The agreement, signed in Kyiv by Prime Minister Andy Burnham and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, establishes government, industry, and academic cooperation on defence AI, autonomous systems, cyber security and secure data.

UKAI has welcomed the deal as an opportunity to connect Britain’s AI ecosystem with real-world applications and deepen long-term collaboration between UK and Ukrainian innovators.

The agreement, signed by Prime Minister Andy Burnham and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv on Monday, will make the UK the first international partner to gain access to Ukraine’s Avengers AI Labs.

The platform collects real-world information from thousands of daylight cameras and infrared sensors operating across the battlefield in Ukraine, capturing millions of objects including tanks, artillery, air-defence systems, infantry positions, Shahed drones, and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles.

That information is then used to train AI models.

For UK researchers, engineers and technology companies, access to the platform could provide an unusually large source of real-world operational data through which new AI systems can be developed and tested.

In return, Ukraine will gain greater access to Britain’s universities, researchers and technology companies as the two countries seek to turn battlefield experience into technologies that could have applications well beyond the war.

From battlefield innovation to a long-term technology partnership

The Government said the initial focus would be defence and national security, bringing together engineers, academics, businesses and military operational expertise from both countries through what it described as an AI cell.

However, ministers believe some of the resulting technologies could eventually have civilian applications in areas including critical infrastructure, transport, and energy.

The agreement forms part of the wider UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership and establishes a framework intended to extend beyond individual defence projects.

Prime Minister Andy Burnham said:

“Ukraine has become one of the world’s leading innovators in defence technology, forged through courage, ingenuity, and the hard lessons of war.

“This groundbreaking partnership will bring together Ukraine’s unrivalled operational experience with Britain’s world-class AI ecosystem, giving us the opportunity to develop the technologies of the future, changing lives here in Britain and saving lives on the battlefield in Ukraine.

“By combining Ukrainian battlefield data with UK expertise, we will accelerate the development of capabilities that not only strengthen our national security but better protect our critical infrastructure and growth in every postcode here at home.”

The accompanying Joint Declaration of Intent provides greater detail about how that cooperation will operate.

It commits the two countries to developing next-generation AI-enabled armed forces and establishes three main pillars of cooperation.

Government-to-government collaboration will cover areas including jointly developed models, secure data and computing pathways and AI assurance.

Industry will work through those government arrangements to develop, test and deploy technology against agreed operational challenges.

Universities and research organisations will meanwhile collaborate in areas including autonomous systems, AI assurance, cyber security and synthetic data.

The declaration also commits both countries to protections around data sovereignty, intellectual property and export controls, while seeking interoperability with NATO systems.

Importantly, the partnership will initially follow a pilot-first approach rather than attempting to establish an entirely new institutional structure before practical projects have been tested.

UK start-ups already testing technology

That work has already begun.

Three UK start-ups – Bristol-based Sintela, Oxford-based Mind Foundry, and London-based Skyral – are involved in pilot projects combining Ukrainian operational data with UK-developed technology.

One of the first systems is preparing to be deployed at a UK defence site.

The technology uses buried fibre-optic cables as enormous AI-enabled sensors capable of detecting activity around protected sites.

Although initially designed to help protect military facilities from protesters and hostile actors attempting to gather intelligence, ministers believe similar systems could eventually be used around airports, prisons, railway infrastructure, and energy facilities.

A second project will examine next-generation low-power AI chips for drones, robotics, and autonomous systems.

Reducing the amount of energy required for onboard AI could allow autonomous systems to operate for longer periods and respond more quickly in environments where conventional communications or computing infrastructure is unavailable.

Defence Secretary Wes Streeting said:

“Ukraine is pushing the frontier of defence innovation as they bravely resist Putin’s illegal invasion. From supporting with military equipment and training to co-developing cutting-edge technology, the UK will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Ukraine for as long as it takes.

“By combining the UK’s world-leading scientists, engineers and tech companies with Ukraine’s unique battlefield experience and data, we will strengthen both of our nations’ defence and security.”

‘AI sovereignty in practice’

The Government is also presenting the agreement as part of its wider ambition to strengthen sovereign UK technological capability.

Rather than sovereignty meaning that every component of an AI system must be designed or manufactured domestically, the partnership demonstrates an approach in which Britain seeks control over strategically important capabilities while collaborating with trusted international partners.

Minister for AI Kanishka Narayan said:

“Britain and Ukraine are the closest of partners. Ukraine’s extraordinary courage on the battlefield has been matched by remarkable technological ingenuity.

“By giving UK start-ups, researchers and engineers access to insights from its Avengers AI platform, we are taking that partnership further and helping Britain develop the next generation of defence technology.

“This is AI sovereignty in practice: building our own capabilities and turning frontline experience into systems that protect our armed forces overseas and our critical infrastructure at home.”

The partnership comes as the Government increasingly considers AI not simply as an economic or public-service technology, but as part of the UK’s national security and strategic infrastructure.

The Joint Declaration explicitly recognises AI, autonomous systems and network-enabled capabilities as increasingly important to modern warfare and argues that maintaining a technological advantage will form part of future deterrence.

It also creates scope for technologies developed jointly by Britain and Ukraine eventually to be shared with trusted allies and partners where both governments agree.

UKAI welcomes opportunity for collaboration

The trade association for the AI economy in the UK, UKAI, welcomed the agreement and the opportunities it could create for UK technology companies, researchers and universities.

A UKAI spokesperson said:

“This is a significant development for the UK AI ecosystem and demonstrates what can be achieved when government, industry, academia, and end users collaborate around clearly defined real-world challenges.

“Ukraine has developed extraordinary technological and operational expertise under the most difficult circumstances, while the UK has world-leading AI companies, researchers, and universities. Bringing those capabilities together can support both countries while creating lessons and technologies with applications across defence, resilience, and the protection of critical national infrastructure.

“UKAI welcomes the Government’s commitment to involving UK start-ups and technology companies from the outset. We look forward to working with government, our members, and partners across the Ukrainian technology community to explore how that collaboration can be expanded, while ensuring that responsible development, security and effective AI assurance remain at the heart of deployment.”

For the UK AI industry, the significance of Avengers AI Labs may extend beyond access to another dataset.

One persistent challenge when developing sophisticated AI systems is securing high-quality information from real operating environments against which technology can be trained and evaluated.

Ukraine has accumulated exactly that kind of information through more than four years of intensive warfare.

The challenge for both governments will now be turning access to that experience into deployable capabilities while maintaining the safeguards around sensitive military data, intellectual property, and national security set out in the agreement.

A wider defence relationship

The AI agreement was one of several announcements made during Burnham’s visit to Ukraine.

The Prime Minister also announced that the Government had agreed that defence company MBDA could release classified information relating to UK components within the long-range SCALP missile.

The move is intended to support the establishment of local assembly lines in Ukraine.

Together, the announcements point towards an evolution in the UK-Ukraine defence relationship: away from a model centred predominantly on Britain supplying weapons and equipment towards one involving increasing amounts of joint development, industrial cooperation, and technology sharing.

The Artificial Intelligence Partnership makes that shift explicit.

Rather than treating Ukraine simply as the recipient of Western technology, the agreement recognises the country as an increasingly important source of defence innovation in its own right – and seeks to combine that experience with Britain’s research base, technology industry and AI ecosystem.

The next test will be whether the pilot projects can be converted into operational technologies at sufficient speed and scale.

