “choose” to give away the islands for no reason. For over a decade, the British position had become legally and diplomatically unsustainable on the world stage. In 2015, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that the UK’s “Marine Protected Area” around Chagos was illegal. This was followed by a 2019 advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which stated that the UK’s detachment of the islands from Mauritius in 1965 was unlawful and that decolonisation was incomplete.

Image: Prime Minister Keir Starmer gives a press conference after signing a deal to secure the military base on Diego Garcia at Permanent Joint Headquarters in Northwood – No 10 Downing Street / Simon Dawson

These rulings were reinforced by the UN General Assembly and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Had the UK continued to ignore these international verdicts, it would have faced immediate court injunctions that could have rendered the operation of the Diego Garcia base illegal, effectively locking the US and UK out of their own facility.

The UN resolution gave effect to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which demanded that the UK “withdraw its colonial administration … unconditionally within a period of no more than six months”.

116 states voted in favour of the resolution, 55 abstained and only Australia, Hungary, Israel and Maldives supported the UK and US throughout the debate.

International courts increasingly viewed the Chagos case through the lens of self-determination and decolonisation law. The ICJ concluded that the UK’s 1965 detachment of Chagos violated the UN Charter principle that colonial territories must be decolonised as a whole, noting that Mauritius had been pressured into “consenting” to the separation as a condition of independence. The Permanent Court of Arbitration and ITLOS similarly found that the UK could not lawfully exercise sovereignty over the islands while its title was disputed, meaning it lacked authority to impose a Marine Protected Area or regulate the surrounding waters under UNCLOS.

Security Guarantees and the 99-Year Lease

The treaty finalised in 2024 and currently moving through Parliament in 2026 also provides security guarantees that can prevent other countries from extending their influence in the region. Mauritius has granted the UK a 99-year lease for the island of Diego Garcia, with an option to extend for a further 40 years.

The deal includes a 24-mile “security buffer” around the base where no construction or activity can occur without UK consent. Furthermore, the agreement explicitly bans foreign military or civilian forces from the other islands in the archipelago, giving the UK a permanent veto over any presence that could threaten the base. Far from “surrendering” the base, the deal provides a legal foundation for its operation that did not exist under the previous contested ownership.

The US Endorsement: Secretary Rubio’s 2025 Support

Image: Secretary Rubio Participates in UN Security Council Ministerial Meeting alongside Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper – US State Department / Freddie Everett

While some domestic critics suggest the deal undermines the “Special Relationship,” the Trump administration’s own State Department previously provided its full endorsement. In May 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio formally welcomed the agreement, stating that a “comprehensive interagency review” by the Trump administration determined the deal “secures the long-term, stable, and effective operation” of Diego Garcia. Rubio described the treaty as a “monumental achievement” for global security. This support confirms that the US security establishment viewed the legal normalisation of the base as a vital priority, contradicting the current narrative of “weakness.”

Trump’s 2026 U-Turn and the Greenland Precedent

President Trump’s recent attacks on January 20, 2026, labelling the deal “great stupidity,” represent a significant departure from his administration’s 2025 stance. Analysts note that this rhetoric is not based on a new assessment of Indian Ocean security but is a reaction to his own territorial ambitions in the Arctic. Trump has explicitly linked his frustration over the Chagos deal to his desire to acquire Greenland from Denmark.

Image: President Donald Trump speaks with members of the media before boarding Marine One on the South Lawn of the White House en route to Joint Base Andrews – The White House / Molly Riley

He views the “decolonisation” logic of returning Chagos to Mauritius as a threat to his argument that the US can acquire or purchase new land. His current comments are widely interpreted as a rhetorical tool to pressure European allies rather than a legitimate reversal of the security findings released by his own Secretary of State last year.

Geopolitical Risks of Non-Compliance

The consequences of the UK breaking international law to keep the islands would have been severe. Persistently ignoring the ICJ and UN would have decimated the UK’s ability to lead on the world stage, making it impossible to hold countries like Russia or China accountable for their own territorial violations. It would have signalled to the Global South that the “rules-based order” applies only when it benefits the West, potentially pushing Mauritius and other Indian Ocean nations closer to Chinese influence. By settling the dispute, the UK has removed a primary diplomatic weapon used by its adversaries to paint Britain as a colonial relic, thereby strengthening its alliances across the Indo-Pacific.

Featured Image via No 10 Downing Street / Simon Dawson

The case, The Gambia v Myanmar, is not just a trial about past atrocities; it is a stress test for the international legal order. Here is an in-depth explainer on the “crime of crimes,” the people at the centre of it, and why the world is watching so closely.

Who are the Rohingya 

The Rohingya are a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority who have lived for generations in Rakhine State, Myanmar. Despite their deep roots, the Myanmar government has systematically attempted to erase their identity for decades.

Under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, the Rohingya were stripped of their citizenship, effectively making them the largest stateless population on earth. They cannot vote, travel freely, or access basic healthcare without state permission.

Image: US Ambassador to Bangladesh Miller visited Rohingya Refugee Camps in Cox’s Bazar – US Embassy Dhaka

The current case focuses on a brutal military campaign launched in August 2017. While the military claimed to be targeting militants, UN investigators found evidence of “genocidal intent.” Over 730,000 people fled to Bangladesh in a matter of weeks, carrying stories of mass rape, extrajudicial killings, and “slash-and-burn” tactics that leveled hundred of villages.

Today, more than 1.1 million Rohingya live in overcrowded bamboo-and-tarp shelters in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, while roughly 600,000 remain in Myanmar under what rights groups call “apartheid conditions.”

Why is The Gambia Leading the Charge? 

One of the most remarkable aspects of this case is that the plaintiff is The Gambia, a small West African nation nearly 7,000 miles away from Southeast Asia. 