Under the declaration signed in Kyiv, further implementation arrangements are expected to be developed over the coming months.

Photo: Lauren Hurley/No 10 Downing Street

The programme aims to strengthen the UK’s defence capabilities by delivering four new Dreadnought-class ballistic missile submarines. They will be the Royal Navy’s largest, stealthiest and most powerful submarines, maintaining the UK’s continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent from the 2030s onwards.

Burnham, however, has chosen to focus as much on the economic and social impact of the programme as on its defence benefits. Alongside the unveiling of the latest funding phase, known as Delivery Phase 4, or DP4, he launched an apprenticeship initiative aimed at creating opportunities for young people, particularly in the North West, where much of the project is based.

Jobs, Skills and Apprenticeships

The funding is divided into two main allocations: £5.9 billion for BAE Systems and £2.5 billion for the wider supply chain. The Government says the investment will help support and create 22,000 apprenticeships by 2035.

This aligns closely with Burnham’s announcement earlier this week emphasising the importance of vocational training and giving “the hard hat just as much value as the graduation cap”.

Burnham argues that the programme can help reverse the rise in the number of young people who are not in education, employment or training, while also supporting smaller local businesses to recruit and train new workers.

The Government claims that current spending on the UK’s nuclear deterrent supports approximately 47,000 jobs, with this figure expected to rise to 65,000 by 2030. This supports Burnham’s wider ambition to reduce youth unemployment and inactivity, although the announcement has attracted criticism.

With public finances already under considerable pressure, some have questioned whether additional funding should be directed towards existing training programmes or invested in other forms of economic development.

Part of the apprenticeship initiative will help small and medium-sized enterprises in the local defence supply chain recruit up to 30 apprentices over the next three years. It draws on a model developed by BAE Systems in Barrow-in-Furness, but the initial target has been criticised as modest.

With the number of young people not in education, employment or training now exceeding one million, critics argue that 30 targeted apprenticeships will make only a limited contribution to addressing the national challenge.

Questions over Defence Spending

The funding forms part of a four-year plan to spend £63.6 billion on the Defence Nuclear Enterprise, a partnership between government and industry responsible for maintaining the UK’s continuous at-sea deterrent.

Most of the funding will be used to keep the existing nuclear submarine fleet operational, develop replacements for submarines currently in service or production, and expand manufacturing facilities.

These spending plans sit alongside Burnham’s ambition to honour NATO commitments by increasing defence spending to 3.5 per cent of national income. However, questions remain over whether the Government will meet its own target of spending 3 per cent of GDP on defence by 2030.

The plans themselves are not entirely new. Much of the programme was already under way towards the end of Keir Starmer’s premiership and was included in the Defence Investment Plan.

John Healey, who resigned as Secretary of State for Defence under Starmer amid frustrations over the unclear timetable for defence funding, is now serving as Chancellor of the Exchequer under Burnham and supporting the programme.

Despite previously expressing concern that Starmer was not moving quickly enough to meet the UK’s defence targets, Healey has remained positive about the latest announcement. It remains to be seen whether this reflects renewed confidence in the Government’s plans or whether familiar concerns about funding and delivery will return.

Adding to the uncertainty, the current Defence Secretary, Wes Streeting, has declined to provide further details about how Burnham intends to meet the 3 per cent target.

Political Criticism and Continuity

Opposition parties have also raised concerns about the initiative.

Green Party Westminster leader Dr Ellie Chowns questioned why such substantial funding was being provided for “weapons that should never be used”, highlighting the longstanding ethical debate surrounding the UK’s nuclear deterrent.

For Reform UK, Danny Kruger described Burnham’s announcement as a “rehashed spending plan that did nothing”, arguing that the “crisis” facing the UK’s nuclear programme was not being properly addressed or understood.

The criticisms are significant, but some may be directed as much at the wider programme as at Burnham himself. Many of the policies and spending commitments announced this week were inherited from the previous government and would probably have continued regardless of the change in leadership.

Final Thought

The Dreadnought-class announcement is far from surprising and, as the country becomes more familiar with Andy Burnham’s domestic agenda, neither is its emphasis on apprenticeships and regional opportunity.

The real question is what the next four years will hold: whether the Prime Minister can remain within the available budget, whether Healey will again become frustrated by the pace of defence investment, and whether the programme can deliver meaningful opportunities for the communities it is intended to support.

Only then will it become clear whether the initiative can help steer the country towards greater security and prosperity – or leave it drifting into deeper financial waters.

Photo: Lauren Hurley/No 10 Downing Street

After several high-profile figures in Labour have called on the likely Prime Minister to set out his foreign policy stance, Burnham makes clear that national security would be his first priority if he becomes prime minister. The world he describes is one of Russian aggression, conflict in the Middle East, climate and energy insecurity, cyberattacks, and rapid technological change. His central claim is that these pressures are no longer distant events. They are felt in household bills, hospital systems, energy prices, supply chains, and jobs.

This is where Burnham’s position begins to differ from a more traditional foreign policy statement. Rather than treating defence, economics, and social cohesion as separate policy areas, he presents them as part of the same national resilience agenda. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the war in Ukraine, attacks on NHS systems, and disruption at Jaguar Land Rover are used to show how international instability can quickly become a domestic crisis.

Hard power, but with a domestic dividend

Burnham’s clearest commitment is to rebuilding Britain’s “hard power”. He backs the UK’s pledge to increase defence spending to 3.5 per cent of GDP by 2035, while arguing that the public must be levelled with about what this will cost and why it matters.

However, the political significance lies in where he wants that money to go. Burnham argues that increased defence investment should not simply purchase equipment from overseas suppliers. Instead, it should regenerate British industry, support apprenticeships, and create jobs in communities that have seen economic opportunity decline.

This is a foreign policy with an industrial strategy at its centre. Burnham wants Britain to strengthen sovereign capability in areas such as shipbuilding, energetics, AI and quantum technologies. The argument is that defence investment should improve military readiness while also rebuilding domestic productive capacity.

That approach is likely to appeal to parts of the country where traditional industry has declined and where globalisation has often been experienced as insecurity rather than opportunity. Burnham is presenting defence not just as a national obligation, but as a route to reindustrialisation.

Continuity on NATO, Ukraine and the US

Despite the domestic emphasis, Burnham is careful to reassure allies that his approach would not weaken Britain’s existing commitments. He describes the UK’s commitment to NATO and the nuclear deterrent as absolute and says the United States would remain Britain’s most important defence and security ally.

His support for Ukraine is also firm. Burnham argues that British security and Euro-Atlantic security are inseparable from Ukraine’s struggle against Russian aggression. By referencing his engagement with Ukrainian mayors, including Andriy Sadovyi and Vitali Klitschko, he places his support for Ukraine in both strategic and civic terms.

This matters because Burnham is not attempting to sound isolationist. His emphasis on British workers and domestic resilience could easily be read as a turn inward, but his argument is more nuanced. He is saying that Britain can only be credible abroad if it is stronger at home.

A stronger European pillar

Burnham also signals a desire for closer European co-operation, particularly through the E3 grouping of the UK, France, and Germany. He wants to strengthen the European pillar within NATO and remove barriers to defence industrial co-operation.

This is one of the most important elements of his foreign policy positioning. It suggests a pragmatic post-Brexit approach that avoids reopening old arguments while seeking closer co-operation where British interests are clearly aligned with European partners.

He also links this to wider UK-EU negotiations, including illegal migration, economic security and resilience against terrorism and AI-driven disinformation. The message is that Europe is not simply a trading relationship or a diplomatic forum. It is a shared security space.

Defence, technology, migration, cyber resilience, and economic security are increasingly interconnected. Burnham appears to be arguing that Britain needs a more joined-up state to respond.

Values, institutions and international law

Burnham’s intervention also contains a values-based argument. He says Britain’s alliances must be built on interests and values, and that support for international law and institutions such as the UN extends UK influence.

This is a deliberate contrast with a world in which major powers are increasingly willing to ignore international norms. Burnham is positioning Britain as a country that should remain principled while also becoming more capable and resilient.

His argument is that values alone are not enough, and that military power alone will not secure Britain’s interests. In continuity with his predecessor, he is attempting to combine deterrence, industrial strength, alliance-building, and international legitimacy.

Transparency and public consent

Burnham also calls for greater public scrutiny of defence spending. He wants more detailed progress updates on major defence and infrastructure projects, with stronger accountability to prevent delays and cost overruns.

This reflects a wider theme in his political brand: the idea that government should be more open, more place-based and more accountable. Defence spending is often treated as distant from everyday politics, but Burnham argues that it must deliver social value as well as security.

That may become a major test of his position. Asking the public to support higher defence spending at a time of pressure on public services will require a clear explanation of trade-offs. Burnham’s answer is that defence investment can also support jobs, skills and economic renewal.

Foreign policy through No 10 North

Perhaps the most distinctive part of Burnham’s argument is his insistence that Britain’s strength at home and abroad are indivisible. Through No 10 North and further devolution, he says Britain should regenerate and reindustrialise all parts of the country as part of a broader security strategy.

This is foreign policy seen through the lens of place. Burnham is arguing that national resilience starts locally: in industrial towns, energy systems, hospitals, ports, supply chains, digital infrastructure and skilled workforces.

The result is a foreign policy doctrine that blends Labour’s traditional concern for workers and communities with a more hard-headed view of global threats. It accepts that Britain faces a more dangerous world but insists that the response cannot be left to defence policy alone.

Burnham’s message is therefore both international and domestic. Britain must remain committed to NATO, Ukraine, the US alliance, European co-operation, international law and the UN. But it must also use the demands of this new security era to rebuild its own industrial base and restore confidence in the state’s ability to protect people.

Whether that can be delivered is another question. Defence procurement is complex, industrial renewal takes time, and closer European co-operation will require careful diplomacy. But as a statement of direction, Burnham’s foreign policy pitch is clear: Britain should face a darker world by becoming more resilient, more productive, more allied and more rooted in the strength of its own communities.

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Photo: House of Commons

If successful in the upcoming Makerfield by-election and any subsequent leadership challenge, the Liberal Democrats would push Andy Burnham to instigate talks on a far more ambitious, new EU partnership.

At the heart of this proposal is a call for closer economic and political ties with Europe, alongside deeper security cooperation and a long-term pathway to re-building Britain’s relationship with the EU.

Could Davey’s New EU Partnership Right the Economic Wrongs of Brexit?

The Liberal Democrats argue that Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson’s ‘Brexit experiment’ has failed, citing estimates that in the midst of a cost-of-living crisis, the decision to leave the EU is costing the UK economy £90 billion per year. 

Under the prospective Growth and Defence Partnership, the UK would re-join the single market as a member of the European free trade agreement. Davey claims this could remove all trade barriers to Europe, boosting Britain’s economy and reversing years of economic damage in turn. 

He also advocates for the negotiation of a Customs Union between the UK and EU, which would prevent reciprocal tariffs on goods traded with member countries and ultimately lead to more efficient exchange: ‘Labour has failed to act. They refuse to cut red tape, pull down trade barriers and generate the growth we desperately need. Instead of change, they buried their heads in the sand’. 

Despite promises that Brexit would allow Britain to “take back control” of its laws and regulations, British businesses must still comply with many EU standards in order to access European markets. The difference is that the UK no longer has any meaningful influence over how those rules are made. Davey argues that a closer partnership would give Britain greater influence over decisions that directly affect its economy, allowing it to shape regional standards rather than simply adapting to them.

Immigration and the New EU Partnership

Daisy Cooper, Deputy Lead of the Liberal Democrats and Treasury Spokesperson, told PoliticsUK “It was the conservatives and Nigel Farage who plunged our immigration system into chaos by ripping up our returns agreement with EU countries”. She argues that breaking ties with the European Union has counterintuitively made it more difficult to control Britain’s borders in practice. 

The Party claims that the UK government currently lacks the agreements required to return individuals who arrive in the country illegally by crossing the channel in small boats. Cooper believes that a “new partnership with Europe would bring more control to Britain’s borders by giving us a returns agreement with every EU country, stopping dangerous small boat crossings by ending the pull factor created by the Conservatives and Farage.”

Defence: Britain’s Trump Card In Europe

The Liberal Democrats argue that Britain should use its strengths to secure a better deal with Europe. At a time of growing instability across the continent, given Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine and Trump’s initiative to ‘abandon European security’, the EU is seeking greater cooperation with the United Kingdom over defence. Meanwhile, Britain remains one of Europe’s leading military powers, with world-class armed forces and defence industries. 

According to the Lib Dems, the government should therefore leverage this strength in negotiations; a new EU defence partnership would allow Britain to work alongside ‘dependable allies’ to keep the region safe, while also creating jobs across the UK. 

Davey’s proposal has come at a time of heightened global conflict and diplomatic disjuncture. The Growth and Defence Partnership would send a clear and positive message to current EU members that the UK is committed to a future of cooperation with the European Union and reversing the isolationist policies of Brexit. 

This certainly aligns with the Liberal Democrats’ wider ambition to rejoin the European Union, but whether Labour is prepared to embrace the deal, is another matter altogether.

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Featured Image: Stephen Bingham/Flickr

In-text photo: House of Commons

The letter reads as a stark warning about the UK’s defence position. Healey lays out a record of achievements under the Government: increased defence spending, strengthened alliances, major export deals, and the publication of a Strategic Defence Review. Yet the tone is brutal when addressing funding.

At the heart of the disagreement is the long-delayed Defence Investment Plan (DIP). Healey argues that the financial settlement agreed by the Treasury “falls short of what is required for defence and the country at this dangerous time.” He says funding increases are, in his view, backloaded, while immediate operational pressures demand urgent investment.

His conclusion is that by remaining in post he would have to accept decisions that could reduce military readiness and “increase the risk to personnel on operations.”

Mounting Pressure on the Prime Minister

The timing of the resignation is politically challenging for the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister is preparing to attend the G7 summit on Monday, where he is expected to meet with US President, Donald Trump. Such meetings typically require a strong and stable domestic footing, particularly on defence and international security. Starmer was already under pressure on defence spending prior to the resignation. Therefore, expect Trump to humiliate the Prime Minister following Healey’s departure over defence spending.

The resignation also feeds into a broader narrative of strain within government and the Parliamentary Labour Party. While the letter is respectful and measured, its content signals a significant policy divide at the top of government – specifically between defence priorities and Treasury constraints.

Politically, the immediate question is not only about defence policy, but about leadership stability. Although there is no indication of an imminent Cabinet move against the Prime Minister, the absence of certain key figures in Westminster may delay any collective response. Nonetheless, the symbolic damage is immediate.