The Gambia acted on behalf of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), invoking a legal principle known as “erga omnes partes” (obligations toward all). This principle argues that because genocide is a crime against humanity itself, any country that signed the 1948 Genocide Convention has the “standing” to sue another member to stop it. This “David vs Goliath” dynamic has set a precedent, proving that geographic distance is no barrier to seeking international justice.

Why Is This Hearing Monumental? 

This is the first time the ICJ has held a full “merits hearing”, the stage where actual evidence is debated, for a genocide case since the 2007 ruling on the Bosnian Genocide. It marks a shift from procedural delays to the heart of the atrocities. 

Typically, the ICJ relies on written reports and state declarations. However, in a rare move, these 2026 hearings include closed-session testimony from Rohingya survivors. For the first time, those who survived the 2017 massacres are speaking directly to the world’s highest judges.

Image: Former Prime Minister of Myanmar and 1991 Nobel Peace Prize Winner Aung San Suu Kyi – Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

When the case began in 2019, Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi famously travelled to The Hague to defend the military. Since the 2021 military coup, she has been imprisoned by the same generals she once defended. The military junta now represents Myanmar at the court, creating a surreal legal environment where the alleged perpetrators of the genocide are the ones tasked with defending the state’s actions.

The Global Ripple Effect: Israel and Gaza

The timing of this case is critical. The legal interpretations established by ICJ judges in the Myanmar case will likely influence South Africa’s genocide case against Israel regarding the war in Gaza.

International lawyers are watching to see how the court handles “genocidal intent.” Because states rarely admit to genocide, intent must often be inferred from patterns of conduct, such as the systematic destruction of homes of the use of dehumanising rhetoric. If the ICJ accepts these patterns as proof of intent for Myanmar, it lowers the “evidentiary bar” for other genocide cases worldwide.

What Could Happen? (The Outcomes) 

The ICJ does not have a police force to arrest generals, but its rulings carry immense weight.

A final ruling of “genocide” would legally brand Myanmar a pariah state. This would trigger mandatory international sections and could force the UN Security Council to take more drastic actions.

Image: US Ambassador to Bangladesh Miller greets children on a visit to Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar – US Embassy Dhaka

The court could order Myanmar to pay billions in reparations to survivors and most importantly to restore the citizenship of the Rohingya. While the ICJ deals with states, the International Criminal Court (ICC) deals with individuals. A “guilty” verdict would provide massive momentum for the ICC’s pursuit of arrest warrants for Myanmar’s top generals, including Min Aung Hlaing. 

The hearings are expected to conclude by late January 2026, with a final judgment likely appearing 6 to 12 months later. For the Rohingya, it is a race against time and a test of whether “Never Again” is a binding legal promise or merely a hollow slogan.

Featured Image via The US Embassy Dhaka

January: The Restoration and the Old Guard

The year began with the passing of a pillar of the old guard. From January 4–9, the United States held a state funeral for Jimmy Carter, a week-long commemoration of the 39th president that served as a final reflection on the era of liberal internationalism. The ceremonies in Plains, Georgia, and Washington D.C. gathered world leaders in a rare moment of unity before a radical shift in American leadership.

On January 20, Donald Trump was sworn in as the 47th President inside the U.S. Capitol Rotunda due to freezing temperatures and high winds. His “Great Restoration” address promised a return to “transactional sovereignty,” signalling immediate withdrawals from the Paris Agreement and a freeze on foreign aid. Simultaneously, Poland assumed the EU Presidency, pivoting the bloc toward a “security-first” posture focused on military resilience and border protection.

February: European Shifts and Deadlocks

On February 9, Kosovo’s parliamentary elections resulted in a total hung parliament. The winning Vetëvendosje (LVV) party failed to secure the 61 votes needed for a Speaker, plunging the young nation into a legislative freeze. This deadlock fuelled civil unrest as citizens protested against political paralysis that threatened to restart ethnic tensions in the North.

Image: Prime Minister Keir Starmer meets Chancellor Friedrich Merz – Ben Dance / FCDO

On February 23, the German Federal Election delivered a seismic victory for Friedrich Merz and the CDU/CSU, which secured 28.5% of the vote. The far-right AfD, led by Alice Weidel, achieved a historic 20.8%, becoming the second-largest party in the Bundestag. This result effectively crushed the SPD to a historic low of 16%, signalling a definitive rightward shift in Europe’s largest economy.

March: Natural Disaster and the Carney Pivot

In Canada, the political landscape was redrawn on March 9 when the Liberal Party selected former central banker Mark Carney to replace Justin Trudeau. Carney won with a landslide 85.9% of the party vote, immediately pivoting the party toward a platform of “technocratic nationalism.” He positioned himself as a vanguard of Canadian sovereignty in anticipation of an aggressive trade war with the new administration in Washington.

Tragedy struck Southeast Asia on March 28 when a massive 7.7 magnitude earthquake struck the Sagaing region of Myanmar. The disaster killed over 3,700 people and injured thousands more. The military junta was widely condemned for weaponising the disaster by restricting aid to resistance-held territories, utilising the “natural” catastrophe to perform a brutal display of institutional dominance.

April: Impeachment, Terror, and a New Mandate

On April 4, the South Korean Constitutional Court delivered a unanimous 8–0 ruling to impeach and remove President Yoon Suk-yeol from office. The verdict concluded a crisis triggered by Yoon’s failed martial law declaration in late 2024. The court ruled that mobilising troops to block the National Assembly and ordering the arrest of judges constituted a “grave betrayal of public trust,” triggering a snap presidential election.

In South Asia, the relative peace of the Kashmir Valley was shattered on April 22 by the “Pahalgam Massacre.” Islamist militants from The Resistance Front (TRF) killed 26 civilians, mostly Hindu tourists, in a brutal mass shooting. Prime Minister Narendra Modi responded by granting the armed forces a “free hand,” approving “Operation Sindoor.” By the end of the month, India had moved to a war footing, preparing surgical strikes against terror infrastructure deep within Pakistan.

Amidst these crises, the Catholic Church entered a period of mourning following the death of Pope Francis on April 21 (Easter Monday). The 88-year-old Pontiff passed away at the Vatican following a stroke and complications from a respiratory infection. His funeral on April 26 drew over 400 pilgrims to St. Peter’s Square.

Image: Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Prime Minister Mark Carney – Simon Dawson / No 10 Downing Street

The month concluded with a major shift in North American politics. On April 28, Mark Carney led the Canadian Liberals to a surprise minority victory in a snap federal election. Defying polls that had favored the Conservatives for over a year, Carney successfully campaigned on a platform of defence against American trade threats. His victory secured a fourth consecutive term for the Liberals and set the stage for deep diplomatic tension with the Trump administration.

May: Landslides, Missiles, and Border Friction

On May 3, Anthony Albanese’s Labor Party won a historic 94-seat landslide in the Australian Federal Election. This crushing victory left the Liberal Party decimated, with opposition leader Peter Dutton losing his own seat. Seventeen days later, on May 20, the National Party officially ended its 38-year coalition agreement with the Liberals, effectively ending the conservative alliance as it had existed for decades.

On May 8, following a brief conclave, white smoke emerged from the Sistine Chapel. The College of Cardinals elected Chicago native Cardinal Robert Francis Prevost, who took the name Pope Leo XIV. As the first American Pope, his election signaled a shift toward institutional stability and “bridge-building” during the Church’s Jubilee Year.

In South Asia, India and Pakistan engaged in their largest air battle since 1971. Between May 6–10, India launched precision missile strikes under Operation Sindoor, targeting nine major terror camps inside Pakistan. A ceasefire was eventually reached on May 10 after a panicked Pakistan requested a halt via the DGMO hotline. In Southeast Asia, fatal gunfire on the Thailand-Cambodia border led to the constitutional suspension of the Thai Prime Minister.

June: The Twelve-Day War and the Tokyo Fallout

The Middle East reached a tipping point on June 13 as the Israel-Iran “Twelve-Day War” began. Israel’s “Operation Midnight Hammer” neutralized several Iranian nuclear sites, while Iran’s retaliatory “True Promise III” strikes hit the Haifa oil refinery. A June 25 ceasefire was brokered by the U.S., but the conflict left the region fractured and led to a formal international declaration of famine and genocide in Gaza later on in the year.

Image: US President Donald Trump welcoming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Mar-a-Lago – Ben Amos Gershom / GPO

In East Asia, Lee Jae-myung won the South Korean snap presidential election on June 2, securing 49.42% of the vote. His victory signaled a shift toward a more pragmatic, “equidistant” foreign policy. On June 27, the Washington Accords were signed between the DRC and Rwanda, mediated by Donald Trump to swap regional peace for U.S. access to cobalt, aimed at countering Chinese influence in the critical minerals market.

July: Territorial Struggles and Japanese Upheaval

On July 20, Japan’s LDP lost its majority in the House of Councillors for the first time since 1955. This historic defeat, driven by a “slush fund” scandal and the “Rice Crisis,” left Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba governing as a minority leader. The vacuum in Tokyo allowed the nationalist wing of the LDP to begin campaigning for a more aggressive, independent military posture.

Image: Former Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba – Dean Calma / IAEA

In Southeast Asia, a full-scale Border War erupted between Thailand and Cambodia on July 24. Triggered by rocket strikes on Thai residential areas, the conflict displaced over 300,000 people and saw Royal Thai Air Force F-16s bomb Cambodian command posts. Domestically, the Trump administration shuttered USAID on July 1 under the “DOGE” mandate, ending sixty-four years of American humanitarian promotion.

August: Breakthroughs and Famine

The Kosovo deadlock finally ended on August 26 with the appointment of Dimal Basha as Speaker, allowing for a fragile coalition government. This breakthrough followed months of civil protests that had paralysed the nation’s legislature. In the Middle East, secret talks in Hargeisa between Israeli officials and Somaliland leaders sought to secure Red Sea access in exchange for official recognition.

Simultaneously, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza reached its most harrowing nadir. On August 22, the IPC officially confirmed that 641,000 people were living in a state of catastrophic famine. The report cited the total collapse of aid corridors during the summer conflict as the primary driver, leading to international calls for humanitarian war crimes investigations against regional leaders.

September: The Triple Shock

September saw the “TikTok Revolution” in Nepal, where violent “Gen Z” protests forced PM Oli to resign on September 9 after nineteen youth protesters were killed. The next day, on September 10, the U.S. was rocked by the assassination of Charlie Kirk at Utah Valley University. The suspect, Tyler Robinson, was captured shortly after, triggering a massive national security response across American universities.

Image: Political Activist Charlie Kirk speaking at the 2022 AmericaFest – Gage Skidmore via Flickr

On September 11, Brazil’s Supreme Court delivered a final blow to the far-right, sentencing Jair Bolsonaro to 27 years in prison for his central role in the coup plot intended to overturn the 2022 election. The ruling was supported by testimony from senior military officials, preventing a broader uprising but deepening the diplomatic freeze between Washington and Brasília.

October: Coups, Mandates, and Peace Prizes

Peru’s Dina Boluarte was impeached on October 10 for “permanent moral incapacity.” Two days later, a military coup in Madagascar by the CAPSAT unit overthrew President Rajoelina following protests over utility failures. Amidst the chaos, Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on October 11 for her tireless struggle for democratic rights.

Image: 2025 Nobel Peace Prize Winner Maria Corina Machado, Venezuelan Congresswoman and Opposition Leader – CSIS

Electoral shifts further reshaped the West. Catherine Connolly won the Irish Presidency with 63% of the vote, and Javier Milei solidified his “chainsaw” mandate in the Argentine midterms on October 26. On October 29, the Dutch D66 defeated Geert Wilders’ PVV, breaking the European far-right domino effect. Timor-Leste also officially joined ASEAN as its 11th member at the month’s end.