Defence Spending: The Core Fault Line

Healey’s resignation centres on a fundamental disagreement over defence spending. The former Defence Secretary makes clear that he supports a faster and more ambitious funding increase, including hitting 3% of GDP by 2030.

By contrast, the current plan outlined in his letter would see spending rise more slowly, reaching around 2.68% by 2030 – barely above levels already projected. To Healey, this is insufficient given the scale of global threats.

He explicitly references intelligence assessments suggesting a potential Russian attack on NATO “as soon as 2030”. This framing elevates the dispute beyond routine budgetary wrangling, positioning it as an urgent matter of national security.

The letter also highlights expanding UK commitments, from Middle Eastern operations to leadership roles in NATO missions, and increased involvement in Ukraine. In this context, Healey argues that underfunding risks undermining both operational capability and international credibility.

Beyond domestic politics, the resignation could have implications for the UK’s international status. Healey emphasises the importance of alliances and the UK’s leadership role within NATO. His departure raises questions about continuity in defence leadership at a time of heightened global tension.

There are also immediate practical uncertainties. A planned visit to a drone facility, expected to be attended by the Prime Minister alongside John Healey and Al Cairns, now comes into question. With Healey no longer in post, it is unclear whether the visit will proceed in its original form, be reshaped, or be postponed altogether.

Such visits are typically designed to showcase defence innovation and government commitment to military capability. Any disruption risks reinforcing perceptions of instability at the top of defence policymaking.

The Prime Minister now faces a politically dangerous balancing act. On one hand, maintaining fiscal discipline remains central to the Government’s economic strategy. On the other, Healey’s resignation amplifies calls for increased defence spending at a time of rising geopolitical risk.

In his closing remarks, Healey offers continued support for the Government, suggesting the split is one of policy rather than personal rupture. However, the public nature of his critique ensures the issue will remain at the forefront of political debate. As Starmer heads to the G7 summit, he does so under intensified scrutiny – not only from international partners, but from within his own party and government.

Healey’s departure has transformed what might have been a managed policy disagreement into a significant political crisis – one that could bring down a Prime Minister.

Photo Credit: Simon Dawson, No.10 Downing Street

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The UK is well placed to lead allies in building a shared view of the information environment for enhanced defence. A new wave of Russian information operations shows how hostile actors turn lies into leverage.

Last month, a false story claimed President Zelensky’s inner circle was funnelling 50 million dollars a month to Dubai. As later traced by NewsGuard, it began on a fringe Turkish site, was picked up by Russian outlets, surfaced on Microsoft’s MSN feed and was finally shared by a US Congresswoman. Within days, Russian media cited her post as proof that “even American lawmakers” agreed. The story was fiction, but its spread was real. This is how digital lies are laundered into legitimacy.

The same pattern drives DoppelGänger, a broader Russian campaign that clones trusted media outlets and fills them with fabrications. Investigations by the EU DisinfoLab and Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency have traced its servers, front companies, and fake accounts, showing how operators exploit takedown-proof hosting to keep the lies alive. The aim is not persuasion but paralysis, to distort debate, undermine trust and constrain allied decision-making regarding defence.

Viewed together, these operations form a system built for speed, deniability, and disruption, impacting politics long before anyone calls it an attack. Operators clone trusted domains to publish deceptive material in national languages, then move it through synthetic personas and co-ordinated amplification networks from Telegram to X and, eventually, into mainstream feeds.

Other campaigns, such as Operation Overload and Operation Ghostwriter, expose the same cross-border and cross-platform choreography: seeding, sharing, and amplifying falsehoods until they look like facts. Analysts can now map these patterns with the DISARM framework. The problem is not a lack of data; it is the lack of shared situational awareness and understanding.

Ghostwriter planted forged stories on compromised national outlets, then localised and republished them in multiple languages through co-ordinated networks of controlled or compromised accounts. A study by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats applied the DISARM common language to Ghostwriter, showing how seeding, referencing, and amplification can be consistently mapped across jurisdictions. Each case exposes the same weakness: adversaries use repetition and replication as force multipliers, turning ordinary online behaviour into a delivery mechanism for falsehood – truth becomes collateral damage.

The Allied Capability Gap

Allies lack a shared operating picture of the information environment. This environment includes not only information itself but also the people, systems, and spaces where influence takes hold. Without a shared view of what is happening across borders, each nation sees only a fragment and treats manipulation as a local anomaly. The result is duplication, delay, and diminished capacity for co-ordinated action.

Warning signs are scattered across languages, platforms, and jurisdictions. A single false story can flare on one platform, reappear days later on a cloned outlet elsewhere and end up in mainstream debate through co-ordinated reposts.

Without context, they look like isolated incidents. The connection stays invisible until the damage is done, by which point, the narrative has already spread too far to contain. This asymmetry gives hostile actors an edge: they can experiment and adapt faster than governments can detect and share. As recent European analysis noted, the advantage lies with those who move fastest to exploit allied seams.

Allied doctrine already calls for early, continuous analysis of the information environment – but, in practice, implementation is patchy. When co-ordination falters, allied freedom of manoeuvre shrinks and adversaries gain narrative and operational space to act.

The House of Commons Defence Committee reached a similar conclusion, warning of persistent gaps in hybrid-threat preparedness and partner co-ordination. The answer is not another task force or toolset. Allies now need a secure, standards-based coordination mechanism that brings national information-threat data together into a single, cross-border picture, turning fragments into an allied early-warning system. The goal is to get on the front foot with joined-up analysis and faster, collective action. Right now, allied warning systems still lack the shared standards and automation to connect information across borders, so indicators of the adversaries’ campaigns arrive late and opportunities to act are lost.

A UK-anchored Path Forward

The UK is well placed and, arguably, obliged to lead this effort. The National Cyber Security Centre already offers a proven model for cross-government threat response – a single front door, clear severity levels, and a standing national picture of risk. Adapted to information threats, the same principles could connect departments, link existing expertise and bring allies together through shared data standards and secure interfaces.

What is needed now is an alliance-wide co-ordination mechanism built on shared standards, not new tools, designed specifically for information defence. Its purpose: to integrate existing national feeds, translate them into a common classification and deliver a unified cross-border view of information threats in near real time.

This would not replace the work already underway in UK departments and NATO structures; it would connect and amplify it. A shared operating picture would make national efforts mutually reinforcing, more accessible to allies, and faster to act.

This capability should sit within Strategic Communications, bridging policy, planning, and operations, and serve as a strategic co-ordination mechanism within a wider deterrence posture. It would help allies anticipate rather than react, and support decision advantage below the threshold of conflict. With a clearer picture of the threat’s scale and persistence, governments could allocate resources more effectively and intervene before false narratives harden into public belief.

Implementation should be incremental. The UK can draw on its experience countering hybrid threats and its deep partnerships with NATO and EU counterparts. The process should start with a UK-led pilot using common data standards, recognised behaviour taxonomies, and shared workflows for detection, triage, and escalation. Success will depend on turning intent into structure, providing earlier warnings, faster handovers, and cleaner co-ordination across borders.

The UK already characterises hostile state activity as gradual, ambiguous, and often deniable – language consistent with the Integrated Review. A co-ordinated information-threat monitoring capability would expose that activity at scale, improve attribution and give decision-makers a fuller picture of the threat.