November: Climate Friction and the G20 Boycott

The COP30 summit in Brazil (Nov 10–21) saw a total freeze in U.S.-Brazil relations over Amazonian sovereignty and the “Tropical Forests Forever” facility. Tensions peaked when President Trump refused to meet with President Lula, announcing a rival “Coal and Nuclear Energy Alliance.”

Image: Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva – Ricardo Stuckert

This was followed by the G20 Summit in South Africa (Nov 22–23), which was overshadowed by an unprecedented U.S. presidential boycott. President Trump skipped the summit to focus on domestic trade negotiations, leaving South Africa to push the “Africa debt trap” agenda alone. In the Pacific, terror suspects Sajid and Naveed Akram returned to Australia undetected from the Philippines.

December: Recognition and Year-End Terror

The year closed with a diplomatic bombshell: Israel officially recognised Somaliland as a sovereign nation on December 26 to secure naval access to the port of Berbera. This move made Israel the first UN member state to grant such recognition, establishing full diplomatic ties and a new strategic hub in the Horn of Africa.

This recognition followed one of the year’s most shocking terror attacks on December 14, where a mass shooting at Bondi Beach by the Akrams left 15 dead, including a ten-year-old child. The attack during a Hanukkah celebration horrified Australia and led to a massive overhaul of counter-terrorism laws. 2025 concluded with the final ratification of the “Washington Accords” on December 4, a deal between the DRC and Rwanda swapping regional security for U.S. critical mineral access.

Featured Image via The White House / Daniel Torok

A Staggered Farce: Geography of a Sham

The December 28th vote is merely the first of three phases, with subsequent rounds planned for January 11 and 25, 2026. However, the physical reality of the vote reveals its illegitimacy. According to the junta’s own Union Election Commission (UEC), voting is cancelled in at least 56 out of 330 townships and over 121 constituencies.

Independent analysts, including the BBC and Council on Foreign Relations, estimate the military holds firm control over only 21% to 25% of the country. In the “liberated zone” of Sagaing, Magway, and other ethnic states including the Shan state voting has been banned. By excluding these regions, the military is not just holding a flawed election; it is effectively disenfranchising half the nation to ensure a victory for its proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).

The Human Cost: A Legacy of Five Years of Blood

While the junta prepares polling stations, the people of Myanmar endure a humanitarian catastrophe. The “suffering” described by international monitors is not abstract; it is a daily fight for survival against a regime that has turned the tools of the state against its own people.

Image: Life in Myanmar at the Shwedagon pagoda in Yangon before the chaos of the coup – Stella Paul / IPS

Over 3.5 million people are now internally displaced. Following a catastrophic 7.7 magnitude earthquake in March 2025 and devastating floods earlier in the year, the misery has compounded. The World Food Programme (WFP) warns that 16 million people, nearly one-third of the population, now face acute food insecurity.

In a desperate bid to cement control before the polls, the military has intensified its “campaign of terror.” Airstrikes and drone attacks increased by 30% in 2025 alone. Just weeks ago, on December 11, a junta airstrike hit a hospital in Mrauk-U, killing dozens of patients and medical staff. This followed an attack on a tea shop in Tabayin that killed eighteen civilians watching a football match.

Facing dwindling ranks and mass desertations (estimated at 20,000 soldiers since the coup), the junta has turned to “conscription-related abductions.” Young people are being snatched from the streets of Yangon and Mandalay as human shields or front-line fodder, leading to a massive exodus of the country’s youth to Thailand.

Engineering a “Result”

The legal framework of this election is a masterclass in authoritarian engineering. The junta has replaced the “First Past the Post” system with Proportional Representation (PR), combined with a 25% seat reservation for the military. This ensures that even with a fraction of the popular vote, the military can maintain a “legal” grip on the legislature.

Furthermore, the National League for Democracy (NLD), the party that won a landslide in 2020, has been dissolved. Its leaders, including Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, remain in solitary confinement. A new Election Protection Law enacted in July has seen over 267 people charged for “interfering” with the poll, a charge that can be triggered by merely liking a social media post critical of the process. In some cases, young activists have been sentenced to 49 years in prison for hanging anti-election posters.`

A Cry for Recognition

The junta’s true target audience for this election is not the people of Myanmar, who have responded with “silent strikes” and boycotts, but foreign governments. While Western nations and the UN have unequivocally denounced the “charade,” regional powers like China, India and Russia have offered varying degrees of support, viewing the vote as a potential “off-ramp” for regional instability.

Image: Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Tianjin, China – MEAPhotoGallery

For the citizen standing in a polling line in Mandalay today, the “reality” is not a choice of policy. It is a choice between participating in a stage-managed performance or facing the lethal consequences of dissent. Outside the urban bubbles, the reality remains the smell of smoke and the sound of jet engines.

The wars in Ukraine and Gaza continue to hold the world’s attention, whilst the suffering in Myanmar goes largely under the radar. The December 28th election will not bring peace; it is merely a new, more clinical chapter in the military’s long-running war against the sole of Myanmar.

Featured Image via Leo Bild via Flickr

The Catalyst: Terror at Archer Park 

The legislative push follows the horrific events of Sunday, December 14, 2025. During a “Chanukah by the Sea” celebration at Bondi’s Archer Park, two gunmen, identified as 50-year-old Sajid Akram and his 24-year-old son Naveed, opened fire on a crowd of approximately 1,000 people. 

Image: Australia’s Bondi Beach where the attack took place – Loraine Blyth via Flickr

The attack, which claimed 15 lives and left dozens injured, has been officially designated an Islamic-State inspired terrorist incident. Public fury has been fuelled by revelations that the elder Akram had a valid firearms licence and legally owned six weapons, despite his son having previously been investigated by security agencies for extremist associations.

IS in the Philippines ? 

The investigation has cast a spotlight on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao, a region that has functioned as a volatile epicenter for Islamist extremism in Southeast Asia for decades. While the Philippine government reports that the Islamic State (IS) presence is significantly diminished today compared to its peak during the 2017 Siege of Marawi, the area remains home to a fractured network of militants, including remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Maute Group (also known as Daulah Islamiyah). These groups operate in the dense jungles and remote maritime borders of the Sulu Archipelago, often exploiting local grievances and porous boundaries to attract foreign sympathisers. 

Although major coordinated attacks have decreased, recent incidents, such as the December 2023 Mindanao State University bombing, prove that “lone wolf” or “leaderless” cells inspired by IS ideology continue to pose a lethal threat, providing a plausible, if unconfirmed, backdrop for the Bondi shooters’ recent 26-day stay in the region.

Australia’s Crackdown: Targeting “Hate Preachers” 

On Thursday, Prime Minister Albanese announced a five-point plan designed to lower the legal threshold for prosecuting hate speech. The Prime Minister admitted that “more could have been done” to address a rising tide of antisemitism prior to the massacre. It comes after a rise of antisemitism globally since the October 7th attacks, Prime Minister Netanyahu criticised the UK and Australia for allowing these attitudes to develop and the role their recognition of Palestine has played in fuelling these ideas.

Image: Prime Minister Keir Starmer meets Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese for a bilateral as he attends the G7 Summit in Canada – No 10 Downing Street / Simon Dawson

Key proposals include: 

• Aggravated Hate Speech Offences: A new federal offence specifically targeting religious and community leaders or “preachers” who promote violence or racial supremacy.
• Visa Cancellation Powers: Expanded authority for the Home Affairs Minister to refuse or cancel visas for any individual deemed to be spreading “hate and division”
• Listing Hateful Organisations: A new regime to “list” and restrict organisations whose leadership engages in serious vilification or promotes radicalisation. 
• Online Aggravation: Amending sentencing laws to make “hate” or an aggravating factor in crimes involving online harassment and threats.

Australia’s Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke said “There have been individuals who have exploited our principles of freedom of speech to go right to the limits of dehumanising language.” 

“We just don’t need them,” he added.

State-Level Response: Emergency Gun Reform

While the federal government is targeting the ideological motivations behind the attack, the New South Wales government is targeting the access to arms used to carry it out. Premier Chris Minns has announced that he will recall state parliament next week to pass “urgent and controversial” firearms legislation.

Image: NSW Premier Chris Minns meeting Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr. Kao Kim Hourn – The ASEAN Secretariat / Organising Committee

At the moment there is no strict statewide cap per license on arms, proposed reforms could see limits ranging from 3-5 firearms per individual. Restrictions may also be imposed on who can own firearms, currently non-citizens are able to hold licenses and the application is largely based on criminal records, reforms hope to require police to use security intelligence to deny licenses and restrict licenses to Australian citizens. Shotgun reclassification may also change with stricter categories and ban on belt-fed magazines.

The suitability test is a major change, with people facing restrictions on licenses if intelligence agencies link them to extremist circles, despite not committing any crimes. 

The Political Friction 

The government’s refusal to hold a Royal Commission has drawn criticism from the Opposition. While Treasurer Jim Chalmers argued that a high-level inquiry would “distract security agencies” during an active investigation, the Coalition has demanded even harsher measures, including stripping citizenship from dual-national terrorists and pausing visas from “terrorist enclaves.”

As the first of the 15 funerals conclude, including that of 10-year old Matilda and 87-year old Holocaust survivor Alex Kleytman, the Australian government faces the challenging task of balancing legal maneuverers, investigating the attack and managing a shocked and divided general public.

Featured Image via International Institute for Strategic Studies

The precision airstrikes, which the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) described as a necessary preemptive move to “cripple” Cambodia’s offensive capabilities, mark the fiercest direct combat between the historic rivals since the bloody temple standoffs of 2011 and the flash-conflicts of July 2025. The renewed violence has already resulted in confirmed fatalities, the mobilisation of heavy armor, and the chaotic displacement of nearly half a million civilians, raising fears that a localised border skirmish is spiraling into a full-scale regional war.

The Spark: A Weekend of Violence

While tensions have simmered for weeks, the situation deteriorated rapidly over the weekend. The catalyst appears to have been a chaotic firefight late Sunday night in the dense jungles of the Dangrek Mountains.

Thai authorities reported that a patrol unit near the disputed Preah Vihear temple complex was ambushed by heavy mortar fire and drone-dropped munitions, killing one Thai ranger instantly and critically injuring others. Bangkok claims this was the final straw following a month of “provocations,” including the maiming of a Thai soldier by a freshly laid landmine in November; an incident that had already led Thailand to suspend de-escalation protocols.

By Monday morning, the conflict had transformed from border skirmishes to air superiority operations.

“Cripple Their Capability”: The Thai Offensive

In a televised address that stunned regional observers, the Thai military command confirmed the deployment of F-16 Fighting Falcons to strike logistics hubs and artillery batteries inside Cambodia.

“We are no longer firing warning shots,” stated General Chaipruak Doungprapat, the Thai army chief of staff, in a briefing from the 2nd Army Area Command. “The objective of the army is to cripple Cambodia’s military capability for a long time to come. We are acting for the safety of our children and grandchildren, ensuring that the threat from across the border is neutralised.”

Bangkok asserts the airstrikes were defensive, targeting drone launch sites and ammunition depots that Thai intelligence claims were being prepared for a cross-border offensive. The Thai Army also released grainy aerial footage purported to show Cambodian BM-21 truck-mounted rocket systems moving into firing positions aimed at Thai civilian population centres in Sisaket province.