What This is Not

It is not censorship, not a public-facing counter-disinformation campaign, and not a single-tool purchase. It is a secure co-ordination function that provides a shared operating picture of the information environment, enabling rapid response to identified adversary networks. There are clear reference points for interoperability.

Federated Mission Networking already shows how information can be standardised and shared across nations at speed, and NATO’s C3 Taxonomy provides a common language to align data and services. Experience shows that effective information-sharing starts with the basics: common standards first, the interfaces that link them next, and the analytic tools last.

Implementation Priorities

Turning this concept into a working allied capability requires steady, demonstrable progress rather than grand announcements. Each step should deliver visible value and strengthen confidence among allied partners.

• Secure scope and governance. Establish a closed, legally grounded partnership among trusted allies, with clear audits, data protection, and oversight.
• Standards and interoperability. Demonstrate cross-government interoperability first, then publish shared data standards and taxonomies for classifying actors and behaviours. This enables automated de-duplication, cross-border correlation, and secure evidence exchange – drawing on NATO’s C3 Taxonomy and other federated models.
• Delivery and integration. Provide early, tangible outputs, such as near-real-time early warnings and shared indicators, to support attribution. Link national data feeds through standard interfaces and replace manual transfers with secure, real-time exchange across borders.
• Exercise, align and scale. Embed the function within NATO planning (J5) and operations (J3), incorporate it into national and alliance exercises and start with a UK-led pilot that proves faster detection, smoother co-ordination, and earlier warning before expanding participation.

Hostile actors exploit speed and ambiguity to gain advantage through persistent activity below the threshold of conflict. A co-ordinated allied response anchored in shared standards and automated exchange would shorten detection and decision cycles, strengthen resilience and restore freedom of manoeuvre in the information environment.

Conclusion

DoppelGänger is not an isolated case. It is one example of how weaponised information exploits the seams between allied responses. The recent NewsGuard investigation, which tracked a fabricated story about Ukraine from a fringe website to Russian state media via Western news aggregators and even a US lawmaker, shows the same mechanism in action. Falsehoods now move faster than facts, carried by algorithms, repetition, and misplaced trust.

These cases expose a consistent weakness. Allies remain reactive, limited by fragmented data and incompatible systems. Hostile actors, by contrast, behave as networks, testing, refining, and synchronising their narratives at speed. Unless that imbalance is corrected, adversaries will continue to dictate tempo and shape public debate long before governments can respond. A coherent allied response anchored in shared standards and secure exchange can reverse that dynamic.

Linking national data sources through a single trusted framework would allow allies to shift from monitoring to anticipating, from reacting to pre-empting. It would turn dispersed awareness into collective readiness. This is the foundation of resilience in the information domain: standards that create interoperability, interoperability that enables speed, and speed that restores allied freedom of manoeuvre.

The UK now has an opportunity to lead this effort with NATO and EU partners, turning policy intent into a working, standards-based capability. Done well, it would shorten detection and decision cycles, strengthen allied cohesion and constrain adversary freedom of action – protecting the integrity of public debate and reinforcing deterrence below the threshold of conflict.

Hadley Newman is a Senior Adviser and defence researcher specialising in foreign information, threats, and interference. He has advised governments and international organisations on strategic communications and strengthening information resilience, with work published in the Journal of Information Warfare and cited by UK Parliament committees. He previously served as Strategic Communications Director for the G20.

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“Can We Be Great Again?”

Opening with humorous anecdotes, Hunt recalled his time as Foreign Secretary, describing the grandeur of the Foreign Office and the question every new occupant asks: “Is this just an imperial delusion, or are we actually this amazing, strong, powerful, great country?”

His new book, he explained, was written to answer that question. It examines seven major global challenges – from democracy and climate change to migration and artificial intelligence – and assesses Britain’s influence in addressing them.

“In every single case, out of 193 countries in the United Nations, we were always in the top ten most influential nations – often in the top five.”

Sir Jeremy Hunt

That, Hunt suggested, is a truth the British often forget. Despite national pessimism, he said, the country still has profound global clout and strong fundamentals. The challenge is to turn that potential into renewed confidence.

Economic Strength and Political Power

Hunt linked global influence directly to economic performance. Drawing on forecasts from the Centre for Economics and Business Research, he noted that the UK is projected to remain the world’s sixth-largest economy in 2039 – behind only the United States, China, India, Japan and Germany.

“Even with all the doom and gloom, we’ll still be number six. We have the third-largest technology sector in the world. We should be a little more optimistic than the general mood suggests.”

Yet, he warned, economic strength and political clout are inseparable. Citing China’s rise as an economic superpower achieved “without firing a shot”, Hunt argued that Britain’s global influence depends on rebuilding fiscal discipline at home. He lamented the absence of a clear plan to reduce national debt which now costs every household nearly £4,000 a year in interest payments, compared to 800 euros for every German household.

His prescription was straightforward: never allow public spending to grow faster than the economy. “That’s how debt spirals,” he said. “We’ve been increasing welfare spending faster than national growth – and that is simply unsustainable.”

Confidence, Not Isolation

Hunt urged Conservatives and the wider country to resist self-doubt and insularity. Britain, he said, remains admired abroad for its integrity and global outlook, even as it indulges in national self-criticism at home.

“We are the global leader in washing our dirty linen in public,” he joked. “But we forget that other countries have challenges too.”

The book, he stressed, was not jingoistic. “This isn’t about claiming we’re better than anyone else,” he said. “It’s about recognising that the world is dangerous, and underestimating ourselves is the worst possible response.”

Hunt called for renewed co-operation with allies who share Britain’s democratic values: “The important thing is not to pull up the drawbridge but to roll up our sleeves and work with those who share our worldview.”

Rebuilding Relations with Europe

In discussion with Forum members, Hunt praised the Labour Government’s pragmatic diplomacy in improving relations with the European Union. This was a point that received wide appreciation from the audience. “Foreign policy may be where Keir Starmer’s greatest success lies,” he observed. “He’s managed to make friends with both Donald Trump and the EU – no small feat.”

Hunt argued that, after the “messy divorce” of Brexit, the war in Ukraine had helped both sides mature. The UK’s leadership in European security, he said, had “shown that we are good Europeans”. Though frustrated by new EU barriers to British participation in defence projects, he judged that relations were “broadly moving in the right direction”.

The US and Britain’s Global Standing

On the “special relationship”, Hunt adopted a pragmatic view. “Diplomacy is a cold-hearted, transactional business,” he said. The US values the UK because it can rely on us as a military partner prepared to project force overseas.

He cited former President Trump’s remark that “Britain would come to America’s aid if it were attacked” as an important compliment.

Around the world, Hunt added, Britain continues to command respect for its role in creating the post-war international order. “People look to us, even more so when America appears unpredictable,” he said.

Restoring the Centre Ground

Asked whether the Conservative Party could return to the centre, Hunt gave a candid assessment. Moderate parties globally, he observed, have been losing elections. “We need to look in the mirror,” he said. “People must see that elected politicians can actually solve problems faster and better than we did in office.”

While upholding moderate values – strong public services, climate responsibility and international development – Hunt said the party must also show toughness and radicalism in tackling challenges like illegal migration. “We must be both compassionate and effective,” he said.