Cambodia: “Inhumane Aggression”

In Phnom Penh, the mood is one of shock and defiance. The Cambodian government has vehemently denied instigating the Sunday clash, portraying the airstrikes as a disproportionate and “inhumane” act of bullying by a wealthier, better-armed neighbour.

Image: Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and his wife Pich Chanmony in South Korea – Republic of Korea / Jeon Han

“Thailand is fabricating pretexts for an invasion,” read a furious statement from the Cambodian Defence Ministry. “Our forces have maintained strict discipline. We came under sustained bombardment from air and ground but exercised maximum restraint.”

However, that restraint may be fraying. Hun Sen, the country’s influential former leader and father of current Prime Minister Hun Manet, took to Facebook to rally national sentiment. While he publicly urged patience, his language hinted at a looming counter-strike.

“All frontline forces must remain patient because the aggressors have been firing all kinds of weapons,” Hun Sen wrote. “But they are trying to bait us. We must be smart, but we must be ready. They have crossed a line.”

Observers note that while Cambodia lacks Thailand’s air power, its artillery capabilities and seasoned ground forces make a prolonged ground war a deadly prospect for both sides.

“There Will Be No Talks”: Diplomacy Deadlocked

Diplomatic avenues appear to have completely collapsed. Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, known for his populist rhetoric, adopted an uncompromising hardline stance on Monday, rejecting calls for an immediate summit.

Image: Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul signs the Kuala Lumpur Accord alongside President Trump – The White House / Daniel Torok

“There will be no talks. If the fighting is to end, they must do what Thailand has set,” Anutin told reporters outside Government House, emphasising that his administration would prioritise territorial integrity over diplomacy. “We gave peace a chance. They used it to reload.”

This refusal effectively nullifies the “Trump Accord,” a diplomatic victory touted by the US President earlier this year. The collapse of the deal is a significant blow to US prestige in the region, leaving a vacuum that regional powers are struggling to fill.

Humanitarian Emergency

Official tolls confirm one Thai soldier and four Cambodian civilians killed in the initial salvos. However, unverified reports from border villages suggest higher civilian casualties on the Cambodian side due to the airstrikes.

Hospitals in Thailand’s Ubon Ratchathani province are treating 18 wounded soldiers, while Cambodian medical units report at least nine civilian injuries, including children.

Thailand has evacuated approximately 438,000 civilians across five border provinces, turning schools and temples into makeshift shelters.

Regional Shockwaves

The escalation has drawn immediate concern from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who served as a key co-broker of the original ceasefire, issued an urgent plea for de-escalation.

IMAGE: President Donald Trump speaks with Malaysian Prime Minister Seri Anwar Ibrahim – The White House / Daniel Torok

“The renewed fighting risks unraveling the careful work that has gone into stabilising relations,” Anwar wrote on X (formerly Twitter), warning that a prolonged conflict could destabilise the entire Mekong sub-region.

As night falls over the border, artillery duels continue to be reported near the Preah Vihear temple. With the US administration yet to issue a formal response to the collapse of its deal, and Bangkok refusing to answer the phone, the window to prevent a full-scale war is closing fast. The breakout of the conflict marks a major to President’s campaign to establish peace across the world, and could raise questions about his deals in Gaza and Ukraine, as to whether they are short-term answers incapable of solving longer-term issues.

Featured Image via The White House – Daniel Torok

On Wednesday, the focus shifted to the “final hurdle” preventing the implementation of a broader peace architecture: the return of the last hostages held in Gaza. As Hamas prepares to hand over the body of a captive this evening, diplomats are optimistic that this move will trigger the long-awaited reopening of the Rafah crossing, signalling a shift from active conflict to stabilisation.

While the ceasefire has been undeniably fragile, punctuated by a deadly incident earlier this week involving the deaths of two Palestinian children in the Zeitoun district, it has proven remarkably resilient. Unlike previous pauses in the two-year war, during which the Palestinian death toll has surpassed 70,000, the current framework is buttressed by a new international architecture, specifically the UN Security Council’s recent authorisation of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF), which has given mediators the leverage to keep the peace process on track.

Breaking the Stalemate

The ceasefire, which came into effect on October 10, has faced severe stress tests. The most recent flashpoint occurred earlier this week when two young Palestinians were killed by a drone strike in the Zeitoun district, an incident that in previous months might have collapsed the truce entirely. Instead, the agreement has proven resilient.

Wednesday’s developments mark a pivotal moment in the stalled negotiations. Hamas announced it would transfer the remains of a hostage from Gaza at 5:00pm local time, a move that follows Israel’s rejection on Tuesday of “forensic findings” provided by militants, which officials said were unrelated to the two missing captives – police officer Ran Givili and Thai national Sudthisak Rinthalak. Israel has made the verified identification of these remains a key precondition for any further progress.

The Next Stage: Opening the Gateway to Gaza

The immediate reward for this progress will be the opening of the Rafah border crossing, Gaza’s lifeline to Egypt and the outside world.

Image: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the Civil-Military Coordination Center in Kiryat Gat – Toaf Maayan / GPO

Unlike previous ad-hoc openings, this step is part of a structured “Phase Two” plan. COGAT, the Israeli body overseeing humanitarian affairs, confirmed the opening will be coordinated with Egypt under the strict supervision of a European Union mission. This echoes the successful monitoring mechanisms of the past and is designed to ensure the crossing remains permanently open for the 16,500 patients the UN says are waiting for urgent medical treatment abroad.

How did we get here?

The endurance of the current truce is largely underpinned by the international framework established last month. Following the October 10 cessation of hostilities, the UN Security Council passed the landmark Resolution 2803, authorising the creation of an International Stabilisation (ISF).

This resolution, a key component of US President Trump’s peace plan, changed the calculus on the ground. It offered a political horizon beyond the fighting: a transition from Israeli military presence to an international police model.