Migration, Openness and Britain’s Future

Hunt described illegal migration as the issue most undermining Britain’s traditional openness. “For centuries, this country has thrived by welcoming the brightest and best,” he said. “A third of our Nobel Prize winners were born abroad.”

But he warned that public trust in that openness is “fraying”, and mainstream parties must restore confidence by proving they can control borders. Only then could Britain remain open to talent, students and investment.

“If we want to protect the virtue that made us great, we must also show that we can control who comes here.”

Sir Jeremy Hunt

He called for reform of the European Convention on Human Rights if necessary and urged co-operation with France and the EU on practical solutions, similar to the EU–Turkey agreement that curbed crossings in 2016.

China, Democracy and Dialogue

Hunt reflected on his personal connection to China and the global contest between democracy and autocracy. “Xi Jinping would say autocracies are better because they make long-term decisions,” he said. “That’s the argument we must defeat.”

He advocated a twin-track approach: “We need both strength and dialogue.” Britain, he argued, must engage China to prevent conflict and address shared challenges like climate change and bioethics. “There’s no solution to global warming without China,” he noted. “And we must work with them to set limits on technologies such as gene editing.”

Europe’s Security and Economic Challenge

On European defence, Hunt said leaders had so far acted wisely – increasing military spending and avoiding trade wars with the US. However, he warned that Europe’s dependency on America stems from economic stagnation.

“If we want to defend ourselves without cutting public services, we must understand why Asia and North America grow faster than we do – and act on it.”

He urged both Britain and the EU to revive long-stalled reforms in planning, welfare and productivity.

On the Next Budget

Asked what he would do as Chancellor today, Hunt sympathised with Rachel Reeves but warned against further tax rises. “Higher taxes will simply reduce economic growth,” he said. Instead, he called for major welfare reform, a productivity overhaul in the NHS, and a renewed focus on technical education for non-graduates.

He concluded with characteristic clarity, “We know what to do – it’s about having the courage to do it.”

“A Dangerous World Needs Britain”

Closing the evening, CEF chair, Stephen Hammond praised Hunt for reaffirming core Conservative values – fiscal responsibility, fairness, compassion and international co-operation.

Hunt’s central message resonated with the audience; Britain remains capable of greatness if it combines economic discipline with moral confidence and works alongside allies who share its democratic ideals.

“This is not the moment to retreat,” Hunt said. “It’s the moment to remember who we are – and what we can do when we act with our friends to make the world safer and freer.”

To find out more about Sir Jeremy Hunt’s book, visit Swift Press.

Key elements of the Lib Dems’ motion include calling on the government to agree to a European Youth Mobility Scheme, immediately begin talks with Brussels on establishing a new UK-EU customs union, and secure associate membership of the European Defence Agency,

The motion also described the Lib Dems as the ‘only voices in parliament consistently and unashamedly’ calling for a closer relationship with the EU and said the best way to ensure such a relationship is by ensuring that as many Lib Dem MPs and councillors as possible are elected across Britain.

As well as calling for closer ties with the EU, today’s motion also called for Britain to ‘reduce (its) strategic dependence on an unpredictable President Trump.’ The US President was a prominent topic in the debates preceding this morning’s vote, with MP for Tunbridge Wells Mike Martin describing him as the ‘most unreliable’ partner Britain has ever had in the White House, and Hannah Betsworth from the Liberal Democrats in Europe group criticising his Secretary of Health Robert F Kennedy Jr for abandoning evidence-based standards.

Bettsworth also described the motion as a ‘no-brainer’ for the UK’s pharmaceutical industry, due to its demand for the British government to secure collaboration and mutual recognition agreements with European regulatory bodies, including the European Medicines Agency and European Chemicals Agency. She argued that the increased efficiency this would bring would help the UK maintain its status as a ‘global life sciences hub’ and ‘defend scientific expertise.’

The debates also made it clear that the Lib Dems believe that Brexit has been a disaster for the UK economy, with the party’s spokesperson for trade Clive Lewis MP claiming that the country’s future prosperity relies on closer relations with Brussels and arguing that red tape caused by the Conservative’s sub-par Brexit negotiations is ‘strangling’ British business.

Lewis claimed that cutting such red tape could generate £25 billion per year for the exchequer, whilst Councillor Richard Kirkpatrick cited the European Movement’s Business Impact Report which found that 97% of companies feel Brexit has been bad for their business and that 98% would support increased access to the single market.Today’s motion hopes to resolve these complaints by calling on the current government to immediately begin talks with on the establishment of a bespoke UK-EU Customs Union.

However arguably the most prominent topic of both the motion and the surrounding debates was defence, with it being the Lib Dems’ position that a closer defensive alliance with European nations is the key to protecting the continent from Russian aggression, at a time when, according to the arguably hyperbolic Mike Martin, the geopolitical landscape of Europe is arguably the worst it’s ever been.

Within the motion the Lib Dems criticise the UK government for failing to make progress on securing associate membership of the European Defence Agency and praise themselves for their efforts to establish a new European Rearmament Bank that would provide funding for defence programmes across Britain and the EU.

Additionally, to highlight just how much emphasis the Lib Dems are placing on national security, 3 of the motion’s 7 calls to action are directly related to the defence sector, with point 5 calling for the government to secure the aforementioned associate EDA member status, point 6 calling for the expansion of defensive co-operation with EU and NATO member states, and point 7 calling on Downing Street to commit to ‘recognise the importance of promoting stability in the Balkans’ by joining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Furthermore, one of the 2 amendments made to the motion criticised the government for failing to secure access to the EU’s Security Action for Europe fund; this amendment passed with an overwhelming majority.

Invited to speak during this morning’s debate was Edward Lucas, a journalist, security expert, and the man behind the aforementioned European Rearmament Bank proposal. He argued that Europe was at ‘5 minutes past midnight when it comes to…security’ and said that the continent had an ‘enormous task’ ahead when it comes to defending itself against ‘imperialist’ Russia.

Lucas also added that the USA was no longer a reliable defence partner for the UK, echoing a sentiment party leader Ed Davey displayed in an interview with PoliticsUK on Sunday, and thus they would not be welcome in his proposed bank, which he said would see rearmament efforts actually make Europeans safer, as opposed to merely doubling the share prices of arms manufacturers.

Overall, in passing this motion, the Liberal Democrats have sought to draw a dividing line between themselves and both the Conservative and Labour parties, positioning themselves as the most unequivocally pro-European force in British politics.

Today’s debates underlined how deeply the party sees closer cooperation with the EU as not only an economic necessity but also a strategic imperative in an increasingly unstable world. By tying together calls for deeper defence integration, increased life-sciences collaboration, and a new UK EU Customs Union, the Lib Dems are betting that voters share their belief that Britain’s future security and prosperity lie firmly in Europe, and that the long-term path inevitably leads back towards EU membership.

Deliveries will begin in 2030 and create a combined UK–Norwegian fleet of 13 modern ASW frigates operating jointly in Northern Europe.

The agreement is explicitly framed as a long‑term strategic partnership: Both governments stress the ships’ role in defending national sovereignty and enhancing mutual capabilities.

Strengthening relations amid growing tensions

The frigate partnership is centered on co‑owning and co‑operating identical UK‐built Type 26 ships. Both countries emphasize that these warships are “essential” for defending maritime sovereignty and countering submarine threats.

By fielding a common design, Norway and the UK can integrate training, logistics and tactics, while reducing costs and allowing joint maintenance and even crew swaps.