Image: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Donald Trump in the Knesset plenum – Zaich Haim / GPO

While the ISF has yet to deploy, its existence on paper has given mediators the leverage to keep the ceasefire intact through weeks of friction. The handover of the final hostage bodies and the opening of Rafah are the necessary prerequisites to unlock the ISF’s deployment and cement the progress made since October.

As families across Israel wait for closure on the final hostages, and families in Gaza wait for the border gates to open, the region stands on the precipice of a new, albeit difficult, reality: a peace that is imperfect, often violent, but undeniably moving forward.

While the ceasefire remains undeniably fragile, underscored by a deadly incident earlier this week in which two Palestinian children were killed in the Zeitoun district, it has also proved unexpectedly resilient. Unlike previous, ad-hoc pauses in the two-year war, during which the Palestinian death toll rose above 70,000, the current truce is reinforced by a far more substantial international framework. The UN Security Council’s recent authorisation of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) has reshaped the landscape: it provides a credible deterrent against a full-scale collapse and equips international mediators with the political leverage needed to keep an often fraught peace process on course, even during moments of acute tension

Featured Image via Prime Minister of Israel – Zaich Haim / GPO

Mali’s military regime, led by President Assimi Goïta, appears to be on the brink of collapse. A months-long siege of the capital by the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has choked the city, creating a fuel crisis that has shuttered schools and paralysed the economy. With the US Embassy evacuating non-emergency personnel as of early November and the UN warning of a “disastrous domino effect”, the question is no longer if the security architecture in Sahel will crumble, but when – and whether the West’s retreat has created that a vacuum that will inevitably result in a strategic “blowback” of catastrophic proportions on its Europe’s periphery.

The Siege of Bamako: A Strangled Capital

The situation on the ground is dire. JNIM has expanded its blockade, which tightened significantly on November 1, targeting the major highways that serve as Mali’s lifelines. This not merely a military skirmish: it is economic warfare. 

The blockade of fuel imports forced a nationwide shutdown of schools and universities from late October to mid-November.

Image: President Assimi Goïta – Présidence de la République du Bénin

This resulted in a diplomatic exodus that began on November 7, France, the UK and the US urged citizens to leave. The evacuation of US embassy families signals a loss of confidence in the junta’s ability to hold the line. 

JNIM is also operating further south than ever before. This geographical shift threatens to force the junta to the negotiating table or, more dangerously provoke yet another coup d’etat, a replay of the chaos in 2012.

How Did We Get Here? The Failed Pivot 

The road to this precipice is paved with failed interventions and a disastrous pivot to Russia. Since 2012, Mali has weathered three coups and a relentless insurgency. The French Operation Serval (2013) temporarily saved Bamako, but the subsequent decade of grinding conflict eroded public trust. Following the coups of 2020 and 2021, Mali’s junta repudiated Western support, expelling French and UN forces in favour of a new security partner: Russia.

The results have been catastrophic, not just in Mali but across the Sahel, with the region accounting for 5 of the 10 countries most affected by terrorism and accounting for 19 percent of global terrorist attacks and over half of global terrorism-related casualties.

The Russian private military presence (formerly Wagner Group, now Africa Corps) has proven adept at committing human rights abuses but incompetent at counter-insurgency. They have failed to secure the population, leading to the mobilisation of Dozo militias-self-defence groups whose operations have only exacerbated mass atrocities in the Segou and Sikasso regions.

The “Afghan” Scenario: A Terrorist Safe Haven?

The most chilling prospect is the potential for a JNIM takeover of the state. While less likely than a collapse into anarchy, it is now “on the board”. A JNIM victory would mark a historical turning point: the first time an Al-Qaeda affiliate has taken formal power of the country. This would turn Mali into Africa’s Afghanistan – a sovereign sanctuary where terrorists can train, plan and operate freely, but this time far closer to Europe.

Image: French President Macron at the G5 Sahel Summit in Bamako, Mali – François Lafite / Présidence de la République

The major issue with JNIM is that it’s not just a local insurgency, rather it has a global DNA. JNIM’s leadership retains historical links to the cadre that fought Soviets in Afghanistan and to Osama bin Laden. The group has already claimed its first attack in Nigeria signalling an intent to expand beyond the Sahel with operations already ongoing in Niger and Burkina Faso. Like Sudan in the 1990s, a JNIM-controlled Mali could become a premier state sponsor of terrorism, exporting violence to Europe and the United States.

The Collapse of the Sahel Alliance 

The fall of Bamako would effectively ring the death knell for the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) – the pact between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. These three nations left ECOWAS to form a mutual defence bloc, betting their survival on Russian support. If Mali were to fall, the alliance would fracture. Both Burkina Faso and Niger, facing their own identical crises of JNIM/ISIS insurgencies and their fragile juntas, would be left exposed.

A JNIM takeover is also a direct humiliation for Moscow, a further loss after Syria and humiliation of Iran. The “Russian model” of security, authoritarian protection in exchange for sovereignty, will be exposed as a fraud. JNIM has been fighting Russian mercenaries for years; they will not be looking to cut deals with Putin.

The Cost of Turning Away 

The West’s strategy of disengagement, driven by frustration with the juntas and the arrival of Russia, is reaching its limit. The “let them fail” approach ignores the reality that a terrorist super-state in West Africa is a direct threat to global security.

Mali is facing a stronger enemy than in 2013, but this time it stands alone. The African Union offers words, not soldiers. ECOWAS remains the only viable lifeline, despite the bad blood. If the West continues to turn its back, treating Mali as a lost cause, it may soon wake u p to a reality where al-Qaeda controls a territory the size of France, launching attacks that will make the current spats seem trivial by comparison. With all eyes on the Middle East, turning away from the rise of terrorism in Africa, may come back to bite Western states.

Featured Image via Présidence de la République du Bénin

Territorial Concessions and Sovereignty

The document begins by affirming Ukraine’s sovereignty (Point 1), though this is immediately qualified. This affirmation is contingent on a comprehensive non-aggression agreement between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe to resolve all past ambiguities (Point 2).