The Type 26 is explicitly designed for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), with both sides agreeing that the frigates will “significantly strengthen” NATO’s ability to patrol the North Atlantic and Arctic, helping to deter Russian threats.

A joint procurement also maximizes economies of scale. Building all ships in UK yards (BAE’s Clyde shipyard) keeps costs competitive, and the UK government notes this largest-ever warship export will sustain thousands of jobs, many of which are set to be in Glasgow, Scotland, supporting the city’s economy and restoring pride in the Clydeside shipyards, once a bastion of Labour support.

NATO and European Defense Context

The UK–Norway deal is explicitly framed as a boost to NATO and collective defense, bolstering the coallition’s northern front.

A united UK–Norwegian ASW fleet enhances NATO’s deterrence posture in the High North. As the MoD states, the joint frigates will enable allied navies “to detect, classify, track and defeat hostile submarines” in northern Europe.

Norway’s new frigates thus bolster the alliance’s capacity to safeguard undersea lines of communication and NATO member coastlines from submarine threats.

The partnership exemplifies NATO’s emphasis on standardized platforms among allies. Norway will be joined by Australia and Canada with their adoption of the Type 26, creating a “highly-integrated force” with shared logistics and training across the globe, expanding NATO’s advanced ASW reach beyond Europe.

The timing aligns with broader Western defense efforts. European NATO members have been urged to boost spending after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

This deal shows Norway meeting its NATO commitments by investing heavily in cutting-edge naval defenses, and the UK leveraging its defense industry in support of alliance security, solidifying its role as the heart of Starmer’s “coalition of the willing.”

Arctic and North Sea Security Implications

The deal has clear implications for Arctic and North Sea security. Norway’s geostrategic position – bordering Russia in the Arctic – makes ASW frigates crucial. Norway is NATO’s designated monitor of the vast North Atlantic patrol area used by Russia’s Northern Fleet submarines. Equipping Norway with Type 26s directly enhances surveillance around Svalbard, the Barents Sea and North Sea approaches.

The new frigates will be tasked with tracking Russian nuclear-powered submarines based on the Kola Peninsula. This supports NATO efforts to contain Russia’s undersea operational reach, attempting to prevent sabotage and espionage.

A major role they will play is contributing to the defence of undersea infrastructure (e.g. cables, pipelines) in the region, an emerging NATO concern after European gas pipelines and telecommunications equipment have been damaged in suspected espionage acts by Russia.

Industrial and Technological Collaboration

The partnership includes broad industrial offsets and tech cooperation, benefiting both defense sectors. Under the draft accord, UK defense companies must commit to work with Norwegian industry equal to the deal’s full value.

This means Norwegian firms are guaranteed substantial roles in frigate maintenance, upgrades and possibly production of parts. British sources note the deal will sustain about 4,000 UK jobs (over 2,000 in Scotland) and involve hundreds of UK suppliers. The agreement also opens opportunities for joint development of future upgrades like new sonar and unmanned or AI powered systems.

Final Thought

Politically, the frigate deal signals deepening UK–Norway alliance ties and a unified message to adversaries. Leaders on both sides frame it as reinforcing a historic partnership.

The UK stresses the deal as evidence of its global partnership strategy and its commitment to Ukraine through strengthening the coalition of the willing – creating jobs at home while bolstering collective security.

Each of these strategic objectives – from bolstering ASW defenses to cementing industrial ties – serves multiple purposes: Strengthening NATO’s Arctic maritime posture, deepening UK–Norway integration, and signaling Western resolve to both its allies, and its potential adversaries.

Featured image via MoD / BAE Systems / Tom Smith.

The funding is in place despite the Government’s longstanding policy of not providing funding for the manufacturing of munitions.

These include £465,307 in Leonardo UK Ltd and £250,000 in Raytheon Systems Ltd, two of the largest defence companies working in the UK.

The funding has been allocated through the Scottish Government’s economic development agency, Scottish Enterprise.

Three people were recently charged under terror laws for driving a van into the Edinburgh based Leonardo factory in protest against the firm’s alleged supply of laser technology to the Israeli military.

Various other protests have been staged at the facility since the escalation of conflict in October 2023 and an activist group, Shut Down Leonardo Edinburgh, has been established.

Responding to Politics UK, a Scottish Enterprise spokesperson said: “Our support for defence companies is consistent with Scottish and UK Government policies and guidance.

“We make it clear to those businesses, through legally binding contracts, that our help can only be used to deliver agreed projects in Scotland. None of the projects we support involve the manufacture of munitions.”

They also stated: “Our systems do not allow us to indicate which companies are directly involved in defence contracts”, but that none of the contracts involved the manufacturing of munitions.

The funding provided to the various companies detailed in the FOI response was based on their Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, which detail what sector they operate in.

Following a request for comment, Scottish Enterprise said: “Companies choosing to operate under these SIC codes may or may not be directly involved in defence related contracts.

“What we can confirm under FOI is that Scottish Enterprise funding provided to these companies was provided for specific projects at Scottish sites and did not include assistance for any projects related to the manufacture of munitions.”

The manufacturing of munitions are not part of Leonardo’s portfolio of activities in the UK, with electronic systems such as radars and infrared countermeasure devices being developed instead. However, activists argue that some of this technology is being used by Israel’s military in Gaza.

They also allege that components for munitions are manufactured in the UK by Raytheon as part of their global supply chain, supporting the development of weapons such as the Tomahawk long range land attack cruise missile and the Javelin portable anti-tank guided weapons system.

Responding to a request for comment, a Scottish Government spokesperson said: “We recognise the importance of the aerospace, defence and shipbuilding sectors to Scotland’s economy.

“However, the Scottish Government’s long-standing policy position is that neither the government nor its agencies should use public money to support the manufacture of munitions.”

The figures come following a public row between the Scottish and UK governments over the longstanding principle of not providing public money for the manufacturing of munitions in Scotland, which saw UK defence secretary John Healey accuse the SNP of “student union politics”.

Healey was responding to the report that a planned specialist welding training centre in Glasgow operated by Rolls Royce would not be eligible for Scottish Enterprise funding as a result.

The Labour Government has pledged to move to an “always on” capability for the manufacturing of munitions in the Strategic Defence Review, planning to open six new munitions factories, one of which would be in Scotland.

In response to the report that the planned welding skills centre may be under threat, Healey also said the Scottish Government was “not concerned about the skills base of Scotland or indeed the industry and innovation in the future because Scotland does have a big part to play in strengthening the industrial base as we will through more defence investment.”

While recognising the threats to national security posed by global events such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Scottish Rural Affairs Secretary Mairi Gougeon stressed the importance of maintaining “policy positions that we (the Scottish Government) have had for quite a long time.”

She told the BBC Scotland’s Sunday Show that “the project wasn’t eligible for funding because of the long standing policy position that we have that we do not provide or support the use of public funding for the manufacture of munitions.”

These events take place within the context of controversy following the allocation of £5.1 billion of public spending to the defence sector by the Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland (GERS) report for 2024-25.

This figure is in contrast with the £2.1 billion of defence procurement with Scottish industry by the UK Ministry of Defence. However it has been highlighted that this figure does not include wider defence expenditure such as the salaries of service personnel.

Leonardo and Raytheon have been approached for comment.

The headlines around AI in defence tend to focus on the dramatic: drones, autonomous weapons, or robot soldiers patrolling future battlefields. But the most important challenges posed by AI in the UK’s defence landscape are less visible and far more fundamental.

They speak to sovereignty, ethics, and long-term security, not just of systems, but of our strategic autonomy as a nation.

In the latest Strategic Defence Review (SDR), AI rightly features as a game-changing capability.

Yet while there’s plenty of emphasis on the potential of quicker decision-making and better logistics to improved threat detection, the conversation often skims over more uncomfortable questions.

Who owns the technology underpinning these tools? Can we trust it? And are we truly in control?

For AI to strengthen the UK’s national security, it must be more than powerful. It must be sovereign, ethical, and secure.

Sovereignty in the digital age

Defence sovereignty isn’t a new idea. It’s been central to our thinking for decades, particularly when it comes to nuclear deterrents, warships, and aircraft.

But as AI systems become embedded in the heart of military decision-making, we need to reimagine what sovereignty means in the digital age.

Right now, much of the world’s leading AI capability, especially in terms of foundational models and computing infrastructure, is in the hands of large multinational firms, many of them based in the US or China.

For routine commercial applications, that’s often a manageable risk. But in defence? It’s a different story.

Imagine a mission-critical logistics tool powered by an AI model built abroad, trained on data we can’t inspect and hosted on a server outside our legal jurisdiction.

That’s not just a data issue, it’s a sovereignty problem. When we don’t fully understand or control the systems underpinning our defence decisions, we open the door to risk, dependency, and even potential compromise.

This doesn’t mean the UK needs to start building every AI tool from scratch. But it does mean we need to be smart and strategic: Investing in our own compute capabilities, supporting homegrown AI innovation, and ensuring we maintain access, transparency, and control over any systems we deploy in a defence setting.

Ethics: Not just a nice-to-have

The ethical use of AI in defence isn’t just about maintaining our values, it’s also about operational integrity and legitimacy. In warfare, decisions carry immense weight.

Whether it’s selecting a target, prioritising resources, or identifying a potential threat, military leaders must be confident that their systems are reliable and explainable.

This is where “black box” AI becomes a real problem. If an algorithm makes a recommendation that can’t be explained – or worse, one that turns out to be wrong – this can erode trust in the system and in the leadership that relies on it.

The Ministry of Defence has begun to take steps to understand this, with principles around lawful and proportionate use of AI. But these principles need to be backed by robust oversight mechanisms, built-in accountability, and the ability to interrogate AI decisions when lives are on the line.

We also need to be honest about the pace of change. AI development is fast and getting faster. We can’t afford to bolt on ethics after the fact. Ethical considerations must be part of the design process from the very beginning and embedded in procurement decisions, testing, deployment, and training.

This is an area where the UK could take a real leadership role. A publicly stated Defence AI Ethics Charter, developed with partners across academia, industry, and civil society, could send a powerful signal about our intent to use AI in a responsible, human-centric way.

Security: The less glamorous, but critical challenge

We don’t talk enough about the cybersecurity risks that come with AI. As we integrate machine learning into more of our operational systems, we expose new attack surfaces, whether it’s data poisoning, adversarial attacks, or software supply chain threats.

AI is only as good as the data it’s trained on. If that data is compromised, the outputs will be too. Worse still, many AI tools today are trained on open datasets or third-party repositories that could introduce vulnerabilities without anyone noticing until it’s too late.

And it’s not just about malicious threats. There’s also the risk of over-reliance. In future contested environments – say, a GPS-denied battlefield or disrupted comms zone – our digital infrastructure could come under huge pressure. AI tools that are normally reliable might falter. Do we have contingency plans? Can we operate effectively if those systems fail?

Building resilience into our AI-enabled systems is as important as making them cutting-edge. That means planning for failure, designing in redundancy, and ensuring human operators can take back control when needed.

Where do We Go From Here?

The UK is well placed to shape the future of AI in defence – but only if we act decisively and thoughtfully. Here are five priorities I believe we must focus on

1. Secure Sovereign Capability: Invest in sovereign compute infrastructure and UK-developed AI models for defence use. Independence doesn’t mean isolation, it means strategic control.
   
2. Ethics at the Core: Make ethical design and oversight an integrated part of defence AI procurement and deployment. Don’t bolt it on after the fact.
   
3. Demand Explainability: Ensure that AI tools can justify their outputs in ways commanders can understand and act upon. Trust requires clarity.
   
4. Design for Resilience: Build systems that can operate in degraded environments and include clear, tested fallback protocols for when things go wrong.
   
5. Support Talent and Innovation: Grow the domestic AI talent pipeline – not just engineers, but also ethicists, legal thinkers, and digital strategists with defence literacy.

Artificial intelligence is not a silver bullet for defence, but it is a powerful tool that will shape the UK’s strategic edge for decades to come. Used wisely, AI can help us make faster, smarter decisions and better protect our interests at home and abroad.

But to realise that promise, we need more than ambition. We need a clear-eyed view of what it means to build AI that we can trust: AI that reflects our values, safeguards our sovereignty and strengthens our national security.

The UK has the opportunity to lead by example. Let’s make sure we take it.

Operation INTERFLEX, the codename for the training programme, was initially intended to conclude at the end of 2025.

Since the operation began, over 50,000 Ukranian troops have been trained on British soil, with 13 other nations supporting the programme.

The decision marks a celebration of Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union 34 years ago.

Marking the occasion, Defence Secretary John Healey, said:  “The UK is united for Ukraine.

“We will continue to step up our support alongside allies, so that Ukraine can defend today and deter tomorrow.

“In the face of ongoing Russian attacks, we must put Ukraine’s Armed Forces in the strongest possible position. And as the push for peace continues, we must make the Ukrainians into the strongest possible deterrent to secure that future peace.

“On this special day for the freedom and democracy of the Ukrainian people, we are ramping up and evolving our world-leading training support that has given more than 50,000 Ukrainians vital combat skills.

“This matters to Ukraine and it matters to Britain. A secure Ukraine is a secure Europe.

“From learning lessons from the battlefield to strengthen our own Armed Forces, to deepening our military industrial collaboration supporting jobs across the nation, Britain and Ukraine are growing closer than ever before.”

Celebrations across the UK are set for Ukrainian Independence Day, with an event planned with 2,000 Ukrainian and British troops and other attendees at one of the INTERFLEX training sites.

INTERFLEX began as a five week training programme, later being extended to a seven week programme aimed at boosting leadership and command skills for Ukranian officers.

The programme has been credited by the MoD for making 93 per cent of its trainees more confident that they could lead their troops to be more lethal in the field, and 83 per cent believed their troops would be better able to survive attacks thanks to their leadership training.

Artem, a Ukrainian soldier currently training on Operation INTERFLEX’s Platoon and Company Sergeants Course said: “I am very grateful to the UK for supporting the people of Ukraine in their struggle for independence and identity as a nation.

“I am grateful for the opportunity to take such courses, for the high level of professionalism of the instructors, their dedication to their work, and for their ability to organize both group training and find an individual approach to each of us.

“Instructors ensure that classes are conducted in conditions as close to real-life as possible, whether it be in trenches, in a forested area, or in an urban area.

“I learned how important it is to be prepared for coordinated actions in conditions of increased danger, how to properly coordinate personnel during defence, and planning offensive actions. I learnt how to survive in conditions of minimal support and improve first aid skills. “

Featured image via Ministry of Defence.