The most contested element lies in the territorial settlement detailed in Point 21. It proposes that the United States and other parties recognise Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk as de facto Russian territory. Furthermore, the conflict in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia would be frozen along the existing line of contact, effectively legitimising Russia’s current military control.

In exchange, Russia would relinquish any other agreed territories it controls outside of these five named regions. Crucially, Ukrainian forces would be mandated to withdraw from any parts of the Donetsk Oblast they still hold. This area would then become a neutral, demilitarised buffer zone, internationally recognised as Russian Federation territory, which Russian forces would be barred from entering. Once this arrangement is agreed upon, both nations would commit not to change the borders by force (Point 22).

New Security Architecture

The plan outlines a rigorous new security structure designed to satisfy Moscow’s long-term demands while theoretically protecting Kyiv. It explicitly states that Russia is expected not to invade neighbouring countries, and NATO must commit to no further expansion (Point 3).

Image: President Zelenskyy in Bucha where Ukrainian Forces successfully pushed back Russian forces – President of Ukraine via flickr

A central pillar is the permanent neutralisation of Ukraine (Point 7). Ukraine must constitutionally forbid joining NATO, and NATO must reciprocate by including a provision in its statutes permanently barring Ukraine’s future admission. Complementing this, NATO would agree not to station troops in Ukraine (Point 8). The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces would be strictly capped at 600,000 personnel, a reduction from their current force of 2.2 million (Point 6). As a measure of deterrence on the alliance’s eastern flank, European fighter jets would be stationed in Poland (Point 9).

The US would provide a decisive security guarantee for Ukraine (Point 10), receiving compensation for this commitment. If Russia invades Ukraine, all global sanctions will be reinstated, and all benefits of the deal, including the international recognition of the new territorial arrangements, will be revoked. Prior to full implementation, a US-mediated dialogue between Russia and NATO must resolve all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation (Point 4), ultimately ensuring Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees (Point 5).

Economic Integration and Reconstruction

The proposal offers a significant financial incentive for Ukraine and a pathway back to the global economy for Russia.

Ukraine would immediately become eligible for EU membership and receive short-term preferential access to the European market during its application process (Point 11). This is coupled with a massive global reconstruction package for Ukraine (Point 12), which includes establishing a Ukraine Development Fund focused on fast-growing sectors like technology, data centres, and artificial intelligence. The United States would also take the lead in rebuilding, developing, and modernising Ukraine’s gas infrastructure.

Image: The Impact Sites of Russian Ballistic Missile Strikes in Ukraine – President of Ukraine via Flickr

For Russia, the plan outlines a staged reintegration into the global economy (Point 13), with the lifting of sanctions discussed on a case-by-case basis. The US would commit to a long-term economic cooperation agreement with Russia in areas such as energy, natural resources, infrastructure, and Arctic rare earth metal extraction. In a major diplomatic gesture, Russia will also be invited to rejoin the G8.

The use of frozen funds is a key transactional element (Point 14): $100 billion in frozen Russian assets will be invested in a US-led effort for Ukraine’s reconstruction, with the US receiving 50 per cent of the profits. Europe is then expected to contribute an additional $100 billion to this reconstruction fund. The remaining frozen European funds will be unfrozen, and the remainder of frozen Russian assets will be invested in a joint US-Russian investment vehicle intended to strengthen ties and create a disincentive against future conflict.

Governance, Culture, and Final Amnesty

The final points address mechanisms for concluding the conflict and ensuring enforcement. The United States and Russia would agree to extend treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons, including the START I Treaty (Point 17), and Ukraine agrees to remain a non-nuclear state (Point 18). Russia would formally enshrine in law its policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine (Point 16).

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant would be relaunched under IAEA supervision, with the electricity produced distributed equally, 50:50, between Russia and Ukraine (Point 19).

Regarding social and cultural issues (Point 20), both countries commit to educational programmes promoting understanding and tolerance. Specifically, Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities, and both sides will abolish discriminatory measures against media and education. Crucially, all Nazi ideology and activities must be rejected and prohibited.

Image: Military and Civilian personnel exchange in Russia where 390 people were returned home to Ukraine – President of Ukraine via Flickr

A humanitarian committee will be established (Point 24) to resolve outstanding issues, ensuring the exchange of all remaining prisoners and bodies on an ‘all for all’ basis, the return of civilian detainees and hostages (including children), and the implementation of a family reunification programme. Furthermore, Russia agrees not to impede Ukraine’s commercial use of the Dnieper River, and agreements will be reached on the free transport of grain across the Black Sea (Point 23).

Finally, once the agreement is codified, Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days (Point 25), and all parties involved in the conflict will receive full amnesty for their actions during the war (Point 26). The entire agreement will be legally binding, with its implementation monitored and guaranteed by a Peace Council, headed by President Trump, where sanctions will be imposed for violations (Point 27). The ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides retreat to agreed points to begin implementation (Point 28).

Ukrainian and European Response

Shortly after the deal was proposed, Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy held a call with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Following this, President Zelenskyy confirmed that any response to the deal would be coordinated with these three European nations. France and the UK have led the support efforts throughout the conflict through the Coalition of the Willing and must now stand behind Ukraine as it negotiates the end of it. While the EU stated that Russia has “no right” to concessions from Ukraine, it stressed that the terms of any peace agreement are ultimately for Ukraine to decide, indicating the ball is now firmly in Kyiv’s court.

Despite the damaging nature of the deal for Ukraine, it is in a difficult position, with the US reportedly threatening to halt arms and intelligence support for the war effort. While Ukraine may seek to negotiate the deal, the scope for this is likely limited by Russia’s stated ambitions. Washington has set a deadline for Thursday 27 November, further intensifying the pressure on Kyiv.

Featured Image via President of Ukraine via Flickr